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ABSTRACT: This thesis aims to ‘reconstruct’ the concept of nonviolence, offering 
a new unifying and pluralistic definition, which rejects recent worrying uses of the 
term, and is able to deal with the crisis of democracy and the construction of a 
post-secular society. Currently nonviolence is split in two between principled and 
pragmatic nonviolence. This division has been successful, but it is now a problem: 
it divides means and ends, politics and morality, religion and politics. In order to 
find a way out we will turn to the Italian philosopher Aldo Capitini. He interpreted 
nonviolence as a tension, a praxis of liberation from the chains of reality and 
openness to the existent. This approach includes a pragmatic dimension, which 
is a logic reinterpreting current practices and inventing new ones to build up via 
facti a new society (omnicracy); and a principled dimension, which is a craft of 
integrating reality with values, reaching its peak in the connection with everybody 
in an action of value (compresence). This approach offers actions of protest-to-
project to overcome the division between means and ends; a political approach 
between ‘realism and serenity’ to overcome the division between politics and 
morality; an open religion which can work at the centre of society and politics. 
Finally, we will extend Capitini’s reflection claiming that nonviolence as praxis is 
a non-systematic revolutionary approach aiming at freedom and plurality. We will 
add that this praxis is impure, because made of less than perfect actions 
performed in a very imperfect environment by imperfect human beings. 
Reconceiving nonviolence as impure praxis will allow us to reunite principled and 
pragmatic nonviolence, reinterpreting the former as actualisation of a public 
principle and the latter as a phronesis. This interpretation will offer an interesting 
form of transformative realism, which enriches via facti any democratic order with 
life, and show the way to overcome the secular divisions towards a post-secular 
society centred on the Assisi presumption. 
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Preface 
 
This dissertation started by chance, but it revealed to be the necessary end of a 
coherent journey started in Milan some years ago. The choice to work on 
nonviolence, and in particular on Aldo Capitini, came from the precious encounter 
with Claudio Radaelli. He introduced me to the world of nonviolence, and he 
provided me with trust, guidance, understanding, encouragement and friendship. 
Without him, this work would not have been possible. 
Before focusing on nonviolence, my interests revolved around concepts such as 
peace and just war. These are very well-established topics. Instead, since I 
started to work on nonviolence, I had to deal with a completely different situation. 
Nonviolence is a recent and quite mistreated concept, which achieved already a 
lot in practical terms, but still suffers a chronic lack of theoretical analyses (and 
debates). Besides, I found that the literature on nonviolence was almost 
completely ignored by mainstream political theory. This was definitely the sign 
that a much more comprehensive work was needed.  
In this journey, I found in Aldo Capitini the perfect guide and help. His formation, 
influence and style are at the same time very Italian and very international. He 
represents an interesting mix of various Italian schools of thought, from the 
Actualism of Gentile, to existentialism of Baglietto, to the school of Milan of 
Martinetti, Preti and Dal Pra. At the same time, these very deep roots do not limit 
his thought. Capitini is part of an international dialogue on how to work for a better 
and more pacific world. At the centre of this international drive, we find the 
concept of nonviolence, which he marvellously described as something neither 
only for saints, nor for cowards.  
This was the best starting point for a student who received his training in 
philosophy in Milan, with a strong phenomenological blueprint, but found himself 
in a political science department of the UK, with different concerns and 
sensibilities. The result is in my view a very interdisciplinary work, which tries to 
speak to everybody without closing down into one tradition. 
This interdisciplinary work is also a mix of help from very different scholars 
coming from very diverse backgrounds, who I want to thank. I would like to thank 
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dr. Andrew Shaap for his precious help. He showed me what is expected from a 
political theorist through the many suggestions and criticisms to the (many) 
versions of this work. I would also like to thank prof. Mario López Martínez for the 
many discussions we had while I was Visiting Researcher at the University of 
Granada, and prof. Antonino Drago of the University of Pisa for the email 
exchange we had, in which he offered important suggestions on early drafts of 
the thesis. At the same time, I would like to thank prof. Massimo Parodi of the 
University of Milan. This dissertation is inevitably the result of the many 
discussions I had with him during my years in Milan.  
All this work, training and network would have been impossible without the help 
of my family. No word of this dissertation would have been written without 
Alessandro, Rosanna and Giampietro, who I should thank for their endless faith 
in me and providing all the help and support I needed to realise my ambitions. 
Also, I thank Tania Risoleo for all the care, encouragement, patience and love. 
They represent the bedrock upon which all my life and work are built. 
The result of this journey lies in the following pages, which I hope will represent 
the basis for future research and work. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The opposite of foot is what? 
A mountain top’s one answer, but 
If you are thinking of a bed, 
The opposite of foot is head. 
To ancient generals, of course, 
The opposite of foot is horse. 
Richard Wilbur, Opposites 
 
 
The poems of Wilbur are perhaps the best way to describe the varying 
connotations that can be derived from the meaning of a simple term. His poems 
on the opposites are meant to be for children, but they reveal an important lesson 
for everybody. Each word he uses, even the most common and apparently 
unambiguous term, like ‘foot’, finds itself always in use, in new and unexpected 
plays with other words. And in the play of life, words arise, change in meaning, 
and play with different opposites, are frequently used, or die. This word interplay 
underlies a war, a real struggle for the term’s existence. This struggle leads us 
back to the words of Heraclitus. With the famous sentence, “we must know that 
war [polemos] is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into 
being through strife necessarily,” the Greek philosopher reminds us of the worldly 
features in which this struggle takes place. This world is far from immutable and 
stable; it is a flux, in a cosmos interpreted as fire, as energy in endless 
transformation. The harmony of the world does not lie in the conciliation of 
opposites, which would lead to dead quiet, but in a continuous struggle between 
them. The being is the result of this struggle, in perfect adherence to the logos, 
the universal law that governs our existence.  
In this play, or struggle, it happens that the many different circumstances of 
everyday life constantly create and destroy words and meanings. Nevertheless, 
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some words are less in danger than others. Indeed, the struggle has witnessed 
the frequent presence of dominant terms, which have been defined and redefined 
in positive ways, overshadowing their many and changing opposites, which tend 
to be defined exclusively as their negation. Sometimes, the dominion of a term is 
persistent and crystal-clear. Most of the time this is due to the fact that the 
dominant term is also the one that is considered more important, and it is very 
difficult to change what has been solidified by habit.  
In some cases, the dominion of one term is so deep that a classic opposite does 
not even exist. This has been the case with the term violence. Violence is an 
extremely vague word. Ricoeur claimed that the term violence has two extremes: 
murder and the ‘strength of nature’, which cannot be tamed by man: fire, 
hurricane, flood, avalanche, even death. Right in the middle of these two 
extremes we find human violence.  
“His violence has aspects of the hurricane and of the murder: on the side of the 
hurricane, it is the violence of desire, of fear, and of hate; on the side of murder, 
it is the will to dominate the other man, the attempt to deprive him of freedom or 
of expression, it is racism and imperialism” (Ricoeur, 1998:32).  
The vagueness of this term meant that finding its exact opposite is an act of 
desperation. A long list of opposites have been provided, including peace, order, 
good, democracy, meaning, love, civilisation, or even being. Many of the actual 
definitions of violence are so attenuated that the term began to include almost 
everything, however insignificant the action. 
However, the dominion of a term is never absolute; new opposites and new terms 
may unexpectedly appear. This was the case when a new term appeared in the 
West in the 1920s: nonviolence. Since its birth, this term struggled for its 
existence and recognition, and it is now at the dawn of another struggle. The first 
battle that the term nonviolence went through was against the dominion of 
violence in the context of decolonisation. The key player in this struggle was 
Gandhi. He provided the West with a new method, theory, as well as with a new 
vocabulary that included the word, nonviolence. He did this notwithstanding two 
facts: Firstly, the only certainty about Gandhi is that he was not a systematic 
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writer1. Gandhi himself did not even use the term ‘nonviolence’ in South Africa; 
rather, he only adopted it “occasionally after his return to India in 1915” 
(Hardiman, 2013:47). Secondly, “his precise activities were long enveloped in a 
curtain of ignorance and misunderstanding,” as for years it remained difficult to 
establish what Gandhi did (Scalmer, 2011:39). In spite of these facts, nonviolence 
emerged as a profound and flexible notion, which survived and is still widely used.  
This notion is the direct translation of the Sanskrit ahimsa, which means, literally, 
absence of desire to harm and kill. Hardiman claimed that ahimsa has been used 
mainly in the context of refusing to carry out animal sacrifices, and more 
generally, to harm animals in any way. However, this refusal is backed by the 
wider traditional idea of himsa, or violence, present in many of the different 
oriental religions. This term encompasses any form of harming or injuring to any 
living being. Violence is both a physical phenomenon and a reality of the mind. It 
follows that violence is considered an ever-present aspect of life, as total 
avoidance is almost impossible. Instead, it is possible and required in different 
degrees by Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, to follow a natural law or ethical 
principle to make “one’s footprint in the world as infinitesimal as possible,” 
practicing “a variety of forms of nonattachment to body and world” (Mantena, 
2012a:459).  
This struggle can take different forms and degrees. In Jainism, the ethical 
imperative of ahimsa has always been dominant, taking also extreme forms, such 
as wearing masks to avoid inhaling any living thing flying in the air (Jahanbegloo, 
2014:19), because of the conviction that every living being should be treated with 
respect. In Hinduism, the concept of ahimsa was present, but it became very 
important only with Gandhi. This term was important in the path of individual 
liberation (moksa), and it was linked to the ‘greatest duty’ present in everyone, 
the internal law to achieve good. Instead, in Buddhism ahimsa was (and still is) 
the feeling of compassion for the whole universe, which is key to destroy the 
causes of suffering and to develop spiritually (Dalai Lama, 2001). 
Gandhi was heavily influenced by these ideas. However, he was also aware of 
the fact that more direct forms of violence were merely the tip of the iceberg; 
                                                          
1 The vast body of Gandhi’s writing consists of opinions, mainly in the form of short sermons to 
those who sought his advice, or short statements in reply to critics. 
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beneath the surface there festered torture, starvation, and exploitation, which he 
witnessed firsthand in South Africa and India. There was the violence associated 
with the British state, with the imposition of its system of education, along with its 
model of civilization, and even ‘other and more insidious forms of himsa’ such as 
harsh words, judgments, ill-will, anger, lust for cruelty (Gandhi, [1928] 1999:59).  
Ahimsa, as conceived by the tradition, is a partial answer to such an extended 
concept of himsa. It involves a personal journey of purification and development 
in two directions: the self and the other. Indeed, ahimsa is the way to achieve full 
conversion and purification of the self. At the same time, it is also the way to 
acquire peaceful coexistence with others. In other words, ahimsa is both a 
process of knowledge of the self, especially of the personal interconnectedness 
to the entire world, and a process of conduct with others, a practice of living. 
However, something was missing. Gandhi inherited this theory, but he also added 
something more in the light of his anti-colonisation struggles. His broader 
conceptualisation of violence could not have reduced ahimsa only to a process 
of self-purification based on the refusal to hurt and kill. Ahimsa began to focus 
more on the relation with the other; it started to involve qualities of “respect and 
sympathy for the opponent, freedom from anger, and a desire for peace” 
(Hardiman, 2003:58). In other words, Gandhi added a political dimension to the 
concept of ahimsa. He put this concept at the centre of the political struggles 
against racial prejudice in South Africa and colonization in India. Thus, 
nonviolence started to imply real mass struggles, along with techniques such as 
marches, strikes, hunger-strikes, acts of non-cooperation, and more. He even 
envisaged a peace army called Shanti Sena that would resolve conflicts non-
violently. From the inspiration of Gandhi, the idea of ahimsa changed its meaning 
forever.  
The consequence of the innovations of Gandhi is that nonviolence started to be 
a complex and powerful political concept, which closely related with other terms, 
in particular satyagraha, swaraj, sarvodaya, and constructive programme. The 
struggles of the Mahatma are sometimes also called Satyagraha. This concept 
was coined in 1908 by Gandhi to describe the South-African campaigns2. 
                                                          
2 Gandhi started the search for a new term, different from the general one of passive resistance, 
asking for suggestions from his supporters through the South African newspaper Indian Opinion. 
After a few unsatisfactory responses, a reader proposed ‘sadagraha’, meaning truth (sat) and 
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Unfortunately, satyagraha has never been a settled idea (Jahanbegloo, 2013:24). 
Gandhi admitted that he had no set theory to go by: “I am myself daily growing in 
the knowledge of Satyagraha. I have no textbook to consult in time of need” 
(Gandhi, [1938] 1999:41). Even the relation with the concept of ahimsa is 
confused because sometimes they are synonyms (Gandhi, [1938] 1999:42), 
while other times the former refers to actual struggles, while the latter to a 
principle.  
Turning to swaraj and sarvodaya, the former term means a complex process of 
self-rule or autonomy, which invests both the individual and the society3. It 
became central especially when Gandhi began to look at India. Self-rule was for 
Gandhi the logical conclusion of the Satyagraha. However, autonomy and self-
rule is possible only when everybody is on board, which is the key concern of the 
concept of Sarvodaya. This principle comes from sarvo, meaning one and all, 
and uday, meaning welfare or uplift, and it meant the welfare of all, the awakening 
of all, the autonomy of communities and individuals4.  
Finally, the acknowledgment of the many forms that violence takes, the ability of 
self-rule, along with the conviction that individual good cannot be distinguished 
from the good of others, were backed by the conviction that a retreat from the 
world is not a solution. A good deal of work and creative effort is required. In more 
precise terms, what is needed is a ‘constructive programme’, the ‘complete 
independence by truthful and non-violent means’. Nagler explains that 
constructive programme happens “where you create things and make corrections 
                                                          
firmness (agraha) in Sanskrit. Gandhi liked the idea, and slightly changed the word into 
Satyagraha, meaning clinging to truth, in order to make the meaning of his campaigns clearer. 
3 Swaraj should not be interpreted as mere independence of India. Self-rule means a lot more. It 
means first “government of the self”; it is the slow process of learning to rule oneself, to become 
truly independent. Then, the process of swaraj concerns the family, because “if joint families, i.e., 
families enjoying self-government, become divided through family quarrels, how can we be 
considered fit for swaraj?”GANDHI, M. K. [1917] 1999. Speech at Gujarati Political Conference-I. 
The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Electronic Book). New Dehli: Government of India.119. 
After the family, swaraj requires important changes within the caste, the city, and the state. For 
what concerned India, the process included the retreat of the British. However, it also meant a 
slow and difficult process of building up a different society, in which citizens are autonomous, 
independent, and their self-realization is not hindered. 
4 The word was the direct translation of The Welfare of All by Ruskin, which Gandhi read in 1904. 
He was so impressed by the ideas espoused in the book that Gandhi reported them in his 
Experiments, claiming that he was ready to change his life on the basis of these ideals. In 
particular, he referred to three tenets: the good of the individual is contained in the good of all; a 
lawyer’s work has the same value as the barber’s, as all have the same right of earning their 
livelihood from their work; a life of labour, such as the one of the tiller of the soil or the 
handicraftsman, is the life worth living. 
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in and on your own community,” and it is complementary to the obstructive 
programme, which takes place “where you refuse to put up with others’ attempts 
to weaken or exploit you” (Nagler, 2004:160). It is a work “not made to assert 
propositions, but to create possibilities” (Bondurant, 1988:VII). 
Gandhi played an important role in the birth of the term nonviolence as we now 
use it. With the concepts of constructive programme, sarvodaya, swaraj, 
satyagraha and ahimsa, Gandhi created a vocabulary of nonviolence, even 
though these terms were complex, quite vague and continuously mutating5. 
Nevertheless, as soon as this term entered the Western world, nonviolence had 
to face another struggle: the reduction of its meaning to terms belonging to the 
Western tradition6. The tendency of the first works on the topic was to associate 
Gandhi's struggle and the term nonviolence with more common terms belonging 
to Western tradition. At the beginning it was associated with concepts such as 
passive resistance (Case, 1923:355) and civil disobedience. The problem of the 
former was that the term conventionally signified “a method of the ‘weak’ or 
‘helpless’, merely forced into supplication by the absence of arms or the 
restriction of the ballot” (Scalmer, 2011:73). Likewise, the connotation of passivity 
shadowed the intense activity of Gandhi’s campaigns, which were different from 
past Western passive campaigns that encompassed acts of destruction. Instead, 
civil disobedience, which was linked to Henry David Thoreau’s essay Resistance 
to Civil Government of 18497, was deemed to be inadequate due to the fact that 
a ‘deliberate opposition to the law’ was for Gandhi only a particular form of non-
violent protest (Scalmer, 2011:82). Furthermore, this term made a terrible 
                                                          
5 As Hardiman claims, “by extending ahimsa into the sphere of politics, and then translating it into 
English in the context of such a practice, Gandhi created a new political language for the English-
speaking world” (Hardiman, 2013:46). 
6 The first medium through which westerners knew about Gandhi's deeds was the press. Then, 
various biographies of Gandhi have been written. In particular: Charles Freer Andrews, Mahatma 
Gandhi: His own Story, London: Allen & Unwin, 1930; Romain Rolland, Mahatma Gandhi: the 
Man who Became One with the Universal Being, New York and London: The Century Co. 1924; 
Glorney Bolton, The Tragedy of Gandhi, London: Allen & Unwin, 1932; Haridas T. Mazumdar, 
Gandhi versus the Empire, New York: Universal Pub. Co., 1932. Besides press and biographies, 
the term has been used in pacifist works. On this field, it is worth looking at: Devere Allen, The 
Fight for Peace, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930; Bennett, Scott H., Radical Pacifism: The 
War Resisters League and Gandhian Nonviolence in America, 1915-1963, Syracuse: SUNY, 
2003. 
7 In this essay, the American author denounced the corruption of the government, and advocated 
the withdrawal of support from a tyrannical government, which still allows slavery. 
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weapon of Gandhi’s struggle, which became a ‘new technique of revolution’8. 
These common but problematic translations led Gandhi to coin another term to 
describe his experience in South Africa, satyagraha. Unfortunately, the new term 
only prompted more debates on the right translation and interpretation9, with 
similar attempts of assimilation to existing categories (Scalmer, 2011:79). Indeed, 
satyagraha has been translated as passive resistance or a ‘resentful fatalism’. 
Finally, both non-violence and satyagraha have also been associated with a term 
belonging to Christian pacifism, ‘non-resistance’10. Unfortunately, the translation 
suggested an “almost complete inertia”; it was a declaration of withdrawing from 
the world (Scalmer, 2011:82), as well as in extreme cases of repudiation by the 
individual of politics, the state, and even the entire civilization (Sibley, 1943:447).  
The concept of nonviolence managed to successfully overcome this first battle 
for its existence. Gandhi’s efforts were not lost. Nonviolence survived the 
reduction to passive resistance, civil disobedience and non-resistance, and this 
concept began to be used in the West. In particular, it started to be used by 
activists and pacifists. Unfortunately, nonviolence did not have a lot of time to 
celebrate its triumph; within a few years, it entered into a second important battle 
for existence. Indeed, WWII and later the Cold War revealed the limits of 
nonviolence. What can nonviolence offer against ruthless dictators? Many started 
to acknowledge that nonviolence was possible within a democratic regime, or at 
least in dealing with a democratic power like the UK, but what about tyrants? The 
two scholars who symbolize this second struggle of nonviolence are Johan 
Galtung and later, Gene Sharp. The two had very different views on nonviolence, 
but at the time, this was a strength.  They showed that nonviolence was actually 
at work in resisting Nazism, and that it can make a key contribution to situations 
of conflict in order to avoid the dangerous spiral of violence and blood. They made 
of nonviolence an interesting answer against the dominion of dictators, 
exploitation, and imperialism, allowing it even to enter the world of academia. 
                                                          
8 Scalmer admits that “while the terms ‘passive resistance’ and ‘non-resistance’ wrongly 
reimagined the Mahatma’s methods as harmless inactivity, the discourse of Thoreau blinded 
Westerners to Gandhi’s insistence on love and peace” (Scalmer, 2011:85). 
9 In the United Kingdom, one popular translation of the new term was ‘non-violent resistance’; 
Americans preferred ‘non-violent direct action’. Instead, in his 1934 The Tragedy of Gandhi, 
Glorney Bolton equated the term to ‘non-violence’. A fourth group even rejected the idea of 
translating, while others translated it literally as soul-force. 
10 Here the term traced back to Adin Ballou’s work Christian non-resistance, to Tolstoy’s writings, 
and other studies on the topic In particular, see: Lanz, H. (1926), The Doctrine of Non-Resistance 
and its Antithesis, International Journal of Ethics, 37(1):53-66. 
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Thanks to them, nonviolence managed to break the silence which lasted at least 
40 years, especially in the realm of political science academia. More and more 
books as well as articles were published using this term. They even made of 
nonviolence a sub-field in many different areas, such as ethics, peace studies, 
social movement studies, and strategic studies. 
This success came with a cost. The cost was the internal split of the term. Indeed, 
there are nowadays two different conceptions of nonviolence. On the one hand, 
nonviolence is a set of techniques of action. On the other, nonviolence is a 
principle to be implemented in every moment of life. In the 1964 article by 
Galtung, the division was already there. For the Norwegian scholar nonviolence 
is a specific kind of way to influence other groups. He proposed thinking of 
nonviolence as negative or positive (Galtung, 1965:232). The former includes “all 
efforts – short of bodily incapacitation of any kind to influence the other party by 
trying to make it more difficult for him to perform actions a non-violent group is 
against”. This certainly contains the flow of violence in the world, but it does not 
face directly frustration and injustice. Instead, positive nonviolence aims to 
construct something new and different, as it includes “any effort, again short of 
bodily manipulation, to make it more easy for the other party to perform the 
actions the non-violence group would favour”(Galtung, 1992). Nine years later, 
the split became definitive with the seminal work of Gene Sharp. He divided 
principle from techniques of action, and on this distinction he built up the 
categories of pragmatic and principled nonviolence. This division, and in 
particular the currently dominant approach of Sharp, is at the basis of the recent 
success of the concept of nonviolence.  
 
This thesis starts from here. The aim is to ‘reconstruct’ nonviolence. At first 
glance, it may look a paradox. Why change a concept which was at the foundation 
of the recent success? At this time, more and more academics are talking about 
nonviolence, so why should we change its definition now? This thesis is obviously 
not the first critical work to the present dominant approach to nonviolence. 
Indeed, we will see that others expressed their doubts about the ambiguity 
(Smith, 1969), inexistence (Yoder, 2010), and full realisation (Miller, 1966) of such 
a radical division. Nevertheless, nobody went beyond particular criticisms.  
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Here we believe that there are at least three reasons at the basis of this urgency. 
The first reason is that it is indeed true that more academics are talking about 
nonviolence, but how are they referring to it? Recently we have witnessed more 
and more creative and worrying uses of the term, which do not have much in 
common with the Gandhian complex mixture of impressive personal 
commitments as well as ingenious tactics and strategies of struggle. The meaning 
of the term is so volatile that some devised very debatable interpretations. Apart 
from the fact that still too many times the term non-violence or nonviolence is 
merely described in negative terms, as absence of violence11, there is something 
more. For instance, Lawrence and Karim put Gandhi and nonviolence under a 
section called ‘The Other of Violence’, along with Malcolm X and Hitler (Lawrence 
and Karim, 2007). But the situation can be worse. Some talk of “non-violent forms 
of right wing extremism” (Briggs and Goodwin, 2012), by which they mean very 
violent and discriminatory groups which simply do not pose immediate threat to 
national security (Goodwin and Ramalingam, 2012). Others even talk of 
‘nonviolent extremism’. This is the case of David Cameron, who at the UN 
General Assembly coined the term to refer to groups such as Nazis, Klu Klux 
Klansmen, or terrorists who incite hatred and intolerance in schools, universities 
and prisons (Cameron, 2014). This term has now seen use in academia (Schmid, 
2014). In addition, other terms are already widely used in academia, such as ‘non-
violent crimes’ and ‘nonviolent offenders’. These terms refer to crimes such as 
theft, burglary, vandalism, fraud, drug use, which should be distinguished from 
physical assault, threatening behaviours, robberies and other offences of 
possessing an offensive weapon (Durose and Mumola, 2002).  
To the contrary, some instead think of nonviolence as something simply being 
passé, like Tony Blair recently. Nonviolence is something which has perhaps 
been useful, but now it is better to look somewhere else (Sinha, 2013), completely 
ignoring the many ongoing nonviolent struggles around the world. These 
connotations trigger a question: how is it possible that a word with such a complex 
and rich meaning is used in this way?  
                                                          
11 UNESCO’s Programme of Action on Culture of Peace and Non-violence backs a wide and 
important understanding of the concept of peace, but adopts non-violence as a corollary, adopting 
quite a general understanding of it, meaning basically absence of violence, or reason as the 
opposite of violence for the philosopher Muller. 
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We believe that a theoretical reason is deeply linked to such a confusion. The 
current definitions helped nonviolence to become a sub-field in many areas of 
study, but we missed the underlying thread that keeps united these different 
efforts. Now we need to reunite the field under a new progressive and pluralistic 
conception of nonviolence. With the term ‘reunite’ we do not simply mean helping 
the exchange between scholars with different interests, which use the term 
nonviolence. At the same time, we do not mean imposing a new single method 
of studying nonviolence, which should be considered better than the others. By 
reuniting nonviolence, we mean that a new conception of this term should be 
found, which is able to explain actual discrepancies without breaking the concept 
in smaller ones. There should be a way to include in the same concept of 
nonviolence the many different (and sometimes contrasting) uses of this term. 
Why is fragmentation a problem? The problem is that the actual fragmentation 
risks being degenerative, in the sense of being an attempt to explain the 
discrepancies in the use of the term in a way that leads to lose the complexity of 
the Gandhian notion of nonviolence (as well as the complexity of the works of 
other key nonviolent actors like Martin Luther King Jr. or San Suu Kyi), opening 
up more opportunities for further worrying uses of the term. In the division, there 
is a split between the vertical tension towards self-rule, autonomy, and the 
horizontal one of openness to the other, to the ‘welfare of all’. Thus, the 
complexity of Gandhi’s nonviolence is reduced by this division, which conveys 
less than the more dynamic Gandhian approach. This paves the way to new 
specific definitions of nonviolence, which restrict even more the potential of the 
concept and further fragment the field. The problem is to find a unique and more 
progressive conception, which is able to explain actual discrepancies with a core 
unifying interpretation, framework, platform; to include existent uses of the term 
as corollaries, as contextualised instances of that concept; and to foster new uses 
and research. Thus, further reflections are needed if we want nonviolence to 
become a reunited and thus progressive field of research.  
At the same time, unity has to go hand in hand with plurality. Indeed, there is the 
need to pursue a pluralistic approach of nonviolence, able to account for many 
different systems of values and beliefs. The actual dominant paradigm seems to 
allow everybody to talk about nonviolence. What actually happened is that it 
ended up being repressive of ideologies and beliefs. Indeed, values, principles 
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and beliefs are not merely equally considered (making of nonviolence something 
that is compatible with any sorts of beliefs), but they are equally excluded from 
the key political category of pragmatic nonviolence, and relegated to the one ad-
hoc category of principled nonviolence. Instead, the aim of this thesis is to offer 
a more progressive and at the same time pluralistic concept of nonviolence, which 
is able to free discussions on values, finding the way in which a serious analysis 
of values may be united with more scientific and value-free approaches. In other 
words, we have to look for a reconciling pluralistic approach, which does not 
exclude or implicitly ‘repress’ ideologies in the name of a more scientific and 
value-free approach. To sum up the two points, can we imagine a new definition 
of nonviolence which manages to reach an equilibrium between unity and 
plurality? 
Finally, the last reason for going back to debate the meaning of nonviolence is 
historical. The historical conditions which were the successful basis of Sharp’s 
definition are changing fast. In particular, nonviolence is now required to face two 
challenges. The first is the crisis of democracy. The dreams of democratisation 
have to face the many challenges that democracy is facing, which led some 
scholars to talk about the crisis or ‘winter’ of democracy. The second challenge 
is to open up a new chapter in the relationship with religion. In other words, 
nonviolence has to reconsider the role and importance of religion for its own 
meaning and in the XXI century. The recent acknowledgment that it was a 
delusion to believe that religion disappeared in the Western and democratic world 
opened up a debate on the role of religion in a future post-secular society. 
Thus, new and worrying uses of the term, the urgency of creating a unified and 
pluralistic political concept, and a changing historical environment require a 
sweeping answer. This thesis wants to contribute to this debate reconstructing 
the concept of nonviolence. In other words, this thesis endeavours to propose a 
different definition of nonviolence. This definition should defend what has been 
achieved up to now, but it should also build a bridge between the principled and 
pragmatic dimensions in order to face these new concerns. We believe that this 
strife is a way to avoid dangerous paths taken by the meaning of the term 
recently, and reunite the field, allowing nonviolence to fully ‘come into being’ as 
an autonomous and dominant political concept. 
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The ‘reconstructed’ nonviolence can be neither a principle nor a technique of 
action. Instead, we will reinterpret nonviolence as an impure praxis, an ideology, 
a non-systematic revolutionary approach enhancing freedom and plurality. This 
definition allows us to reinterpret the ‘principled’ dimension no more as a principle 
to be always implemented, but as the bottom-up actualisation of a principle in an 
excellent action. In the same vein, the ‘pragmatic’ dimension does not look at 
techniques, but at practices, and it generates phronesis, an art of judgment. In 
this way, principled and pragmatic nonviolence become complementary aspects 
of the same praxis, which reinterprets and shape current practices in society, as 
well as introduce new ones.  
The result is that nonviolence returns to be an articulated but united political 
system of concepts, a political ideology which avoids being reduced to everything 
but physical violence as well as to a dogmatic rejections of violence. At the same 
time, unity does not endanger plurality because our conception is compatible with 
many (but not all indiscriminately) values and belief systems, without being well-
suited for notions such as nonviolent extremisms, offenders, or crimes.  
Finally, this new conception will definitely be able to face the changing historical 
environment. Indeed, the complexity and dynamicity of the Gandhian effort is 
preserved in a project of transformative realism aiming at integrating life into the 
decaying democratic order, human aspiration in the architecture of the state.  
With this project, religion is not left aside. Indeed, the impure praxis of 
nonviolence includes actions of freedom and plurality of an ‘open religion’ as the 
most pure and extreme of its actions. This is an opportunity for religions, as it 
shows that the actual Westphalian presumption can be turned upside-down, 
constructing what we called the Assisi Presumption, the conviction that religious 
‘excellent actions’ of freedom and plurality are not only compatible but necessary 
for the development of democracy and a real post-secular society.    
 
Methodology 
The attempt to ‘reconstruct nonviolence’, offering a new united and pluralistic 
definition, required many methodological choices, which should be explained. For 
a start, this thesis will not focus on violence, and it will not focus on the 
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relationship between violence and nonviolence. This choice may be considered 
a hazard. If this thesis was focused on violence, there would have been no need 
perhaps to justify why its supposed opposite was not going to be considered in-
depth; the dominion of the term violence is evident. Nevertheless, the reasons for 
this choice are the following. To begin, the literature on the topic of violence is 
immense, and a consistent analysis of the topic would require perhaps another 
thesis12. Even if we look only at the field of nonviolence, there are already a great 
amount of studies which start with important and interesting analyses of 
violence13, as well as many valid introductions dealing with the more classical 
and generic theses against the idea of a full rejection of violence because utopian, 
sterile, or reactionary, such as those of Marx, Sorel, and Fanon14. We will build 
partly on them, with the idea that a further study on the same issue of the 
interconnection between violence and nonviolence would hardly be innovative, 
and would divert the attention from the more urgent problems outlined above. In 
addition, the vast majority of the literature agrees that violence is more than 
physical violence, even though they disagree on the extent and on which typology 
is correct. Some authors rightly and effectively focus on the latter (Sharp, 1973a), 
but there is consensus on the fact that there are many forms of violence, such as 
psychological or symbolic. A further critique of the many typologies may be 
useful, but it is not the main concern here. We can even say that the problem is 
the opposite. The literature on nonviolence realised very well the vagueness and 
extent of the concept of violence. The problem is that excessive reliance on a 
                                                          
12 Violence is one of the topics most widely studied in every period of time. The contemporary era 
witnessed key works, such as ‘Reflections on Violence’ by Sorel; the chapter ‘Critique of Violence’ 
by Benjamin; the book ‘On Violence’ by Arendt. Between the many most recent studies on the 
topic, it may be important to mention the following works: the articles Violence and Revolutionary 
Subjectivity: Marx to Žižek’ and ‘Hannah Arendt’s Critique of Violence by Christopher Finlay, and 
On Politics and Violence: Arendt contra Fanon by Elisabeth Frazer; the books Violence and 
Democracy by John Keane, On Violence by Slavoj Žižek.    
13 Most of the literature around nonviolence starts with in-depth analysis of violence. Here is worth 
mentioning the ideas of vertical and horizontal violence by De Ligt; the many studies on 
aggression, as well as on direct, structural and symbolic violence by Galtung; the analysis by 
Giuliano Pontara (1978), The Concept of Violence Journal of Peace Research, 15:19-32; 
Bondurant, J.V. (1971), Conflict: Violence and Nonviolence, Transaction Publishers. 
14 Look for instance at Introduction to Nonviolence by Jahanbegloo, who provided us with an 
account of the classical critiques to the rejection of violence. It is true that today some techniques 
of action considered in the past as violence, such as the general strike, are part of the world of 
nonviolence. Nevertheless, the issue is more profound and this thesis will try to address this issue, 
even if only indirectly. Another introduction to the relation between violence and nonviolence, in 
which the difficulties of a clear distinction are listed, is provided by Hallward and Norman in 
chapter 2 of Hallward, M. C. and Julie M. Norman (eds.) 2014, Understanding Nonviolence, 
Cambridge:Polity, p. 22-26. 
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vague term may become a hindrance to the full development of the idea of 
nonviolence.  
The defence to our choice of not focusing on violence may even be pressed 
further, questioning the whole idea of opposing violence to nonviolence. Are we 
sure that violence is the opposite of nonviolence? The first battle for existence 
cannot be reduced to the emergence of a simple and empty opposite, and it is 
not by chance that the tradition of nonviolence seems to be quite confused on the 
issue. On the one hand, most of the studies start with a certain idea of what is 
violence, whether physical and direct or indirect and systemic. Nevertheless, 
nonviolence has been opposed to many other concepts, which are different from 
violence, even if related with it. For example, the opposite of nonviolence has 
been identified with fear, hatred, cowardice, exploitation, or imperialism.  
Besides, nonviolence seems most of the time to fail to be a real opposite of 
violence. For instance, even looking at the key activity of nonviolence, self-
suffering, it is clear that the relation between violence and nonviolence is 
complex. Indeed, self-suffering is violence against the self, and many times 
against the other as well. While the fact that it is violence against the self does 
not require illustrations, the fact that many times it is violence against the other 
needs clarification. First of all, Gandhi acknowledged that “even a fast could be 
violent in intent if deployed wrongly” (Hardiman, 2013:47). However, the violence 
of self-suffering is not only in the intent. Self-suffering goes hand in hand in many 
cases with emotional and moral punishment of the other15. This is no exception. 
Indeed, there is a limbo in which most of the nonviolent actions are condemned. 
The problem is whether acts such as stopping the traffic or the normal functioning 
of a bank, painting walls or shops’ windows, organising boycotts or sit-ins, always 
belong to the world of nonviolence. The same limbo is inhabited even by harsher 
actions, such as throwing rocks, resisting police, blowing up electricity cables. It 
is doubtful that a child throwing rocks at a Jeep full of soldiers is an act intended 
                                                          
15 One example is given by Arun Gandhi on parenting. When he was sixteen, he lied to his father 
to cover-up the fact that he had arrived late to pick up his father because he went to the cinema. 
The father’s response was to tell his son that he must have done something wrong in bringing 
him up, and that he would not let his son drive him home. He would walk home alone to think 
about it. The walk took five hours, and Arun, feeling guilty and worried, drove behind his father at 
walking pace until they arrived home LÜBBE, A. 2009. The Violence within Non-Violence. Peace 
Studies Journal, 2, 39-44.. Although this was a clear example of nonviolent parenting, it included 
a good deal of emotional violence and punishment, which should be acknowledged. 
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to create real harm; at the same time, it is not considered by everyone an act of 
nonviolence.  
Besides the fact that some actions are violent or nonviolent at the same time, it 
should be acknowledged that most of the time there is a mixture of clearly violent 
and nonviolent actions in many nonviolent campaigns. The main problem is that 
some scholars claim that the meaning, importance, and success of certain 
actions depended on the presence of violent protests too16. Some critiques even 
noted an implicit interdependence between violence and nonviolence, pointing to 
the fact that nonviolent actions are often supported by organizations backed by 
force. It cannot be questioned that “sometimes nonviolent activists rely on 
systems of violence to achieve their goals” (Martin, 2009). For instance, this was 
the case during the Civil Rights Movement. The success of the nonviolent 
campaign was decided by the federal government, which means it was decided 
by a more powerful armed organisation. More generally, it is possible to claim 
that many nonviolent struggles are based on at least some type of protection 
provided by police and governments; and therefore, are based on some kinds of 
violence.  
The ambiguity of nonviolence in relation to the state was already clear with 
Gandhi. He actively worked for the formation of an independent India; he argued 
against the pacifist De Ligt on the opportunity for India to have an army. He did 
not despise even the colonising state, Britain. He urged his countrymen in London 
and India to support the British war effort against the Zulu revolt of 1906; he raised 
an ambulance corps in London in 1914, he recruited for the British army in India 
in 1918 (Bartolf, 2000). He even worked his full life with nationalistic groups in 
order to achieve India’s independence. This dangerous concession to 
nationalism was backed by the idea of being an active part of the British Empire. 
                                                          
16 It is true that much research on nonviolence showed that violence represents mainly a problem 
for nonviolent protest because it can backfire. However, here the problem is twofold. On the one 
hand, there is a debate on whether the actual presence of violent protests (or at least the threat 
of them) helps the visibility and acceptance of nonviolence or not. Indeed, the government may 
decide either to recognise only nonviolent protesters, marginalising the others, or to use violent 
protests to delegitimise nonviolent ones. On the other hand, there is the problem that people may 
use guns to ‘protect’ nonviolent protests. This was the case with the Civil Rights Movement. Cobb 
recently argued that the possession of weapons by black community indirectly helped the success 
of the nonviolent way offered by King. For instance, armed black people patrolled and defended 
houses where nonviolent activists were sleeping during the nights in the south. To know more, 
see: Cobb, C. E. 2014. This Nonviolent Stuff'll Get You Killed: How Guns Made the Civil Rights 
Movement Possible, Basic Books. 
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Going back to the Appeal for Enlistment of 1918, it is striking to notice that for 
Gandhi joining the army at that moment was the way of becoming partners in the 
Empire with the British, which he claimed was one meaning of swaraj.  
Finally, the nonviolent fight of the Mahatma included reactionary aspects, such 
as the idea of the caste system. He was against untouchability, but in favour of 
what is called varnashrama-dharma, which is the idea that society should be 
arranged on the fact that individuals have different innate tendencies for work and 
different qualities which are better expressed in certain periods of life. This idea 
has been interpreted by Arundhati Roy as a way to be in favour of the entitlement 
and privileges of some social groups. To bolster this claim are the fact that he 
opposed more radical critics of caste system, such as Ambedkar (even though 
Gandhi later helped him to become Law Minister and Chairman of the 
Constitution Drafting Committee), and he even went on hunger strike against the 
‘Communal Awards’ (Ambedkar, 2014)17.  
The doubts on the relationship between nonviolence and violence become real 
confusion when the former manifests itself in real acts of violence. Interesting 
examples of violent action made by nonviolent actors concern euthanasia and 
assisted suicide. Sometimes these practices are acts of nonviolence, at least 
from Gandhi’s approach (Gielen, 2012). For instance, once Gandhi discussed the 
reported case of an actress in Paris, who shot her life partner. The man implored 
her to do so because he was terminally ill and suffering an unbearable agony. 
For the Mahatma, the act could be described as nonviolence, in the case that the 
action was done with the right intentions. He also recommended avoiding 
premature judgments. Only God is capable of judging human intentions (Gielen, 
2012:432). A similar example relates to killing a rabid dog if it is killed out of 
compassion and to prevent it from dying a slow death. This is considered 
                                                          
17 He even made something in favour of the caste system with the 1932 fast made to block the 
affirmative action of the British government in favour of the outcastes, the untouchables. Gandhi 
was extremely critical of untouchability and caste divisions for his whole life. However, he opposed 
the 1931 proposal to separate the untouchables into a separate electoral group at the Round 
Table Conference in London, and in 1932 he started a fast against the Communal Award until the 
time when a new agreement between Hindus and untouchables, called the Poona Pact, had been 
reached and adopted by the British government. Theoretically, the idea of a separate electorate 
can be considered a way to defend the identity and interests of a subjected group. Gandhi was 
not against separate election in general; he favoured what concerned Muslims and other religious 
groups. However, he recognised the fact that a generally considered favourable reform for the 
untouchables would have further divided an already split Hindu community, causing trouble both 
in the political process of liberation and in the construction of a united country. For more on this 
topic, look: Nanda, B. R. 1994. Gandhi and his Critics, Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 26.  
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nonviolence, too. The same can be said for a child suffering from rabies, when 
there is no possibility of relief from the intense suffering. It is nonviolence to kill 
an ill calf, when the animal is in great pain and nursing would not be sufficient18. 
Nonviolence does not manifest itself only in action of euthanasia and assisted 
suicide, however. There are other cases where acts of violence are committed 
by believers in nonviolence. One of the most well-known devotees is Bonhoeffer, 
who conspired in the plot to kill Hitler. The German Lutheran pastor worked all of 
his life learning and teaching the practices of nonviolence. Even so, he arrived at 
a point of plotting against the life of the symbol of violence in Europe at the time. 
Coming back to Germany from the US, Bonhoeffer found no real education and 
support for a nonviolent action; at the same time, doing nothing would have been 
cowardice. The decision of threatening a person’s life was obviously not the most 
evident proof of his commitment to nonviolence. At the same time, it is highly 
debatable whether he actually departed from his previous creed, or his choice is 
still to be considered part of the universe of nonviolence. Whatever the different 
justifications and specifications there may be, it is clear that sometimes killing is 
part of the world of nonviolence, or at least is not incompatible.  
Thus, the many issues raised up until now led us to a choice. This thesis could 
have continued to focus on digging further into the distinction between violence 
and nonviolence, trying to find a temporary way out. However, it is natural to 
wonder whether this is really an urgency. Instead, we believe that there is 
something, which cannot be explained simply opposing nonviolence to violence 
or other terms, in the many struggles around the world, as well as in the words 
and deeds of Gandhi, San Suu Kyi and others. This does not mean that the many 
studies on the relationship between violence and nonviolence will be forgotten. It 
means simply that the concern on the opposite of nonviolence should be left to a 
second moment, when it will be clear what we mean by nonviolence.  
Having cleared some doubts on the choice of not talking about the relationship 
between violence and nonviolence, it should be made clear why this thesis will 
focus on the term ‘nonviolence’, and not on the alternative spelling ‘non-violence’. 
                                                          
18 Gielen claims that there should be no self-interest, including monetary matters, and at the same 
time uncontrollable suffering at the end of life, along with consent of the person when possible 
GIELEN, J. 2012. Mahātmā Gandhi's view on euthanasia and assisted suicide. Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 38, 431-434.. Gandhi emphasised that care is a solution for most people in these 
situations. Unwillingness to provide care can never be justified, as well as suicide, when is 
committed in order not to be a burden to others. 
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Throughout the first and second chapter, the reader will notice a gradual change 
from the term non-violence to nonviolence. This is meant to reflect a real evolution 
in the history of this concept, as the dash tended to disappear during recent 
decades. Thus, we will tend to write the term non-violence when we are dealing 
with authors who used this term, while using the term nonviolence when the 
authors chose to quit the dash. Nevertheless, we will use the term nonviolence 
for the rest of the thesis. The choice is partly due to the fact that nonviolence is 
now written almost everywhere without the dash. Nevertheless, the omission of 
the dash is the acknowledgment of the development of the term, which 
emphasises more than the term ‘non-violence’ the fact that it is much more than 
mere abstention from violence. Something deeper lies in that word, which is less 
than a rigid doctrine, but more than a simple restraint from using physical 
violence. 
Thus, this thesis will focus on the concept of nonviolence. Yet, it is still not clear 
how. Indeed, it is important to describe how this thesis will actually approach the 
concept of nonviolence. It should already be evident that nonviolence will not be 
considered a “continuing concern” (Rorty, 1984:65) of the history of thought, 
which was out there since the beginning of human history. We already said that 
the concept of nonviolence emerged in the XX century. We acknowledge the fact 
that Gandhi declared nonviolence to be as old as the mountains. Nevertheless, 
the innovation of the concept of nonviolence provided by Gandhi changed 
radically the meaning of this term, and the actual concept of nonviolence emerged 
in the West only in the 1920s. Thus, it is from this perspective that we will proceed. 
Besides, the aim of this thesis is not to find a correspondence with a definite truth 
or immutable essences. It is not even to make any strong normative claim, to 
determine what ought to be done in the light of certain given information, as does 
analytical philosophy (McDermott, 2008:11). We will not intend the meaning of 
the word nonviolence as the truth condition for, or the conventional meaning of, 
an utterance abstracted from the particular instance in which it is claimed. This 
thesis will not propose any sorts of ideal theory, any thought experiment, of what 
a nonviolent society would look like; it will not assume that any human being will 
agree and comply with a rational and logic description of a principle. In other 
words, we will not reduce this work to “find correct answers to questions of an 
abstract or general nature” (Frazer, 2010:5). We are aware that this may 
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represent a risk in the light of certain approaches to political theory, as our work 
will lack “the appearance of rigor which is the source of such pride among 
practitioners of mathematized social science, archival history and philosophical 
logic alike” (Frazer, 2010:11).  
To the contrary, this thesis will describe the different uses of the concept of 
nonviolence. These different definitions of nonviolence will be considered diverse 
and valid descriptions from different perspectives stemming from different periods 
in time. The aim is not to consider them in an argumentative form in which 
someone should be better than the others. On the contrary, the approach is to 
consider the different definitions of nonviolence in a dialogue aimed at finding 
new essential aspects of the idea19, able to unite instead of divide. Indeed, the 
aim is to define the concept of nonviolence from a different angle in a way that 
may in our time help people (academics as well as activists) to describe what 
they are doing without divisions, without thinking that they are doing something 
different from the others. At the same time, this reconciling approach does not 
intend to dissolve the internal tension of the concept of nonviolence. Thus, the 
aim is to ‘reconstruct nonviolence’, proposing a different understanding of this 
concept, which tries to overcome the current division and helps in the fight for its 
existence and, hopefully one day, dominion over its opposites. The idea is to keep 
the tension provided by the two streams of nonviolence, avoiding troubling 
connotations and getting rid of the theoretical obstacles that divide them into two 
different theories. In order to emerge, nonviolence should make order at home, 
and this thesis is an attempt to begin that process. 
In trying to reconstruct nonviolence, we decided to pay particular attention to the 
interpretation of nonviolence by Gene Sharp. This choice is due to the fact that 
Sharp is now considered the “doyen of the field” (Summy, 2005), the father of 
Otpor Revolution in Serbia, and many other struggles in the world. Every 
introduction on the topic acknowledges the key role played by Sharp in the history 
of nonviolence. At the same time, Gene Sharp is the one who most radically 
divided nonviolence in two: a principle and a method of struggle. For these 
                                                          
19 This approach is in line with Bevir’s attitude which the historian should keep in front of the work. 
He claimed that occasionalists confuse dialogue (form of discourse in which we try to recover the 
hermeneutic meanings, without too much attention to the linguistic meaning; we treat the 
utterance charitably) with Argument (form of discourse in which we accept authority of linguistic 
meanings; treat the utterance uncharitably, we want to show other people to be mistaken) (Bevir 
1999:65). 
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reasons, his version of the division will inevitably be central to this thesis. This 
should not diminish the importance of his contribution to the field. Equally, it 
should not diminish the importance of other important scholars, who played a key 
role in the development of the concept of nonviolence. The focus on the 
distinction between pragmatic and principled nonviolence will inevitably lead this 
work to leave aside other ways of thinking about nonviolence; in particular, the 
one by Johan Galtung and Giuliano Pontara. The Norwegian scholar proposed in 
1964 a different division of nonviolence in a negative and positive side. It is true 
that this division is still at the centre of many works, especially in Europe and 
within the Transcend network. It also inspired other studies on nonviolence, such 
as the ones by Pontara, who proposed to divide nonviolence in general, as an 
instrument to defend justice or privilege, and positive or specific, as an ethical-
political choice. Nevertheless, Galtung’s and Pontara’s divisions are definitely 
less dominant than Sharp’s, and are not void of problems, which is not the main 
concern here. In particular, Sharp is unfairly classified in the negative or generic 
side, even though his effort cannot be reduced to a mere limitation of violence, 
overlooking the enormous creative potential of pragmatic nonviolence. However, 
this thesis benefited immensely from the works of Galtung and Pontara. Their 
arguments are part of this thesis, and their definitions represent the richness of 
meaning of the term nonviolence. Yet, this thesis is based on the necessity of 
reconciling nonviolence, and not to oppose different divisions, looking at the more 
appropriate one.    
Thus, we will focus on Sharp. We will critique his definition of nonviolence from 
the point of view of the three reasons outlined above. We will reflect on the use 
of the term, on the theoretical significance of the division, and on the 
consequence at the level of democracy and religion. These are the most urgent 
problems to face, as well as the key opportunities to exploit for reconstructing the 
concept of nonviolence. As it has been claimed above, the aim is to engage in a 
dialogue with the literature, trying to understand the key weaknesses of the 
division of nonviolence in principled and pragmatic, in order to propose a new 
synthesis.   
The exposition of these critiques raise an issue on what to do next of the 
distinction between principled and pragmatic nonviolence. One solution would be 
to simply get rid of the distinction. Some would perhaps agree, claiming that other 
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divisions and categorisations best describe the phenomenon. We may even coin 
a new and different distinction. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that a new 
categorisation would help the research on nonviolence. It would only make the 
literature more chaotic. Instead, it is much more beneficial and fascinating to try 
to rescue what is still actual of this distinction, abandoning what is not. The 
widespread acceptance of the division between principled and pragmatic 
nonviolence signals that it does actually contain something important. 
Nevertheless, too much time has passed and too many problems arisen; it is 
necessary to rephrase the two categories.  
The work of reconstruction will start with the help of a not very well-known 
philosopher of nonviolence, the Italian Aldo Capitini. The philosopher was born in 
Perugia in 1899, son of the custodian of the old tower of the municipality and a 
tailor. He studied Literature and Philosophy at the Normale of Pisa, graduating 
under the supervision of the anti-fascist Attilio Momigliano. It is in this period that 
he started studying nonviolence and in particular Gandhi’s example. Then, he 
worked as Administrative Secretary at the Normale, while also being assistant to 
Momigliano and an active organiser of discussions around politics and religion. 
In 1929 he left Catholicism, due to the Concordat with Fascism, and in 1933 he 
was dismissed from the Normale due to his refusal to join the Fascist Party. He 
went back to Perugia and survived giving private lessons. There he started a 
strong anti-fascist propaganda, with the creation of the Liberalsocialist Movement 
with Guido Calogero, and developed a non-confessional religious thought 
centred on nonviolence20. When the war came, he refused to take up arms in 
fighting fascism, and wrote an important tetralogy21, in which nonviolence plays 
a key role.  
After the war, nonviolence remained a central concern for Capitini, both during 
his troubled academic career and outside. Indeed, besides his work as professor 
of pedagogy in Cagliari and Perugia, he founded the Centro di Coordinamento 
Internazionale per la Nonviolenza (Centre for International Coordination towards 
                                                          
20 In 1937, he published his first book, Elementi di un’Esperienza Religiosa (thanks to the help of Benedetto 
Croce), which may be considered the manifesto of his ideas on religion, nonviolence and war. 
21 He published Vita religiosa (1942), Atti della presenza aperta (1943), La realtà di tutti (written in 1944 
and published in 1948) and Saggio sul soggetto della storia (1947). 
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Nonviolence), the Italian Vegetarian Society, and he organised the first Italian 
peace march in 1961. 
The aim of his whole life has been to place nonviolence at the centre of religion 
and politics. For what concerns religion, Capitini considered himself a ‘free 
religious’, i.e. a scholar acknowledging the importance of the religious sphere in 
human life, but stressing the urgency of a radical religious reform. As other 
European religious thinkers, such as Bonhoeffer, Simone Weil or Lanza Del 
Vasto, Capitini acknowledged the deep link between nonviolence and religion. 
This meant a radical struggle against the continuous acts of closure and 
backwardness of the Catholic Church since the 1950s22, which led to harsh 
debates with other Italian reformers who decided to remain within Christianity and 
accepting the dogmas23. At the same time, it meant a complex work for the 
emergence of a practical and ecumenical religion, or better an ‘open religion’, 
which linked him to other important Italian religious reformers, such as Ernesto 
Bonaiuti and Piero Martinetti.   
Turning to politics, he recognised that the advent of democracy did not reduce 
the need for nonviolence24. As other important scholars of nonviolence such as 
Albert Camus or Jean-Marie Muller, Capitini dedicated his life to develop a better 
‘nonviolent’ democracy after the war. In particular, the Italian philosopher noticed 
that the institutional change was useless without a different extra-parliamentarian 
and extra-party work on the masses to create active and conscious citizens. 
                                                          
22 Capitini wrote extensively about religion. His topics ranged from the doctrine put forward by Pius XII to 
the role of religion in society; from death and paradise to the mystical body; from the issues concerning 
baptized non-believer to the problems around the Second Vatican Council. The books of particular 
importance are: Il Problema Religioso Attuale, Parma, Guanda, 1948; Nuova Socialita’ e Riforma 
Religiosa, Torino, Einaudi, 1950; Religione Aperta, Parma, Guanda, 1955; Discuto la Religione di Pio XII, 
Milano, Parenti, 1957; Aggiunta Religiosa all’Opposizione, Milano, Guanda, 1958; Battezzati Non 
Credenti, Firenze, Parenti, 1961; Severita’ Religiosa per il Concilio, Bari, De Donato, 1966. 
23 The rejection of Catholicism marked a difference with other religious thinkers, who were sympathetic 
with his cry for reform. In particular, this was quite of a strong difference between Capitini and the 
Florentine group of Giorgio La Pira (Capitini left Catholicism few years after Giorgio La Pira’s conversion), 
David Maria Turoldo, and Ernesto Balducci. Even though they all shared the idea that the Catholic 
institution was in desperate need of radical reforms, the group of Florence decided to remain within 
Catholicism, while Capitini never came back. This division faded away only in the 1960s, in particular with 
the encounter with Don Lorenzo Milani. 
24 It is impossible to rigidly distinguish between books on strictly political issues and books focusing on 
religion. Thus, we suggest to look at the above books as well as to the following: I C.O.S. per la Comunita’ 
Aperta, 1948; Italia Nonviolenta, Bologna, Libreria Internazionale Avanguardia, 1949; Nuova Socialita’ e 
Riforma Religiosa, Torino, Einaudi, 1950; Rivoluzione Aperta, Parma, Guanda, 1956; L’Obiezione di 
Coscienza in Italia, Manduria, Lacaita, 1959; Antifascismo tra i Giovani, Trapani, Celebes, 1966; Le 
Tecniche della Nonviolenza, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1967; and in particular the postomous Il Potere di Tutti, 
Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1969. 
30 | P a g e  
 
Thus, Capitini considered himself a ‘left-wing independent’ and proposed 
nonviolence both as a better method of struggle than guerrilla action, and as an 
instrument to increase participation against party politics and technocracy. His 
work managed to influence many Italian scholars and politicians, such as 
Norberto Bobbio, Tristano Codignola, Alexander Langer, and Marco Pannella. 
Unfortunately, he died in 1968, without having been able to directly affect the 
methods of protest as well as the ideas of the protesters. 
At the moment, there are very few works in English on him25; however, he 
represents a valid way to overcome the problems related to the division. The 
reasons for believing this are many. Capitini worked on the concept of 
nonviolence since the 1930s until his death in 1968. This means that he 
witnessed the period in time in which nonviolence entered the Western world. In 
particular, he was the one who started the reflection on the topic in Italy under 
the fascist regime. Yet, his reflections were highly original, and never ended up 
with any internal division of the concept of nonviolence. To the contrary, he 
maintained nonviolence as something unique, even though he described and re-
described this important phenomenon during his whole life. In doing so, he 
approached the topic in a clear and peculiar way, which mixed philosophical, 
poetical, and even religious discourses. This is necessary for such an 
interdisciplinary concept as nonviolence. Capitini never separated even theory 
from practice. This means that he never built up abstract but logically perfect 
theories of nonviolence, as well as he never made simple lists of behaviours or 
practices.  
This approach may be considered a weakness. Indeed, it challenges the 
academic habit of distinguishing clearly between them, and makes the concept 
more difficult to understand and operationalise. Nevertheless, this approach was 
the logical consequence of the work of a person who was at the same time 
philosopher, educator and activist. He knew very well every side of nonviolence. 
He theorised a conception of it able to reach ethics and even religion without 
separating them. At the same time, he organised the first Italian peace march in 
                                                          
25 Nevertheless, most of his writings have been published and can be easily found in an Italian 
library. Moreover, this research benefited also of a visit to the State archive in Perugia in 2014, 
where most of the original documents are kept. 
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1961. And these will be useful points from which to draw an idea of what 
principled and pragmatic nonviolence would mean from his perspective.  
A possible objection to the choice to use Capitini is related to the particular 
historical moment in which he lived. His first book, Elementi di un’Esperienza 
Religiosa, was published in 1937. This was an exacting period for Italy, and he 
was involved in the opposition to fascism. This fact can lead to suspicion that 
Capitini engaged “in oblique methods of conveying their thoughts” (Major, 
2005:483) at least until the end of World War II, and this can lead one to believe 
that he is not the best choice. Against this critique we can claim that Capitini never 
concealed his real intentions in his writings during that period. He has been 
extremely coherent in his production: he did not change his style and way of 
writing after the rise of fascism in Italy; he did not change his particular 
philosophical approach; he had a clear style, which was not difficult to 
understand. He was jailed twice because of that. Thus, the ‘persecution thesis’ 
(Ward, 2009) is not applicable to this author.  
Another possible objection to the choice of Capitini is that he has never been 
translated into English. We acknowledge that this is a problem, but we believe 
that this should not discourage us. For a start, we had to make choices on how 
to translate certain key terms: aggiunta, compresenza and omnicrazia. In doing 
so, we have been helped by the only English translation of some paragraphs of 
Capitini’s work by Faracovi (Capitini, 2000), as well as by an English article 
written by Capitini (Capitini, 1953), by Altieri’s introduction recently translated in 
English (Altieri, 2008), and by the short article by Antonino Drago (Drago, 2014). 
We followed Faracovi in translating compresenza, the most important religious 
neologism coined by Capitini, with compresence. We believe this choice to be 
better than co-presence because the Italian term does not have any dash, and 
because it is a neologism with a complex and innovative meaning. We preferred 
‘integration’ to the terms ‘more’ (Capitini, 2000) or ‘adjunct’ (Drago, 2014) in order 
to translate the Italian term aggiunta. The risk in using more or adjunct is that we 
may give the impression of referring to something not essential which has been 
added or connected to something else. Instead, integration allows us to 
emphasise that nonviolence is combining, bringing together something into 
something else, in order to create a larger unity. Finally, we translated omnicrazia 
with ‘omnicracy’ and not ‘omni-cracy’, for the same reason of compresence. The 
32 | P a g e  
 
Italian term does not have any dash, and it refers to a new complex concept, 
which will be explained in chapter three. 
Then, another issue related to the fact that Capitini wrote in Italian is that it has 
been necessary to translate some passages from his books. In doing so, we tried 
to choose the simplest passages, in order not to be forced to make too many 
interventions, leaving a quasi-literal translation. However, we should make clear 
that we treated the linguistic issue not as a threat, but as an opportunity of 
introducing Capitini to the English speaking world.   
If Capitini may now be considered a good example, it can be claimed that the 
idea of drawing a pragmatic and a principled dimension of nonviolence from his 
thought is a hazard. Nevertheless, it is the aim of this thesis to work in-between 
historical and ahistorical approaches to political theory. The aim of the analysis 
of Capitini will not be to exactly discover the meaning of the term nonviolence 
within the Italian peninsula of the XX century, even though the historical aspects 
will not be left aside. We will adopt the concept of nonviolence of Capitini in a way 
that resembles what has recently been called a transhistorical approach (Frazer, 
2010), which acknowledges that “the past is past, and the present is present, but 
that the latter has much to learn from the former” (Frazer, 2010:2). The idea of a 
transhistorical approach is to draw insight from history of political thought as well 
as contemporary political philosophy. Cherishing the autonomy of the research, 
the help of the example and written words of Capitini may provide us with a 
precious framework for overcoming the division in the concept of nonviolence. As 
explained above, a new framework may be of some help to both activists and 
academics in describing what they are doing in a way that does not create 
divisions.  
The last thing to clarify is why we claim that this framework is an ideology. There 
is a long and articulated debate on what a political ideology is. This thesis relies 
on the approach of Michael Freeden. The British scholar interprets ideology not 
as ‘illusion’, “an unfortunate smokescreen that covers up reality” (Freeden, 
2003:8), or a ‘dogma’. Instead, it is a flexible system of concepts, a distinctive 
configuration of political concepts which creates action and a new reality 
(Freeden, 2003). We will show that nonviolence (nonviolent praxis, or even 
nonviolent thought) is a very complex ‘map’ or ‘morphology’ of the political and 
social world; it is an “understanding of the political environment of which we are 
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part, and have views about the merits and failings of that environment” (Freeden, 
2003:8).  
In particular, our analysis offers a very precise interpretation of ideology as 
impure praxis. Freeden already linked Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis with 
ideology, but he did not dig into this link (Freeden, 2000:316). Here we will clearly 
describe praxis as a non-systematic revolutionary approach, an ideology, which 
creates theories (in the case of nonviolence ethical theories) and practices 
(correct or more appropriate behaviours) depending on time and space. From this 
perspective, we will be able to include Arendt’s concept of praxis (without 
focusing on her pejorative idea of ideology), showing that it helps in 
understanding the internal problems of nonviolence, but it is limited and it should 
be integrated with the adjective impure.  
 
Chapter Outline 
In order to pursue the aim of reconstructing nonviolence, this thesis will be divided 
into five chapters. Chapter one will show the growing success of nonviolence and 
describe the dominant division in principled and pragmatic. Section one will 
outline the variety of ways in which the term non-violence, or nonviolence, is 
currently used, describing ways to overthrow dictators, to protest, defend a 
country, run the state, or change society. Among the many reasons for the rapid 
advance of this concept, which is used in more and more fields, there is the clear 
split in the concept of nonviolence between principle and techniques of action. 
Section two will describe the origins of this distinction, which can be traced back 
to the 1930s. Nevertheless, the division became definitive only since the 1970s, 
thanks to the work of the most important and well-known scholar of contemporary 
nonviolence: Gene Sharp. For the American scholar, nonviolence can be either 
a set of methods of struggle or a principle.  
We will analyse the success of this division on three levels: descriptive, 
praxeological, and religious. At the descriptive level, it averted the use of exotic 
terms and help operationalization, helping the introduction of the concept in 
academia and the adoption by religious groups. At the praxeological level, more 
and more groups could adopt the term, either averting discussions about values 
or about effectiveness, and it was rejected the conviction that nonviolence was 
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effective only with democratic regimes. Finally, at the religious level, the West 
found a secularised concept to avoid being trapped in discussions on values and 
religion.  
What is the result of this success? Sharp’s categories of principled and pragmatic 
nonviolence have now become the dominant categories in the literature on the 
topic. Section three will analyse these two very different categories. Pragmatic 
nonviolence focuses on ‘people power’, looking at new and more effective 
methods of overthrowing dictators, protesting and seizing power. To the contrary, 
principled nonviolence is a far less developed and vaguer category, which 
focuses on what Nagler called ‘person power’ and looks at pacifism and religion. 
Today, the categories of pragmatic and principled represent the dominant way to 
describe nonviolence.  
The success of the division comes with a cost. In order to limit new worrying uses 
of the term, and offer a united and pluralistic concept, able to deal with the crisis 
of democracy as well as be at the centre of a post-secular society, chapter two 
will highlight the problems at the descriptive, praxeological and religious levels. 
For a start, the distinction between principled and pragmatic nonviolence has the 
problem at the descriptive level of reducing nonviolence to techniques, or 
behaviours, and values or ideals, and thus means and ends, splitting in two the 
field. Pragmatic nonviolence is accused of not sufficiently taking into 
consideration circumstances and ends, while principled nonviolence risk 
interpreting too rigidly the Gandhian metaphor of seeds and the tree to describe 
the relation between ends and means. This division allows the proliferation of 
troubling uses of the term. 
The consequence of these problems is apparent at the praxeological level, in 
which there is risk of a regressive field. Here nonviolence is well known for being 
a driving force for destruction, but less known for providing an alternative path for 
construction, especially in a period of crisis of the model of democracy in the 
Western world. Besides, nonviolence runs the risk of failing pluralism, falling into 
realpolitik and moralism, hindering in this way the participation of everybody in 
the change of society.  
Finally, the last problem of the two streams is the implied strong division between 
religion and politics, which is the result of a real process of secularisation. 
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Nowadays, times have changed. Religion never disappeared, and there is a big 
debate on how to imagine a post-secular society. The same is valid for 
nonviolence. Religion cannot be segregated anymore in the category of 
principled nonviolence. Religion was and is present in the mayor struggles around 
the world. The issue is how to acknowledge the importance of religion in almost 
every nonviolent struggle, and to help religion to find a new place in a post-secular 
society. 
These problems will represent the key points in our reconstruction of nonviolence. 
In order to face these issues we will turn in chapter three to the ideas on the topic 
of the Italian philosopher Aldo Capitini. Section one will describe the encounter 
with Gandhian nonviolence under the fascist regime. In such a complex situation, 
Capitini reinterpreted nonviolence neither as a set of techniques to seize power, 
nor as a principle to obey. Instead, the Italian philosopher interpreted nonviolence 
as a tension, a praxis. This tension, logic, or method focuses on reinterpreting 
and shaping reality looking at liberation from the ‘chains’ of reality as well as 
openness to the existent.  
From this perspective, there is no division between pragmatic and principled 
nonviolence. Nevertheless, we will try to describe how the two distinct 
dimensions, one focused on values and the other on techniques, emerge from 
Capitini’s writings. Section two will focus on how to conceive of a pragmatic 
dimension. We will show that from this perspective nonviolence is a kind of 
knowledge, as it promotes some techniques as well as provides the framework 
for an endless work of reinterpretation of existing practices, and production of 
new ones, to build up via facti a different society. The aim of this effort is in a first 
moment to construct a ‘power without government’, which will lead to the 
formation of a new society, called by Capitini omnicracy.  
Instead, section three will turn to the principled dimension. The starting point is 
the acknowledgment of human limits, which may represent an opportunity. 
Indeed, human beings can decide to directly face these challenges alone, with 
the consequence of closing down in themselves. Alternatively, the subject can 
decide to deepen the link with the others, trying collectively to face the burden. 
This last choice implies a ‘great refusal’ , which means the refusal to believe that 
the death of the body is the end of everything, as well as to consider as necessary 
the laws of nature, which assume that the bigger fish devours the smaller one. 
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Out of this refusal, nonviolence emerges as a process of liberation from the 
cruelty of reality, as well as openness to the existent. In other words, nonviolence 
is a work of integration of reality with new opportunities of liberation and 
openness. The integration is described as made of three main acts: ascetic, 
ethical, religious. The integration of these three acts in human life demonstrates 
that cruelty and necessity are not 'necessary’, because there is the possibility to 
build here and now what Capitini called compresence. 
Chapter four looks at how Capitini’s conception of nonviolence answers the 
concerns raised in chapter two. In particular, we will focus on the way in which 
nonviolence as praxis overcomes the divisions between means and ends, realism 
and moralism, as well as religion and politics. For what concerns the division 
between means and ends, we will show, through the analysis of the first Italian 
peace march in 1961, how the praxis of nonviolence cannot be reduced to mere 
means. The march will emerge as a protest-to-project, which balanced 
destruction and construction towards the aim of transcending the actual radical 
contention.  
Turning to the division between moralism and realism, Capitini’s conception of 
nonviolence leads to a precise political approach, described as a balance 
between ‘realism and serenity’. At the centre of this approach lies the construction 
of ‘omnicracy’. During fascism it meant non-cooperation and the construction of 
the liberalsocialist movement, while under the democratic regime it meant the 
creation of new opportunities of participation, such as the COS (Centre of Social 
Orientation).  
Finally, Capitini’s conception of nonviolence included religion through the concept 
of compresence, the maximum liberation and openness possible. Religion is 
interpreted as a set of thought and action, in which faith is no longer passive 
obedience, and the priest is substituted by the prophet. This ‘open religion’ 
represents the opportunity for the development of values, which is necessary 
even in the political realm in order to balance the tension towards more inclusion 
and connection. 
Drawing and extending from the many important suggestions provided by 
Capitini, the last chapter will outline a new interpretation of nonviolence, with its 
principled and pragmatic sides, able to answer our initial concerns at the 
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descriptive, praxeological, and religious levels. In doing so, we will show that this 
new interpretation is able to avert worrying uses of the term under a united and 
pluralistic concept, which provides a valid answer to the changing historical 
environment. Section one will reinterpret nonviolence as an impure praxis, a non-
systematic revolutionary approach, an ideology, a continuous work of 
interpretation and shaping of reality. This praxis is impure because mired in an 
imperfect reality; it includes less than optimal forms, as well as social struggles; 
and it is always directed towards more freedom and plurality (liberation and 
openness in Capitini’s terms).  
This interpretation is of great help in reconceiving the categories of principled and 
pragmatic nonviolence. Principled nonviolence will be reinterpreted as the 
actualisation of a principle realising change towards freedom and plurality. This 
choice implies freedom, or self-restraint, the risk of opening to plurality, the 
opportunity to actively construct an ideal, and the chance of enhancing the link 
with everybody through an excellent action. Instead, pragmatic nonviolence will 
be reinterpreted as practical wisdom, phronesis, an ‘art of judgment’ which can 
be drawn from the continuous reinterpretation and creation of human practices. 
The key features of this phronesis are: enhancement of personal responsibility, 
of the power of all, and of open and inclusive projects. Such a principled and 
pragmatic nonviolence reconsidered will not oppose each other. They are 
complementary and work together towards a different reality. 
Section two will turn to the praxeological level. Our interpretation of nonviolence 
has a strong constructive and progressive drive, leading to a transformative kind 
of realism, a crossroad in-between realism and moralism. This transformative 
realism interprets and shapes any practice as an opportunity for change, leading 
to redrawing the boundaries of politics, fostering trust and social capital through 
a ‘diverse citizenship’. From such a peculiar kind of realistic perspective, the crisis 
of democracy is a problem of ‘order without life’. Instead of proposing alternative 
abstract models, nonviolence works by reinterpreting and shaping the current 
reality. This means offering a phronesis, an ‘art of judgment’, enhancing freedom 
and plurality. This means offering self-restraint and practical ways to enhance 
personal responsibility against the apathy of citizens; offering ethical acts and 
ways to enhance the power of all; offering ‘excellent actions’ and foster open 
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inclusive projects against the dominion of powerful minorities. In few words, the 
phronesis developed by nonviolence looks at integrating ‘order with life’. 
Finally, section three will look at religion. Our interpretation of nonviolence will 
propose to think of religion as a ‘religious act’, as thought and action of deepening 
via facti the link with everybody. This approach may cast religion at the centre of 
a post-secular society. Religion as here conceived is able to integrate the 
‘immanent frame’ with freedom as self-restraint; society with ethical acts of 
openness; politics with excellent actions. This path may lead to the ‘Assisi 
Presumption’, by which me meant the conviction that an open religion is the key 
for an open society and allows a better democracy to flourish. 
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1. The Success of a Division: Nonviolence as Principled and Pragmatic 
The first step in order to pursue the bold aim of ‘reconstructing nonviolence’ is to 
outline the condition in which we currently find this concept. At the moment, 
nonviolence is living a (still modest) growing success in the literature. In order to 
describe this success, this chapter will outline the many current uses of the 
concept, as well as origin and features of the dominant divisions between 
techniques and principle, as well as between the categories of principled and 
pragmatic nonviolence.  
The first section will look at the meanings of nonviolence today focusing on the 
political world. The concept of nonviolence is increasingly studied in politics. 
Currently, it is mainly used in different areas, in four different connotations. Firstly, 
nonviolence is used in strategic and security studies, where it is associated with 
strategies and techniques of action able to overthrow a dictator. Secondly, 
nonviolence is also associated with social movement studies and contentious 
politics, describing certain kinds of actions of protest of social movements. Here 
the research on nonviolence is centred on the attempt to construct the ‘perfect’ 
campaign of civil resistance, able to put pressure on governments in order to 
change their policies and ideas. In addition, nonviolence is part of defence studies 
as referring to techniques to defend a country against invasions or coup d’état, 
and even of peace studies, dealing with emergencies such as international 
conflicts, all without the use of direct and physical violence. Recently, nonviolence 
is (still quite rudimentarily) associated with a certain way in which the state may 
act. This is the case of a nonviolent way to fight against terrorism, or even a 
nonviolent way to regulate society and non-state actors. Finally, the concept of 
nonviolence is used to describe more complex kinds of personal and social 
relations, going beyond the relation between citizens and governors. Nonviolence 
is associated with actions of everyday revolution; it enters the deepest spheres 
of poetry and even religion, becoming an endless work of permanent revolution 
in society.  
Ranging from anti-terrorism to poetry and religion, the universe of nonviolence is 
very wide. One of the reasons for this still growing success in the use of the 
concept lies in a precise theoretical approach to nonviolence, which divides the 
concept in a principle or a set of techniques of struggle. Section two will describe 
the origin of this division as well as the key reasons of this success. This division 
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underlies nonviolence since the 1930s. Indeed, the concept has been interpreted 
either as a substitute for war and violent protests, or as part of radical pacifism 
and religion. This division survived throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Yet, it is only 
with Gene Sharp that nonviolence was definitely split in principle and set of 
techniques. Why was this division so successful? The key reasons of this success 
are: they produced conceptual order; spread the use of the term to groups without 
asking them to adhere to a creed (and thus moving beyond the idea that 
nonviolence was possible only in dealing with democratic regimes); satisfy the 
need for a secularised concept.  
The success of the division in principle and techniques led to the establishment 
of the categories of principled and pragmatic nonviolence, which will be described 
in the last section. It will become clear that they represent two very different 
approaches to nonviolence. While the principled stream focuses on principles 
and on the power of the person to realise pacifism and religious preaching, 
pragmatic nonviolence focuses on techniques of action and on people power to 
face the violence of governments and seize power.  
   
1.1. Nonviolence: Between Anti-terrorism and Religious Preaching 
Nonviolence is slowly becoming a more and more important and studied topic, 
leaving its traditional marginal role. Academia never really engaged consistently 
with the topic until 1960s, and the few books appeared since then still represent 
a kind of esoteric and marginal readings. This is valid in many fields of research. 
It has attracted the attention of many fields, from education (Chubbuck and 
Zembylas, 2011) to psychology (Mayton, 2009), from religion (Jain, 2001, Rowell, 
2006) to science (Bchatterjee, 1974) and communication (Marshall Rosenberg, 
2003), but the topic unfortunately remains marginal. Political studies witnessed a 
similar path. Since the 1960s, nonviolence entered academia as a marginal 
concern. This is slowly changing. One of the main reasons of this change is that 
the term nonviolence is used to describe many revolutions around the world, from 
the People Power Revolution to more recent events, such as Burma’s revolution, 
the ‘coloured revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine, the ‘Arab Spring’ (especially 
Tunisia and Egypt), and the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong.  
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Thus, nonviolence is currently increasingly studied. The rising interest is apparent 
in the extremely fragmented and growing literature on the topic. The term 
nonviolence started to describe a variety of things in many different fields. For a 
start, the term nonviolent direct action is used to refer to a particular response to 
tyranny and oppressive regimes. Some scholars developed interesting analyses 
of the many struggles of people power and civil resistance in the XX century, such 
as Ackerman and Kruegler did in their Strategic Nonviolent Conflict (Ackerman 
and Kruegler, 1994) as well as Adam Roberts in Civil Resistance and Power 
Politics (Roberts, 2009). Some scholars focused on the collections of case 
studies covering different cultures and geographical regions26. Many institutions 
and centres produced handbooks to nonviolent actions in order to topple 
dictators. Recently, an important statistical work began, culminating in the volume 
of Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan on campaigns of nonviolent resistance 
Why Civil Resistance Works (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). The study 
revealed that violent insurgence is rarely justified on strategic ground. Indeed, 
between 1900 and 2006, campaigns carried out through nonviolent resistance 
were more than twice as effective as violent ones, leading to more durable and 
peaceful democracy, and making less likely to regress into civil war.   
Besides, the term nonviolence is widely used to describe a way of protesting 
against the government or the regime. Here nonviolence is included in the 
literature on social movements (McAdam and Tarrow, 2000), from the Civil Rights 
Movement (Calhoun-Brown, 2000) to feminism (Beckwith, 2002, Costain, 2000). 
Nonviolence is described as a form of contentious interaction, of protest, which 
does not rely on physical violence. Recently, nonviolence has even been 
associated to the idea of prefigurative politics, by which we mean something 
opposed to strategic politics in which there is no means-end equality, and it 
broadly refers to the “attempted construction of alternative or utopian social 
relations in the present, either in parallel with, or in the course of, adversarial 
social movement protest” (Yates, 2014:1). Its meaning ranges from “the building 
of movement ‘alternatives’ or institutions” to “a way in which protest is performed” 
(Yates, 2014:2). Whether or not an instance of prefigurative politics, it remains 
the fact that, as Lipsky claimed, a protest is a political resource of the powerless 
                                                          
26 A good bibliography is given by McCarthy and Sharp in Nonviolent Action: a Research Guide; 
a recent excellent example is Wehr, P., Burgess, H., Burgess, G., (eds) Justice Without Violence, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994. 
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(Della Porta and Diani, 2006), and therefore it is important to advance in the 
strategies and mechanisms which empower social movements. Thus it is key to 
analyse the many examples of social movements in the world (Zunes et al., 
1999), finding the best ways to conduct a perfect civil resistance campaign. This 
field shares the same concerns of the one looking at overthrowing dictators, even 
though the degree and the aims are different27. They certainly share the concern 
for unity, planning, and discipline, even though the aim is not a revolution. 
Besides, they share the attention for what Schock described as the three key 
elements for a clear understanding of a campaign, whether for protest or 
revolution. For a start, there is the process of “acquiring resources, people, and 
support for a campaign” (Schock, 2013), which is called mobilisation. The second 
key element is resilience, which is “the ability of a challenge to withstand and 
recover from repression” (Schock, 2013). The key factor is the tactical interaction 
between opponents. A diversification of tactics and the skills of devising effective 
strategies are key for the success of a campaign. Finally, political change is more 
likely when the challenge is able to “sever the opponent from the sources of 
power upon which it depends, either directly or through allies or third parties” 
(Schock, 2013). This is described as the process of leverage, opposed to that of 
violence, which is more similar to a hammer. The leverage approach requires the 
ability of the activists to attract sympathy of what is called ‘the pillars of support’, 
which are those who, willing or not, sustain the opponent.   
Beyond revolutions and protests, the term nonviolence is also used in defence 
studies, referring to particular ways of defending a country. Most of these 
methods constitute what is called civilian-based defence28, or civilian defence, or 
                                                          
27 In this literature review we decided to divide research on revolutions from those on changing 
particular laws or habits. However, this has been done only for a better clarity. We should 
acknowledge that the two are not clearly separable, and that most of the time a nonviolent 
revolution starts from single-issue protests, with small actions aimed at building up a critical mass, 
which will be able to topple dictators only later in time.  
28 One of the first study in this direction is the 1958 book of Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the 
Nuclear Age, who brought non-violence right in the middle of the debate on security in the nuclear 
age. For what concern civil defence, it is important to cite The Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-
violent Resistance to Aggression, edited by Robert Adams in 1967, along with the 1974 book of 
Boserup and Mack War without Weapons. Six years later, Gene Keyes wrote Strategic Non-
violent Defence: the Construct of an Option. In this article, the author stressed that the strategic 
aim of civil defence is to maintain the moral of the resistance. A key contribution to the topic is 
certainly the book by Gene Sharp Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based 
Deterrence and Defence, in which the author proposed civilian-based defence in order to defend 
Europe. Another important contribution to cite is Burrowes’ Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 
published in 1996, in which he criticized Sharp’s model of civilian-based defence because it is not 
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social defence. These three different labels refer to a kind of approach to national 
security which focuses on flexible tactics of non-cooperation applied by citizens. 
The thrust of it is that every person should be trained in the different strategies of 
nonviolent struggle and non-cooperation, in order to respond to two kinds of 
threats: external (an invasion) or internal (for instance a coup d’état) (Lakey, 
1973:176). Therefore, it is a policy centred on civilians and “intended to deter and 
defeat foreign military invasions, occupations, and internal usurpations” (Sharp 
and Jenkins, 1990). The rationale is that “instead of military weaponry, civilian-
based defence applies the power of society itself to deter and defend against 
internal usurpations and foreign invaders” (Sharp and Jenkins, 1990:416). The 
power of society includes social, economic, political, and psychological 
‘weapons’, mainly of non-cooperation and defiance. For what concerns a coup, 
nonviolence is considered by some scholars an effective but understudied 
approach (Roberts, 1975, Sharp and Jenkins, 2003). Even if the new group in 
power controls the most important buildings of the country, they still need physical 
control of government facilities. In other words, they still need cooperation and 
legitimacy. Thus, it is possible for the population to defend the old constitutional 
system nonviolently. In particular, a nonviolent answer would include internal and 
international repudiation of the coup; the non-cooperation of the attacked society; 
the block of any imposition of the new government; the encouragement of 
creative ways of dissent and opposition. Moreover, the society can still continue 
acting independently, as there was still the old government and the constitution. 
Finally, the institution can be made omnipresent resistance organisation, 
especially through a previous training of those working there and the population.   
The concept of nonviolence has also been used in relation to conflict 
management, resolution, and search for peace. In the literature on conflict 
transformation and peace studies, nonviolence refers to a ‘style of action’, a 
certain pattern of behaviours observable by others, dealing with conflict in order 
to avoid to fall into the vortex of violence29. In this field, we can find the expression 
‘nonviolent conflict transformation’, which looks at ways of solving the conflict 
which would change also the actors and the existent social structure (Galtung, 
                                                          
focussed on satisfying human needs, it relies on a conception of society oriented to elites and it 
is a fault strategic theory. 
29 This is at the basis for instance of the Global Network on Conflict Transformation and Mediation 
Transcend founded by Johan Galtung.  
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1996:116). Within this interesting area of study, we also talk of ‘nonviolent 
international intervention’, referring to ways of intervention in international conflict 
with methods that reject physical violence and centre on civil society. One 
example is that of the International Peace Brigade (Checa Hidalgo, 2008), which 
works for the protection of human right activists and organisations, as well as 
other similar associations such as the Peace Corps.  
Recently, the term nonviolence has also moved beyond the action of the people 
and citizens against or for the state. Indeed, it started to be associated to the work 
of the state itself. Going back to the area of defence and security studies, 
nonviolence has been associated for instance to the one of the key threat for 
security of the XXI century, terrorism. There is a growing literature which refer to 
nonviolent ways of fighting terrorism30. For instance, Martin recognized that the 
cause of nonviolence was badly damaged by 9/11 terrorist attack, which 
“provided a stimulus and ostensible justification for a spiral of violence in which 
nonviolent alternatives are marginalised” (Martin, 2002). To the contrary, the 
literature on nonviolence proposes different ways of fighting this phenomenon, in 
which the state plays an important role in leadership and coordination. For 
instance, a nonviolent answer would focus on reducing the vulnerability of high-
technology societies to sabotage and terrorism. Indeed, a nonviolent approach 
proposes that technologies should be designed and chosen to be robust against 
the attack. “Instead of large power plant, energy efficiency and small-scale 
renewable energy sources could be used. Microhidro would reduce vulnerability 
compared to large damns. Organic farming would be far less vulnerable than 
monocultures” (Martin, 2002). Moreover, small-scale buildings are better than 
giant office blocks, office buildings in which workers are encouraged to work 
together should be preferred to isolation and alienation. Intelligence is another 
way to foster a nonviolent approach to counterterrorism. A nonviolent intelligence 
system has been proposed, open and made of different agencies in competition 
between each other (De Valk and Niezing, 1993). Assurance that third party 
supported by the Western security will sign a statement supporting human rights 
is also another way. Finally, nonviolence includes the conviction that it is urgent 
                                                          
30 Some of the key works on the topic are: Cortright, David, Gandhi and Beyond. Nonviolence for 
an Age of Terrorism, London:Paradigm Publisher, 2006; Martin, B. 2002. "Nonviolence versus 
Terrorism." Social Alternatives 21(2):6-9; Ram, S. and Summy R., Nonviolence: An Alternative 
for Defeating Global Terror(ism), New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008. 
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to tackle the conditions fostering terrorism, such as repressive regimes, poverty, 
injustice, inequality, exploitation, neo-colonialism and torture (Martin, 2002).  
The debate on terrorism is just one example of something that we start witnessing 
in the literature more and more often: nonviolence is also a way of behaving of 
the state itself. More recently, the term nonviolence has also been used to 
question the basis of the ‘responsive regulatory theory’, which steer the flow of 
events through a pyramidal approach with violent enforcement at the top. This 
means that nonviolence relates to the regulation of non-state actors by the state 
as well. This may include many different domains, from prison to extra-juridical 
assassination by the state, from war to UN peacekeeping. Braithwaite recently 
started to question the truth that that violence is the necessary peak of the 
pyramid (Braithwaite, 2014).  
Up to now we focused on the relation between people, citizens and the state. 
Nevertheless, the term nonviolence is also associated to many other social 
behaviours, relations and habits. It relates to the widest range of activities, mainly 
contrasting exploitation and oppression. Non-violence has been related to a 
certain approach to economics aiming at self-sufficiency as well as empowering 
people instead of a few. This approach has been called by some Gandhian 
economics (Schumacher, 1993), or Gandhian political economy (Ghosh, 2012). 
The thrust of this approach is to empower citizens and avoid concentration of 
power in order to foster self-sufficiency. One example of nonviolence in 
economics are the many small cooperative communities of producers, such as 
the agrovilas which challenge the dominant industrial agricultural model in Brazil 
(Schock, 2015:176) Besides, some attempts of self-governing around the world 
are labelled nonviolent, such as those in Argentina (Sitrin, 2012). Looking 
beyond, nonviolence refers as well to the many attempts to create ashram-like 
communities around the world, such as those founded by Lanza Del Vasto31 and 
called Ark Communities (Vasto, 1974). Another example of nonviolence is the 
work of Danilo Dolci. The Italian activist and sociologist, who moved to Sicily in 
order to champion the cause of the poorest. He founded an orphanage, 
cooperatives and later the Centro Studi e Iniziative per la Piena Occupazione 
(Centre of Research and Initiatives for Full Employment). He even invented a 
                                                          
31 The first Ark Community has been founded in 1948 in Tournier, Charente-Maritime. New 
communities mushroomed in France and other countries, as well as in South America.  
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new form of struggle, the ‘strike in reverse’ or ‘reverse strike’, consisting in 
initiating unauthorised public works in favour of the poor. Due to the variety of 
these uses, we can claim that nonviolence is used also to describe a real 
permanent and everyday revolution and change in society.  
The permanent revolution of nonviolence mixes politics with religion and the more 
personal spheres of human life. Here nonviolence is associated with terms such 
as love, charity, compassion and many others. Today, one example of 
nonviolence is certainly the current Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, whose 
commitment for nonviolence is expressed both in words (Dalai Lama, 2001) and 
deeds. Turning to Islam, nonviolence has been central in the work of the Pashtun 
leader and contemporary of Gandhi Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Nanda, 2004), or more 
recently to the philosophy of Jawdat Said (Abu-Nimer, 2015:53). Focusing on 
Christianity, nonviolence has been associated with key actors, such as the 
Anglican Desmond Tutu, the American Baptist Martin Luther King Jr., the German 
Lutheran pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer and others. For what concerns the Catholic 
world, along with Mother Teresa (Jahanbegloo, 2014) and Thomas Merton, we 
should consider part of the universe of nonviolence the many South Americans 
fighting against dictatorships. Symbols of nonviolent struggle includes Pérez 
Esquivel (Esquivel, 1983), Oscar Romero, bishop and martyr in San Salvador; 
dom Hélder Câmara, bishop of Olinda and Recife, and fighter against injustice 
and military regimes; Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, Brasilian bishop and later 
cardinal, champion of human rights; and then Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann in 
Nicaragua, the Ecuadorian Leonidas Proaño, Samuel Ruiz, who worked to bring 
peace between Mexican government and Zapatistas, and José Maria Pires 
(Puleo, 1994). 
From this short summary, it is quite evident that the concept of nonviolence is 
present in many different fields of study, from security to social movement 
studies, from economics to ethics. At this point, the question is: What makes 
possible to use the same term talking about so many different things? What 
allowed nonviolence to enter so many fields of study? Is there a definition of 
nonviolence at the basis of this success? This will be the topic of the next 
sections. 
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1.2. The Distinction between Principles and Methods of Action  
Among the many reasons for the successful rise in the use of the concept, a key 
one is the affirmation of a particular conception of nonviolence. As we claimed in 
the introduction, the first battle for the existence of the concept did not lead to a 
widespread use of the term, which remained confined to certain pacifists and 
religious groups. However, something changed since the 1960s, with the 
emergence of key works and a clearer definition of nonviolence. With this term, 
the literature started referring to two different things: a principle or a set of 
techniques of action. This division is the current way to make sense of the fact 
that the same term is used to label Otpor! and the Dalai Lama, those who use 
nonviolent techniques because of their efficiency and Gandhi (Bharadwaj, 1998). 
The key theorist associated to this division is the American scholar Gene Sharp. 
Since the 1960s, his contribution to the field had profound impact on the way 
people looked at nonviolence. For Zunes, it is thanks to him if consideration of 
Gandhian campaigns moved beyond religious and ethics courses, and if we 
witness the development of the study on nonviolent conflict and civil resistance 
in different fields (Engler, 2013:63). By many it is even acknowledged that Sharp’s 
ideas have been the sine qua non of the success of the Otpor! Revolution in 
Serbia against Slobodan Milošević. 
It is worth reminding that the internal tension of nonviolence between a focus on 
a principle and on techniques of action is nothing new in the literature. Since the 
introduction of nonviolence in the west, a tension between two souls of 
nonviolence was evident. During the 1920s and 1930s, there was a split between 
those who considered non-violence a substitute for war, or a principle of a pacifist 
revolution. The former group includes authors such as Case, Shridharani, and 
Gregg. In what is considered the first important study on the topic, Non-Violent 
Coercion: a Study in Methods of Social Pressure, the American sociologist  
Clarence Marsh Case inquired how much room remained “for the positive 
effectuation of social purposes and ideals on the part of those who reject the use 
of physical force” (Case, 1923:413-4). Within this study, non-violent resistance is 
“a principle of social action” (Case, 1923:4). With these words, Case means a set 
of methods, techniques used in order to achieve change, with or without mass 
mobilisation. The aim is to “produce in the mind of the one appealed to, i.e., the 
subject, a change of mental attitude without the use of coercion” (Case, 
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1923:398). Thus, actions of non-violent coercion and passive resistance, 
synonyms for Case, are forms of collective pressure, a reaction “between 
submission and resistance” (Case, 1923:397) to actions which impinge a group’s 
interests.  
The first clear description of this new way of waging conflicts arrived some years 
later with the 1934 book The Power of Non-violence by Richard Gregg. Here, 
non-violence is understood as a particular and useful way to wage conflicts. Using 
“the then prestigious canon of modern psychology” (Scalmer, 2011:100), even 
though still underdeveloped, the book is an attempt to understand “the emotional, 
mental and moral mechanisms” involved (Gregg, 1966:43) in this particular action 
at the level of both individuals and groups. From this analysis, nonviolent 
resistance emerged as an answer to violence. More precisely, nonviolent 
resistance works as a sort of moral jiu-jitsu: “the nonviolence and good will of the 
victim acts in the same way that the lack of physical opposition by the user of 
physical jiu-jitsu, does, causing the attacker to lose his moral balance” (Gregg, 
1966:44).  
Few years later, Krishnalal Shridharani, in his work War without Violence, went 
even further in describing nonviolence. He claimed that satyagraha, or “non-
violent direct action” (Shridharani, 1939:13), is a “new social institution”, a plan 
for concerted action which is equivalent and can substitute the institution of war. 
Nonviolence was that kind of “effective action, short of the destructive practice of 
war” which was able to achieve “realistic and needed ends” (Shridharani, 
1939:13), and it is useful “for attaining group objectives without the aid of 
Machiavellian physical force and fraud” (Shridharani, 1939:12-3). In other words, 
non-violence referred to a “technique of concerted social action” (Shridharani, 
1939:14), which is independent from political and social context, tradition and 
conditions. Shridharani admitted that it was easier for Indians to adopt non-
violence, due to their cultural traits. He also admitted that satyagraha was an 
expansion of the concept of Ahimsa, and it represents the culmination of Hindu 
heritage (Shridharani, 1939:154). However, satyagraha “can be substituted for 
war as simply as outmoded airplanes can be replaced by faster and more 
powerful ones” (Shridharani, 1939:188). 
The interpretations of Case, Gregg and Shridharani may be opposed to other 
ways of understanding non-violence at the time. Indeed, the term has also been 
49 | P a g e  
 
adopted by the pacifist movements. It has become a key component of what can 
be called radical pacifism. Radical pacifism emerged from the peace movement 
between the world wars, along with anti-war peace advocates. The former, also 
called absolute pacifists, repudiate all organised violence, war, and armed 
conflict. On the contrary, anti-war peace advocates oppose war and militarism, 
while supporting defensive wars and even armed social revolution (Bennett, 
2003:XII). Nonviolence became the central component of the radical pacifists’ 
revolution, which does not stop at the political realm, but includes a change in the 
personal, social, and even spiritual spheres.  
Two famous supporters of a more ‘secular’ form of nonviolent revolution are 
Aldous Huxley and Barthelemy de Ligt. In Means and Ends and The Conquest of 
Violence, the two authors acknowledged the importance of Case and Gregg, but 
push the topic in a different direction. Here non-violence was not only a method 
for war or struggle; it was a method of economic, social and cultural revolution. It 
was both method and spiritual force; it was abstention from any kind of violence, 
but also absence of fear and hatred in the fight for a different society. De Ligt was 
clear in saying that “non-violent resistance makes calls on man as a moral being: 
the more he practices it, the higher a level of human value he will reach” (De Ligt, 
1989:165). For Huxley, non-violence is even a philosophy which embraces 
individuals and societies. The agents of this reform were described as new men, 
which De Ligt called ‘soldiers of peace’ (De Ligt, 1989:210), who fight with 
heroism, discipline, self-denial, as in armed battle. They take into account even 
self-sacrifice, even though not subordinated to collective violence, but affirming 
intellectual and moral individuality (De Ligt, 1989:211). Their aim is no more to 
substitute war or violent protests, but to place non-violence at the basis of any 
individual, social and political relationship in order to achieve peace. Huxley and 
De Ligt agree that “the things that makes for peace above all others is the 
systematic practice in all human relationships of non-violence” (Huxley, 
1969:138). Thus, non-violence was described as the key for social liberty, justice 
(De Ligt, 1989:268), the construction of “a free and just society” (Huxley, 
1969:15), and it was even deeply linked with religion or cosmology (Huxley, 
1969:7). This means going beyond anti-militarism, because it was insufficient 
when not embedded in a “wider task, namely the creation of a new culture and 
society” (De Ligt, 1989:XVI). More generally, we can claim that non-violence was 
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also used as a synonym of peace, which meant much more than simple absence 
of war. Huxley claimed that “all men desire peace, but very few desire those 
things that make for peace” (Huxley, 1969:138). Non-violence was both at the 
same time. 
The approach of Huxley and De Ligt was not the only one that radical pacifism 
was expressing at the time. Other authors developed much more than them the 
ties between non-violence and religion. They even merged non-violence and 
pacifism in the different religious traditions. This is the case of Sibley’s 1943 
article The Political Theories of Modern Religious Pacifism, in which he claimed 
that Hinduism and Christianity have deep roots in past philosophies of non-
violence, although their theologies differ (Sibley, 1943:440). However, the  most 
well-known activist of that period, who pushed further the link between pacifism, 
spirituality and religion, was the radical pacifist Abraham Johannes Muste, who 
published in 1940, Non-violence in an Aggressive World. Muste claimed that 
WW2 represented the horrible backdrop against which a different world is 
imagined. The choice was simple: either a life of fear, violence and domination, 
or of love. Many at his time “bow the knee before Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, [and] 
some social arbiter or some other idol” (Muste, 1940:6). This path threatened 
democracy, social progress and even religion, which depended for survival and 
triumph “upon the adoption of a thorough-going, deeply motivated, positive, 
realistic pacifism” (Muste, 1940:10). The future of civilization depended on a 
social revolution toward pacifism. This revolution cannot be violent; violence is 
not a valid way for real change (Muste, 1940:78). Instead, Muste advised to follow 
another example, that of Jesus. Jesus chose the way of love, even though this 
included pain as well as the likelihood of being defeated and killed. Jesus was 
example of non-violence, as it was example of repentance, love of the enemy, 
self-suffering, refusal to inflict or desire to inflict sufferance on the others, and 
repudiation of using Caesar’s weapons (Muste, 1940:28). Nonviolence was thus 
a way that grows out of the Christian or Jewish-Christian view of life (Muste, 
1940:30). Jesus “rejected the way of the sword and knew that He would therefore 
have to tread the way of the Cross” (Muste, 1940:25). Thus, nonviolence was the 
way of the Cross, which means complete sacrifice, and was the way in which a 
person shows the love of God (Muste, 1940:19). 
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The two different interpretations of non-violence as a method of struggle or a 
deep principle of pacifism or religious love have never been seriously challenged. 
To the contrary, since the 1940s we witness a constant attempt to define, 
redefine, and rename two main views of non-violence. One of the first authors to 
do so was Theodore Paullin, who tried to clarify in his 1944 Introduction to Non-
Violence that non-violence can be defined from the idea of a continuum. On one 
extreme we find violence coupled with hatred, then ‘violence without hate’, ‘hate 
without violence’, non-violent coercion, satyagraha or nonviolent direct action and 
non-resistance. At the opposite extreme we find active goodwill and 
reconciliation. Within this continuum, Paullin claimed that non-violence can be 
either a principle, “accepted as an end in itself”, or a “means to some other 
desired end” (Paullin, 1944:3). Non-violence as a principle is the “highest value 
and supreme principle” of the absolute pacifist. On the contrary, he acknowledged 
that many of pacifists and non-pacifists consider non-violence as a technique. 
Being a mere technique, it can be used for different purposes; it is not attached 
to any value in particular, and it does not have to be followed in any 
circumstances.  
The interpretation of Paullin was in line with the concept of non-violence held by 
political and social organisations of the time. One instance is given by Calhoun, 
who reported of a conference of 95 left-wing non-violent revolutionists in Chicago, 
in which it was decided for the establishment in the US of the Committee for Non-
Violent Revolution. In the statement of principle of the conference we read that 
“we see non-violence as a principle as well as a technique. In all actions we 
renounce the methods of punishing, hating or killing any fellow human being” 
(Calhoun, 1946:118). Non-violence was considered the most suitable 
revolutionary technique; a violent uprising was not a valid alternative. Only the 
masses, organised in non-violent movements, can change the current system; 
their weapon is the power to refuse submission to any authority (Calhoun, 
1946:119). The implementation of this power is through “agitation, seizure of 
existing plants, and development of new worker-consumer enterprises” (Calhoun, 
1946:119). 
Thus, the division was almost already established in the 1940s, and it continued 
to manifestly contour the debate on non-violence. Some years later, in 1958, 
Bondurant published one of the key works in the history of non-violence, called 
52 | P a g e  
 
Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict. As Sharp claimed, 
“this is the first book by a Western political scientist on the significance of Gandhi 
and Satyagraha for problems of Western political theory and practice” (Sharp, 
1959b:401). The book is centred on explaining the concept of satyagraha. Even 
though the division seems to be less radical, the influence of the two ‘souls’ of 
nonviolence is apparent throughout the pages. Indeed, she is persuaded that the 
main problem of satyagraha is the ‘cultural matrix’ (Bondurant, 1988:5), which 
obscures its essential elements. A new analysis was needed, which divided the 
technique of action from the rest of Gandhi’s teaching. Bondurant claimed that “it 
is essential rigorously to differentiate satyagraha as technique of action from 
those specific considerations of right-living with which Gandhi also concerned 
himself”. The importance is due to the fact that satyagraha “is basically an ethic-
principle the essence of which is a social technique of action” (Bondurant, 
1988:12). In other words, the social technique of action is at the centre; at the 
same time, satyagraha becomes a group of precepts for action. Thus, Bondurant 
does not depart neatly from the previous tradition, as she tried to explain the 
power and novelty of satyagraha using the division between a principle and a 
mere technique of action. At the same time, it is evident the difficulty of describing 
satyagraha as a mere technique of action. Too much is at stake, such as truth, 
love and self-suffering.  
Nevertheless, the tension between a principle and a method continued to lead 
the literature on the topic. The same need expressed by Bondurant for order in 
the dynamic meaning of nonviolence was at the basis of two other studies 
published in the same period. The first was the article of the philosopher Arne 
Naess, A Systematization of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution (Naess, 
1958). The Norwegian philosopher tried to explain Gandhi’s thoughts and deeds 
as an ethics. In order to do so, he put in place a rational reconstruction in the form 
of a normative system. Gandhi’s actions and speech were translated into norms 
and sub-norms defining valid actions. The normative power of the system rested 
on one norm: acting in group struggle in a way conducive to long-term universal 
reduction of violence.  Naess claimed that on this norm rests the Gandhian 
method of conflict behaviour, called satyagraha. Besides, Naess drew also first 
principles, a sort of secularised metaphysics, including assumptions such as the 
unity of human beings and life. This article is an example of Naess’ attempt to 
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conceive of non-violence as an “alternative to nuclearism and to violent behaviour 
in group conflict in general” (Galtung, 2011:37) through a deductive system of 
norms. This system will be central in the development of Naess’ idea of deep 
ecology. 
Arne Naess will inspire both as tutor and friend Johan Galtung, who put 
nonviolence at the centre of a new field, peace research. Galtung started a 
ground-breaking research on the different kinds of violence, and described 
nonviolence as positive and negative. The former includes “all efforts – short of 
bodily incapacitation of any kind to influence the other party by trying to make it 
more difficult for him to perform actions a non-violent group is against”. This 
certainly contains the flow of violence in the world, but it does not face directly 
frustration and injustice. Instead, positive nonviolence aims to construct 
something new and different, as it includes “any effort, again short of bodily 
manipulation, to make it more easy for the other party to perform the actions the 
non-violence group would favour” (Galtung, 1992). 
In 1958, Gene Sharp was invited to the University of Oslo by Naess. The following 
year, Sharp published The Meanings of Non-Violence: A Typology (Revisited). 
The study tried to provide an answer to the confused meaning of nonviolence. 
The object was to “clarify, classify, and define” (Sharp, 1959a:64) the different 
types of nonviolence. In particular, he called ‘generic non-violence’ the abstention 
from physical violence, and divided pacifism from ‘non-violent resistance and 
direct action’. Then, Sharp listed in a progressive way nine types of non-violence, 
which can be included within the two categories above. The order is on the basis 
of the increasing activity involved.  
The distinction between pacifism and non-violent resistance had to deal with 
doubts and a particular international climate. For instance, Sibley, in The Quiet 
Battle, still considered non-violence an ambiguous term, embedding both a 
“personal ethic of non-violence and its political significance” (Sibley, 1963:7). The 
tendency of linking non-violence, social justice and the total refusal of war was 
widespread, due mainly to the tremendous events of that period, from the 
development of intercontinental missiles, the Cuba crisis, the instability of South 
America, and the mass murder in Hungary, Algeria and Vietnam. The sentiment 
of impotence and fear of many citizens of the two blocs exacerbated. Out of this 
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fear, many authors, such as Thomas Merton32, James Douglass33, Jacques 
Ellul34, Dom Helder Camara35, defended the claim that non-violence was a way 
of life: it was a revolution against a life of terror.      
Hitherto, it is clear that the division between the principle and the method of non-
violence was already there. The need was only to refine and reflect on it. This will 
be done a few years later, with an important article by Judith Stiehm called 
Nonviolence is Two. The American scholar finds the concept of nonviolent 
resistance rather confusing because it “encompasses a wide variety of actions 
(from self-immolation to a carefully conceived consumer boycott) as well as a 
number of philosophic positions (from that of the Friends to that of the Congress 
of Racial Equality activists)” (Stiehm, 1968:23). Along with writing nonviolence 
without the dash, she claimed that ‘for convenience’ there are ‘two strands of 
thought’, which are incompatible, differing “in their motivation their assumptions 
and their implications” (Stiehm, 1968:24). The two strands of thought are called 
“conscientious nonviolence” and a “pragmatic nonviolence”. Conscientious 
nonviolence is associated with the individual, both in decision-making and action-
initiation. It stems from a religious or ethical injunction prohibiting injury. It 
assumes that conscience is inviolable and should be obeyed, and that social 
conflict is “no more than a failure of communication between individuals and their 
consciences”. This category includes a variety of people, from those who 
“conscientiously object to war” to those “who sail (in the Pacific) or walk (in the 
Sahara) into atomic testing grounds” (Stiehm, 1968:24). On the contrary, 
pragmatic nonviolence is associated with collective behaviour, it is a “means of 
economically waging conflict” (Stiehm, 1968:26), “a more or less spontaneous 
response by an unarmed populace or by a minority group to a situation regarded 
as intolerable”. This second strand considers conflict as normal, and nonviolence 
as an effective way of challenging power. Thus, it is clear that the two kinds of 
nonviolence have key differences. Firstly, conscientious nonviolence is an 
                                                          
32 Thomas Merton (1915-1968) was a Trappist monk. He was one of the most important and well 
known Catholics working on nonviolence in the US, influencing a whole generation of theologians 
and activists. His most famous book is the autobiography The Seven Storey Mountain (1948).  
33 James W. Douglass was a theologian and a Catholic peacemaker. He wrote in 1968 The 
Nonviolent Cross. 
34 French sociologist, theologian and anarchist. His most famous work on the topic is Violence: 
Reflections from a Christian Perspective published in 1969. 
35 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Olinda and Recife. One of his famous book is Spiral of Violence, 
written in 1970. 
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individual job, or a group executing a unanimous decision; pragmatic nonviolence 
is the work of persons acting in concert. Secondly, conscientious nonviolence 
believes conflict to be unreal, solvable in an increase of communication, while 
pragmatic nonviolence expects conflict. Then, conscientious nonviolence 
emphasises individual obligation of avoiding doing wrong, meanwhile pragmatic 
nonviolence “seeks to avoid being wronged” (Stiehm, 1968:27). Finally, the aim 
is different. For the conscientious nonviolence the best government is no 
government, whereas pragmatic nonviolence revolves around democracy.  
Thus, with the article of Stiehm, nonviolence lost the hyphen, but witnessed the 
crystallisation of a deep internal division in two. She acknowledged that the 
categories of conscientious and pragmatic run parallel in real life. “The two 
theories do live together” (Stiehm, 1968:28), and this is apparent in many events, 
such as sermons, pickets and theoretical discussions. Nevertheless, the division 
between a collective behaviour and an individual conviction was set up. Even 
more, on this division two quite autonomous categories have been established, 
conscientious and pragmatic nonviolence.  
The definitive break came few years later, with the key refinement and 
clarification provided by the seminal work of Gene Sharp. Sharp, who is 
nowadays considered the most important scholar of nonviolence, started from the 
beginning of his career to read and talk about Gandhi and nonviolence. While at 
the beginning of his career he was a strong follower of Gandhi, later Sharp 
gradually tried to “distance himself from his source of inspiration” (Weber, 
2004:232). Until 1960s, Sharp worked intensively on Gandhi, promoting 
satyagraha as an innovative method of combating evil combining moral power, 
love, integrity, and goodness with non-violent strategy and techniques (Weber, 
2004:234). However, a slow change in his position took place. This change is 
visible in the collection of many works written between 1959 and 1970 called 
Gandhi as a Political Strategist, and led to the publication of The Politics of 
Nonviolent Action. They represent a ground-breaking shift towards a more 
strategic dimension of nonviolence, which still shape most of the current research 
on the topic. 
Sharp faced similar problems to those of Stiehm. The term nonviolence was 
confused; there was the need to clarify, classify and define the different forms of 
nonviolence. The task had to be done in an academic, value-neutral way.  The 
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American scholar began with an impressive study of Gandhi’s works and deeds, 
as he believed the source of confusion laid there. The cause of the confusion on 
the meaning of nonviolence is traceable first of all in the eccentricities, religious 
symbolism and language of Gandhi. It is difficult to deal with an author who was 
far from systematic. Secondly, the frequent identification of Gandhi with the Indian 
National Congress added serious problems in the study and evaluation of the 
Mahatma and of nonviolence itself (Sharp, 1979:2). In addition, the distorted use 
and interpretation of nonviolence spread by pacifist and in particular religious 
pacifists, stalled its acceptance due to the fact that few accepted their 
programmes and doctrines (Sharp, 1979:122). Finally, the novelty and strength 
of nonviolence was threatened by many wrong common beliefs, such as the 
conviction that nonviolent campaigns were possible because the opponent was 
a British Government made up of gentlemen36.  
Nevertheless, one of the main sources of confusion was in the distinction made 
by Gandhi between a ‘nonviolence of the weak’ and a ‘nonviolence of the brave’. 
Here, as in other circumstances, Gandhi “often seemed to [be] torn in two or more 
directions at the same time, and some of his statements were in clear 
contradiction to others” (Sharp, 1979:89). Sharp criticised the view that in the first 
phase of Gandhi’s life, the Mahatma preached nonviolence as a policy, while only 
later he disavowed that limited approach in favour of a more radical and moral 
concept of nonviolence. Sharp admitted that Gandhi’s focus was initially limited 
to nonviolence directed to the achievement of “political objectives” (Sharp, 
1979:96). India had to adopt nonviolence because it was more effective in 
producing change. However, the Mahatma always believed in the importance of 
conviction, will and attitudes. Later in his life, Gandhi stressed the flaws of the 
use of nonviolent technique as a policy, mainly in relation to the violent turn of the 
Indian process of independence. For this reason he bitterly admitted that the form 
of nonviolence used by India was ‘nonviolence of the weak’. Violence came back 
                                                          
36 This argument, developed at page 12 of Gandhi as a Political Strategist, will eventually re-
emerge in the literature. The 1987 article of Stratford, called Can Nonviolence Defence be 
Effective if the Opponent is Ruthless?: the Nazi Case, along with Martin’s The Nazis and 
Nonviolence, are good examples of the different views on the topic. A similar argument is given 
by Liddell Hart in his 1968 Lessons from Resistance Movements-Guerrilla and Non-Violent, in 
Civil Resistance as a National Defense (Harrisburg:Stackpoole, p.240). Walzer repeated the 
same claim in Just and Unjust War. He even supported this claim on the “perverse advice” given 
by Gandhi to the Jews in Germany. A propose, Sharp overcomes this highly debatable mistake 
in Gandhi as a Political Strategist, stressing that this interpretation does not consider when this 
claim has been made, distorting the meaning. 
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on the scene too rapidly, showing how superficially nonviolence has been 
understood. As a reaction, Gandhi opposed to this expedient nonviolence a 
different one based on moral conviction, ‘nonviolence of the brave’. The latter 
described nonviolence more as a ‘creed’, and it did not contain the many 
weaknesses of the former, which was only a ‘policy’ (Sharp, 1979:105). This 
creed meant that it would not give up in favour of violence in difficult times; that 
needs bravery and courage; that it requires the use of intellect, resourcefulness 
and creativity in its application; that it would be applied in all areas of life (Sharp, 
1979:299).  
The complexity of Gandhian nonviolence brought Sharp initially to look for a 
reconciliation between a nonviolence of the weak and of the brave, in other words 
between techniques and principle. Unfortunately, a strong disillusionment 
followed the “long and frustrating period” during which Sharp tried to persuade 
pacifist groups of the need to be leaders in the attempt to replace violent 
sanctions with nonviolent ones, instead of focusing on “continue efforts to gain 
individual converts to personal pacifism” (Sharp, 1979:252). This is one of the 
reasons for the increasing critique to Gandhi evident in Gandhi as a Political 
Strategist. Indeed, Sharp provided a tight response to the Gandhian critique to 
the violence of the weak. Nonviolence of the weak was based on the use of 
nonviolence as an expedient technique by people unwilling or unable to offer 
armed resistance (Sharp, 1979:113). However, Sharp objected, in the moment 
people resort to nonviolence, they change the helpless initial condition. Moreover, 
military weakness cannot be a factor to distinguish nonviolence of the weak 
(Sharp, 1979:115). 
Along with the frequent critiques of Gandhi and the interest in the nonviolence of 
the weak, Sharp started to interpret the Indian leader in a different way. Sharp 
focused more and more on Gandhi as “neither a conscientious objector nor a 
supporter of violence in politics”, but as an “experimenter in the development of 
‘war without weapons’” (Sharp, 1979:4). The reference to Shridharani’s work was 
not by chance. The Indian author, along with Bondurant’s interpretation of 
satyagraha as a technique of nonviolent action37, represent two key sources of 
                                                          
37 Sharp dedicated a review in 1959 to Bondurant’s Conquest of Violence in which he considered 
it “the first book by a Western political scientist on the significance of Gandhi and satyagraha for 
problems of Western political theory and practice” p. 61. 
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Sharp’s ideas. They all belong to a group of authors who research on nonviolent 
action as an “adequate functional substitute for violent conflict” (Sharp, 1979:75). 
From this angle, Gandhi does not look like a saint, but a person with a great 
understanding of political reality, intuition, organizational ability, attention to 
details and will to experiment. In the same vein, India’ choice of nonviolence was 
not pacifism, but a “political act in response to a political program of action 
proposed to deal with a particular kind of situation and crisis” (Sharp, 1979:19). 
Moral superiority was not the prime factor for its acceptance; it was persuasive 
and convincing in that particular political moment. In other words, Sharp started 
to move to the position that systems of beliefs and techniques are separable 
(Weber, 2004:237).  
Satyagraha pays the price of this move, and especially of the disagreement with 
pacifists; it has been in fact severed in two. Indeed, satyagraha is described as a 
“technique of action” (Sharp, 1979:37). This technique of action includes different 
techniques, “degree of dynamism, aggressiveness, attitudes to the opponent” 
(Sharp, 1979:37), and it aims at the conversion of the other through personal 
suffering, with no wish to injure anybody. At the same time, satyagraha is 
described as “firmness which comes from reliance on truth” (Sharp, 1979:14); a 
great deal of attention goes to the inward as the first step for the fight against evil 
in the world (Sharp, 1979:220). 
Thus, nonviolence started to be considered either a set of techniques, a political 
weapon to fight tyranny and a substitute for war; or a principle to obey, which 
comes from a deep ethical or religious belief. The distinction allowed nonviolence 
to enter the many fields mentioned above, such as peace studies, strategic 
studies, social movement studies, and many others. Almost all of the most 
famous handbooks, introductions, and works on nonviolence take for granted (or 
at least acknowledge the existence of) the distinction, such as Holmes (2012), 
Mallik (2002), Jahanbegloo (2014), Atack (2012), Kurlansky (2009). Even in 
some of the Christian scholarship, the division is accepted: methods are divided 
from values. One example is Koontz, who considered nonviolent resistance one 
of the three versions of Christian nonviolence. Nonviolent resistance was the set 
of “pragmatically effective nonviolent means of ‘fighting’ that are viable 
alternatives to war and military conflict and that can achieve or protect crucial 
values” (Koontz, 2008:235).  
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What are the reasons behind this development? Why was the division so 
successful? The reasons for the success of these distinctions are many. The 
division between a set of methods of action and a principle allowed scholars, 
activists and the Western public to identify and describe the complex and broad 
concept of nonviolence, leaving aside exotic words as well as theories. In other 
words, Sharp successfully “produced conceptual order amongst the cluttered and 
scattered experiences and literature on non-violent actions” (Martin, 1989). This 
has a threefold consequence. For a start, it is much easier to describe what 
nonviolence is, and it is much easier to find examples of events and behaviours 
which can be catalogued as nonviolent. It is easier to label ‘nonviolent’ some 
insurrections, some techniques of protesting or defending the country, and 
consequently it is easier to operationalise the concept, which is key in order to 
enter many fields of political science and other subjects. Thus, it became natural 
to claim that “for analytical reasons” and because it is “easier” to understand and 
to describe, we shall distinguish between two components in Gandhism, “the 
political struggle method (non-violence) and the socio-economic program” 
(Hettne, 1976:228). This fact suited even religious groups, because it is easier to 
match the principle of nonviolence with the radical and faith-based ways of life 
that they are preaching, which may be epitomised by their prophet as well as 
justified by the tale of another life.  
Besides the success at the descriptive level, the conceptual order offered by 
Sharp had consequences at what we can call praxeological level38. With the term 
praxeology we refer to the analysis aiming at identifying logical potentials of ideas 
immanent in society and following their logic” (Price, 2008:10), or as Linklater 
claimed, “reflecting on the moral resources within existing social arrangements 
which political actors can harness for political purposes”(Linklater, 1998:5). In 
other words, the dominant categories of the field may raise some concerns about 
their logical full implications, but also hope about their possibilities. The division 
allowed many political groups and association to adopt the concept of 
nonviolence, and in particular some of its more interesting techniques of action, 
without having to deal with moral issues as well as adhere to a creed. This fact 
                                                          
38  This term derived from Raymond Aron’s last section of Peace and War. There, the scholar 
found as the key issue of praxeology the tension between Machiavellian calculations of 
opportunity and the Kantian problem of acting ethically towards universal peace, or as the tension 
between ethics of conviction and responsibility. 
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has been extremely important for the current success of nonviolence around the 
world. Nonviolence became an effective tool to act in the real world to overthrow 
governments and put pressure on political power. This development meant the 
confutation of all those criticisms which considered nonviolence possible only in 
dealing with democratic regimes. Nowadays, many revolutions around the world 
follow the nonviolent path. At the same time, pacifist groups could easily embed 
the concept of nonviolence into their own ideologies, avoiding any concern with 
effectiveness, exchange with other groups, and providing a further argument to 
sustain their actions.  
Finally, there are valid reasons at the religious level. Sharp’s conceptual order 
interjected the need for a secularised concept, which suited the Western secular 
society. Sharp made of nonviolence something very different from a simple 
branch of pacifism or religion. In other words, dividing nonviolence in a technique 
and a principle allowed the former to enter the international sphere, averting the 
many prejudices concerning religion, and in particular the Westphalian 
Presumption, the conviction that religion should remain in the private sphere for 
the sake of the international order. At the same time, the division allowed 
nonviolence to continue to be used in religious circles, but without affecting more 
scientific, secular and international research. 
To summarise, the division of nonviolence in a technique of action and a principle 
is now the dominant way in which the concept is interpreted. This 
conceptualisation benefitted enormously the literature on nonviolence. Gene 
Sharp made a ground-breaking contribution, with consequences at the 
descriptive (it is easier to describe nonviolence as there are many particular 
definitions of it), praxeological (more people use the term and the idea that 
nonviolence is possible only in dealing with democracies is confuted), and even 
religious level (satisfy the need of a secularised concept). What remains to be 
seen is: what is the result of this success? This will be the aim of the next section.  
 
1.3. Nonviolence is Two: Pragmatic and Principled Nonviolence 
The success of the division between principle and techniques of action led to a 
real split in the world of nonviolence. Indeed, we witnessed the development of 
what are now the two most important categories in the literature, those of 
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principled and pragmatic nonviolence. These two categories are sometimes 
described as two “orientations” not always distinguishable (Martin, 2009), but it is 
better to say that they represent two autonomous and very different streams of 
nonviolence, with different key scholars, which sometimes seem to look at very 
different things. Beyond any doubt, the category which benefited most of the 
distinction was pragmatic nonviolence, which has now become an important field 
in politics. Indeed, pragmatic nonviolence represents by far the more dynamic 
field of nonviolence of the last decades. This category includes a variety of 
research whose thread is the understanding of nonviolence as civil disobedience 
or civil resistance (Schock 2013), and a more effective means for a group to 
achieve something considered important, such as democracy or human rights. 
From this angle, nonviolence refers to a series of extremely valuable techniques 
in seizing and keeping power. As Sharp claimed, “self-suffering is no longer only 
a risk, it also becomes a weapon” (Sharp and Paulson, 2005). Nonviolence, and 
in particular nonviolent direct action, constitutes a weapon in the hand of the 
population. Thanks to the many techniques gathered on the basis of this 
conviction, people can finally move away from collective violent behaviours. 
Sharp argues that people turn to violence “because they do not see any other 
option for resolving intractable conflicts”. The problem is not that they are wicked. 
The real issue is that it is not enough to exhort to love; a persuasive and effective 
alternative way of proceeding should be available. The scholarship on nonviolent 
direct action is thus keen to show that a strategy of nonviolent conflict is a more 
effective alternative than violence. 
Pragmatic nonviolence’s key concern is power, and the approach used to achieve 
it is shaped by what is called consent theory. This is not a new theory. La Boetie 
talked extensively about it already in the XVI century, in his Discourse on 
Voluntary Servitude. Sharp claims that this theory is already visible in Gandhi’s 
works and deeds. The theory behind satyagraha itself is that all governments 
depend on the voluntary assistance, cooperation and obedience of their citizens. 
What is new in Gandhi is the focus on the means for change: non-cooperation, 
defiance, and disobedience. These actions, along with a change of attitude 
towards the government, allow the people to move from passive submission and 
acceptance to self-reliance and resistance to whatever is regarded unjust and 
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tyrannical (Sharp, 1979:53). The whole technique of nonviolent struggle is based 
upon the conviction that consent is power.  
“Once grasped, and when the associated corollaries of nonviolent discipline, the 
necessity of wise choice of methods, strategy and tactics, preparations and 
training, development of internal strength, and persistence in pace of repression 
are also understood and implemented, it becomes possible to end war and 
oppression in our lifetime” (Sharp, 1979:39).  
This theory of power, described at the beginning of Sharp’s key work, The Politics 
of Nonviolent Action (1973a), has a pluralistic nature. Power is no more a quality 
of the leader; it is instead the power to influence, pressure, and coerce. Influence, 
pressure, and coercion can be applied both to achieve the aims of those who hold 
power, and to prevent them from obtaining it. This represents a clear rejection of 
a Weberian monolithic view of power, in which control is in the hands of those in 
government, resting on the ability to enforce sanctions and use of violence. In the 
light of the many important nonviolent victories of the XX century, this theory is 
inadequate. On the contrary, the American scholar claimed that there are some 
key sources of power, such as authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, 
intangible factors, material resources and sanctions. They do not always have 
the same value, as their importance change depending on the specific situation; 
nevertheless, these are the keys to power. Power is ultimately based on 
obedience, cooperation and consent of the citizens, therefore. Only the 
cooperation of the people can fuel the authority of a government or a tyrant 
through the above sources of power.  
Thus, nonviolence starts with a ‘no’. This refusal is the premise to change the 
status quo, and is far from being something passive (Sharp, 1973a). It “involves 
an active process of bringing political, economic, social, emotional, or moral 
pressure to bear in the wielding of power in contentious interactions between 
collective actors” (Schock 2005), and it is more effective when it undermines the 
sources of power above mentioned. It can happen that during this process those 
in power will open a dialogue after the refusal of the citizens to collaborate. 
Unfortunately, the most likely consequence will be repression. This kind of 
answer of the opponent, Sharp claims, is not a problem. It is instead an 
opportunity. Indeed, the key part of consent theory relates to the so-called 
‘political jiu-jitsu’. The thrust of this approach is that repression becomes a 
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weakness for those in power, as the brutality of the regime is exposed, 
undermining its legitimacy and pushing to withdraw cooperation. ‘Political jiu-jitsu’ 
“occurs when authorities use violence against peaceful protesters: this is seen as 
unjust and can greatly increase support for the protesters” (Martin, 2009). When 
one group uses violence, the other “will then be able to apply something like jiu-
jitsu to their opponent, throwing him off balance politically, causing his repression 
to rebound against his position, and weakening his power” (Sharp, 1973b:110).  
Yet, how does political jiu-jitsu work? Gene Sharp carefully described the many 
techniques to use in order to ‘throw the opponent off the balance politically’, 
leading to an increase of internal and external dissent against the brutality of the 
regime. He distinguished the methods of nonviolent actions in three categories: 
protest and persuasion, noncooperation and intervention. Protest and persuasion 
include “mainly symbolic acts of peaceful opposition or of attempted persuasion, 
extending beyond verbal expressions, but stopping short of nonviolent 
intervention” (Sharp, 1973b:117). It includes picketing, mourning, parades and 
protest meetings. Noncooperation involves a deliberate withdrawal from usual 
forms and degree of cooperation with person, activity, institutions and regimes 
(Sharp, 1973b:183). It includes social, economic, and political noncooperation. 
Intervention aims to induce change, to work both negatively and positively as 
these actions “may disrupt, and even destroy, established patterns, policies, 
relationships, or institutions which are seen as objectionable; or they may 
establish new behavior patterns, policies, relationships, or institutions which are 
preferred” (Sharp, 1973b:357).  
The catalogue of methods proposed had no precedent in literature, and it is still 
one of the most comprehensive lists of different forms of nonviolent actions. This 
approach is ideal for both revolutions and protests under democratic regimes. 
Indeed, the scholarship is walking both ways as we already claimed above. 
Pragmatic nonviolence is the domain mainly of both studies on how to bring about 
a revolution without weapons (Popovic, 2015), and of research on how to merge 
and enhance the fields of contentious politics (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994, 
McAdam and Tarrow, 2000, Schock, 2005). 
To sum up, pragmatic nonviolence is based on perfecting techniques of civil 
disobedience, with the conviction that the refusal to obey is the key of power. The 
refusal can be applied by a group of citizens fed up with the authoritarian 
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behaviour of their own government, being a valid answer to tyranny; by a 
movement crying out for change in a democratic regime; or as the way to defend 
a country from the threat of a foreign power, being a valid alternative to war. This 
is the way in which pragmatic nonviolence found its way within political science, 
analysing ways to dissent and defend without the use of physical violence.  
This concept has great potential and is gathering more and more interest. The 
same cannot be said for the other category coined by Gene Sharp, principled 
nonviolence.  Sharp did not analyse in depth this category, apart from one article, 
and preferred to dedicate his effort to the pragmatic stream. At the same time, 
there has been no real in-depth study on the category. Perhaps, the most 
interesting theorist referring to this stream is Michael Nagler, who has worked 
and is working a lot on Gandhian nonviolence. Except for this (unfortunately still 
undervalued) research, the result of the lack of a debate on this category is that 
is still now much more vague than the previous one, as it tends to contain in a 
quite confused way all the ‘left behind’ of pragmatic nonviolence. For this reason, 
the literature is still very divided on what exactly principled nonviolence is. There 
seems to be some agreement on defining it as the refusal to kill or harm on ethical 
and religious ground. In other words, this category is used to include ethical and 
religious discussions on the topic, which are considered by some to be a sort of 
‘second-order’ reasons for a change in the behaviour of both masses and 
governments.  
Sharp defined principled nonviolence as the sum of the many beliefs systems 
involving a rejection of violence (Sharp, 1979:205), excluding hermits, legislations 
and state decrees. There are different types of principled nonviolence, but they 
all share the rejection of violence because of some principle. In its more 
purposeful version, the many forms of principled nonviolence share the attempt 
to replace violence “as a feature of social and political life” (Atack 2012). As 
Spencer claimed, proponents of principled nonviolence are those “whose 
principles (whether secular or religious ethical ideals) preclude their use of 
violence under any circumstances” (Spencer, 2012). The supporters of this group 
do not focus too much on pragmatic issues. The effectiveness of an action is less 
important than the moral commitment. This presupposes a one-way reasoning, 
running from the universal principles to particular problems. The tradition of 
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principled nonviolence is often called satyagraha (Martin and Varney, 2003:214). 
As Martin claimed,  
“principled nonviolence is the Gandhian approach: nonviolence is a way of life, 
encompassing personal behaviour, thoughts and social arrangements as well as 
methods used in struggles with others. In the principled approach, the decision 
not to use physical force is made on ethical grounds: it is considered wrong to 
hurt or kill others” (Martin, 2009). 
As for pragmatic nonviolence, the core of principled nonviolence can still be 
considered its relation with power. However, power is not here conceived as the 
possibility of the people to refuse submission to the authority. Power does not lay 
in a different and unconventional practice of the citizens. Principled nonviolence 
is based on the conviction that  “practice requires deep ethical resolve” (Engler, 
2013:60). Thus, the starting point is here the person. In particular, the first 
presupposition is that “principled nonviolence is founded in a belief that behaviour 
flows out of the core values of a person” (Martin and Varney, 2003:214). More 
attention to intentions, consciousness, and the spirit of a person means 
awakening a different power, called by Nagler recently, ‘person power’ (Nagler, 
2014:47-49). Due in particular to the close relationship between nonviolence and 
personalism39, many authors focused on the individual and his capacity to shape 
reality. For this reason, at the very heart of principled nonviolence there is a 
personal conversion.  
This conversion may be based on three main rules to abide, which can be found 
in different degrees again and again in the literature. The first rule is to work on 
personal ‘non-attachment’. As Huxley described, non-attachment refers to a 
refutation of bodily sensation and lust, of craving for power and possessions, 
anger and hatred, and exclusive love (Huxley, 1969:3). This rule can be applied 
in different degrees; nevertheless, principled nonviolence requires some kind of 
detachment from the world.  
                                                          
39 The relation between nonviolence and personalism is still a topic to investigate. Nevertheless, 
it is doubtless that there is a close link between the two. In particular, Boston and Harvard 
represented two important schools of personalism in the US. Some example of authors and 
activists influenced by personalism are Muste (by William James and Harvard), Dorothy Day, 
Peter Maurin, and Luther King Jr. (he studied in Boston with Border Parker Browne). 
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The second rule is that the means are the ends. In other words, it is a mistake to 
think that the ends justify the means. To the contrary, it is only through completely 
nonviolent means that peace can be achieved. This rule is epitomised by the 
many martyrs of different religions, from Christ to those Buddhist monks who set 
themselves on fire as a form of protest (Atack, 2012), from Jagestetter to the first 
Christians. 
The third ‘law’ of principled nonviolence relates to the interconnectedness of life. 
At the spiritual level, the nonviolent believes that human beings are connected to 
each other. This means that any human being is dependent on each other for its 
happiness and realisation. The interconnectedness of life is backed by the 
different religious traditions. Sibley claimed that a key element of Indian 
philosophy, whether Hindu or Buddhist, concerns the intimate connection of all 
forms of life. “All embodied spirits are alike condemned to suffer the bondage of 
the flesh, and thus all alike have at least one element in common” (Sibley, 
1943:440). For what concern Christianity, the interrelatedness of life is in the 
commandments of Christ, as already St. Paul was teaching. Indeed, loving God 
is equal to abiding the law of the Spirit, which comes as an inner force within the 
human being. At the same time, loving God is intimately joined with loving the 
neighbour, even among other communities. Loving God and loving the neighbour 
become in this way two key and linked precepts. Without the latter, we do not 
have the former. In this way, the respect of these two commandments is in line 
with nonviolence, as avoidance of vengeance, retaliation, and the repayment of 
evil with evil instead of love (Jahanbegloo, 2014). 
Personal conversion is the necessary preamble for the implementation of the 
principle or value of nonviolence in any situation of life. Nonviolence becomes 
here a proper ‘way of life’, in which human action creates a new reality here and 
now. Thus, the idea of nonviolence as a technique is considered poor. For 
instance, Yoder criticised heavily Shridharani’s approach, when he wrote that  
“one early book interpreting Gandhi to England and America bore the title War 
without Violence, as if one could proceed, as in an ordinary war, to define one’s 
selfish goals and designate the enemy to be destroyed, and then simply choose 
nonviolent rather than violent weapons for the combat” (Yoder, 2010:41).  
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Principled nonviolence require more. The key actions of this new way of life are 
self-suffering, non-cooperation, and non-lying. Self-suffering is necessary to 
persuade the other of the strength of our convictions, and it should continue even 
if it is clear that martyrdom will not bring any change in society. Non-cooperation 
with the evil can reach different levels, from the total opposition to the dominant 
way of life by existing communities to creation of small new ones. Finally, 
principled nonviolence means also non-lying. This precept does not mean only 
not trying to deceive. It also represents the attempt to link ourselves with others, 
creating trust between people. 
Self-suffering, non-cooperation, and non-lying can be used differently, on 
different degrees, and for different purposes. This generates different kinds of 
principled nonviolence. For instance, Sharp identified six types of principled 
nonviolence: nonresistance, active reconciliation, moral resistance, selective 
nonviolence, satyagraha, and nonviolent revolution (Sharp, 1979:206). There is 
no strict separation between them, and it is possible that particular cases may not 
fit into any of these categories. This classification is neither perfect nor final; it is 
“a tool to facilitate understanding and study of the phenomena” (Sharp, 
1979:206). Non-resistance rejects on principle all physical violence, whether on 
individual, state, or international level. It refuses to participate in war, in state, in 
court. “The nonresistants are concerned with being true to their beliefs and 
maintaining their own integrity”. This means refusal of resisting evil situation, 
along with lack of interest in social reconstruction and the creation of a good 
society on earth. Their influence on society is the result from their acts of goodwill, 
their exhortations, and their example  (Sharp, 1979:207). Examples of this 
approach are Mennonites and Early Christians.  
In a similar vein, active reconciliation uses nonviolence on principle as well. It 
favours active goodwill and reconciliation, focusing on one’s life improvement 
before trying changing the others. The approach is based on the importance of 
the other, and in the conviction that he or she can change; “direct action and 
strategy are not involved” (Sharp, 1979:209). There is the hope to build up a 
different society.  Examples are Tolstoy and the Quakers.  
Moral resistance is based on the conviction that “evil should be resisted, but only 
by peaceful and moral means” (Sharp, 1979:212). The emphasis of this approach 
lies in moral personal responsibility. The individual has an imperative to refuse to 
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participate in evil, as well as to do something against it. The focus is thus not on 
nonviolent resistance and direct action, but on education, persuasion, individual 
example. They lack a comprehensive programme of social change. In this 
category Sharp includes Ballou and Garrison.  
Selective nonviolence is the refusal to participate in particular violent conflicts, 
usually international wars (Sharp, 1979:215). In other situations, such as 
personal life, class struggle, fight against authoritarianism or Satan, they are 
willing to use violence to accomplish their ends. Included in this category are a 
variety of groups, ranging from Jehovah Witness, non-pacifist anarchists, to 
International Socialists during World War I.  
Satyagraha is divided by Sharp in two. It is a type of principled nonviolence, 
because is a normative approach of Gandhi. However, it is also a ‘technique of 
action,  suitable for use by people not sharing his belief’ (Sharp, 1979:219). In 
this context it means ‘adherence to Truth’ or ‘reliance to Truth’. Truth is reality; 
the satyagrahi aims at attaining truth through love and right actions (Sharp, 
1979:220). He or she seeks to improve his own life, combat the evil, and doing a 
constructive programme “to build a new social and economic order through 
voluntary constructive work” (Sharp, 1979:220). It is unique within these kinds of 
principled nonviolence, as it entails method, strategy and constructive work.  
Finally, nonviolent revolution is more ‘a direction of developing thought and 
action’ rather than an ideology. It is the belief that only a deep and revolutionary 
change in individuals and society can substitute exploitation, oppression and war. 
The revolutionary program includes improvement of personal life, acceptance of 
principles, such as nonviolence, equality, cooperation, justice, freedom, as basis 
for the society; building a more ‘equalitarian, decentralized, and libertarian social 
order; combating social evils through nonviolent actions (Sharp, 1979:221). 
It is clear that this typology resembles more a ‘list’ than a proper analysis. Sharp 
never really dug into the category of principled nonviolence as he did with its 
opposite. Perhaps, the aim of the list was not to lay the basis for further studies. 
However, the result was to exclude from pragmatic nonviolence pacifisms and 
religions. Indeed, they are the main groups represented by the different kinds of 
principled nonviolence. Sharp claimed that nonresistance, active reconciliation, 
moral resistance, satyagraha and nonviolent revolution fall into the category of 
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pacifism (Sharp, 1979:227), which is a ‘belief system’ of those who “refuse 
participation in all international or civil wars or violent revolutions, and base this 
refusal on moral, ethical, religious principle” (Sharp, 1979:205). At the same time, 
religion is apparent in all of the above types of nonviolence. There are differences 
in the way nonviolence is interpreted by the many religious groups and sects. 
Early Christians, along with Albigenses, Moravians, Mennonites, and many other 
were keener on non-resistance; other groups, such as the Quakers or the Latin 
American model drawing from the theology of Liberation, are more proactive. The 
different religious groups and sects interpreted nonviolence in a different way. 
However, all of them approached it as the ‘way of life’ chosen and showed by 
Jesus. Nonviolence is thus a synonym of the ‘way of the Cross’. 
To conclude, principled and pragmatic nonviolence emerged as two different and 
complex approaches to the concept of nonviolence. These categories currently 
boost, dominate (and divide) the scientific research on nonviolence. Indeed, there 
are nowadays centres of studies, training programmes, and projects focused on 
either principled or pragmatic nonviolence. They start their analysis from different 
definitions of nonviolence, have a different idea of power, and champion different 
aims. From all this, it is clear that nowadays ‘nonviolence is two’.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed the growing development of the concept of nonviolence, 
which is nowadays used in many different ways. Moreover, it retraced the history 
of the dominant division in the literature between principle and set of techniques, 
and the key features of the two key categories of contemporary nonviolence, 
principled and pragmatic.  
Section one showed the breadth as well as the fragmentation of the studies of 
nonviolence today. Indeed, this term is used in many different fields to refer to 
techniques able to counteract terrorism, face a coup d’état, defend a country, 
overthrow a dictator, successfully protesting against a government, as well as to 
principles and ideas leading to a permanent revolution.  Between the many 
reasons of this success, a key part has been played by the establishment of a 
definition of nonviolence dividing the concept in two: a principle and a set of 
techniques of actions.  
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Section two dug down into this distinction. The origin may be traced back to the 
1920s and continued to be a leit motif of books and articles on the topic. Today 
the division is associated with the scholar Gene Sharp, who persuasively divided 
nonviolence in principle and techniques of action.  
The consequences of the divisions are far reaching. The division produced 
conceptual order, making easier at the empirical level to label events and 
behaviours as nonviolent, as well as operationalise the term; it allowed political 
groups and associations to adopt the concept without having to adhere to a creed, 
pacifists and religious groups to avoid concerns about effectiveness, and it 
allowed nonviolence to become a real political tool which is effective beyond 
democratic contexts; it interjected the need of a secularised concept, averting 
ethical and religious issues.  
The success of the division in principle and techniques led to the establishment 
of the categories of principled and pragmatic nonviolence, which have been 
analysed in section three. The pragmatic stream is by far the most successful 
and the privileged one of Sharp. It is based on consent theory, which is the idea 
that power lies in the consent of the citizens to obey. The ‘people’ hold enormous 
power, which can be used both to dissent and to defend the community. To the 
contrary, principled nonviolence is a more vague and less convincing concept, 
including all the ‘left-overs’ of the pragmatic stream. This category is based on 
the power of ethical conviction, values and principles of an individual. Thus, 
nonviolence is a principle which requires a full personal conversion towards a 
different way of life, based on the rejection of killing on moral ground. This 
approach includes conversion towards non-attachment, the perfect identification 
between means and ends, as well as the belief in the interconnectedness of life. 
The result is visible in actions of self-suffering, non-cooperation, and in non-lying, 
in order to strictly follow the command of non-killing. Sharp listed different ways 
of implementing this command, including non-resistance, active reconciliation, 
moral resistance, selective nonviolence, satyagraha, nonviolent revolution.  
Since the analysis of Sharp, principled and pragmatic nonviolence are taken for 
granted by most of the literature. The natural issue that may be raised at this point 
is: what is wrong with this success? What are the main issues related to this 
popular distinction? This will be the concern of chapter two.   
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2. The Cost of the Division 
The distinctions between principle and methods of action, principled and 
pragmatic nonviolence, have been extremely successful, and they are now widely 
accepted by the scholarship. Nevertheless, this success carried an extremely 
high cost, which is now time to face. Scratching the surface, we find that many 
scholars raised doubts, admitting that the distinction carries important problems. 
We already showed in the introduction that worrying uses of the term nonviolence 
recently emerged. At the same time, we face a divided field of research. As 
already Weber admitted, “principled nonviolence does generate practice, and 
pragmatic approaches may get things done and perhaps even may foster a 
nonviolent way of life” (Weber, 2003:264). In the same vein, Bond claimed that 
“nonviolence is manifest and distinctive in the interplay of method and purpose 
vis-à-vis this continuum” (Bond, 1988:86). Smith clearly talked of the ‘ambiguity 
of nonviolence’, which consists in “appearing both as an appeal to moral principle 
and as a practical device which is effective and therefore the best means to 
achieve the goal” (Smith, 1969:157).  Forgetting this ambiguity, and thus this 
unity, is an unfair reduction of nonviolence. 
The lack of unity carries the risk of creating a regressive as well as repressive 
field of research. As already Miller in 1964 honestly admitted, “nonviolence can 
be reduced neither to a moral philosophy nor to a pragmatic method” because “it 
owes something to each and to the equilibrium that holds the two strands 
together” (Miller, 1966:17). We can say more than this: the division of the concept 
in different and particular definitions, made in order to explain the discrepancies 
in the use of the term, is a danger because it leads to lose the complexity of the 
Gandhian notion of nonviolence, as well as the novelty of the work of Martin 
Luther King Jr., San Suu Kyi and many others. 
Besides being regressive, the plurality of beliefs is ‘repressed’. A serious 
discussion on values, principles, or aims is simply avoided, because it is not 
central to the more important focus on tactics and techniques, and it would 
‘dangerously’ limit their adoption. As Yoder claimed  
“since the pragmatic cultures of the western Europe and North America tend to 
translate everything into terms of procedures and effectiveness, it is 
indispensable to remember that for both Gandhi and King there is no such thing 
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as a ‘technique’ or ‘tactic’ of nonviolent action which could be lifted out of its 
original framework of spiritual and moral community discipline and ‘applied’ as a 
tactic for its own sake” (Yoder, 2010:41).  
Unfortunately, these comments have not been followed by neither in-depth 
analyses of the concept of nonviolence, nor by the creation of deeply 
reconciliatory alternatives40. This is a problem in light of the changing historical 
environment. Indeed, a divided field of study with increasing worrying uses of the 
term and focused more on techniques does not help in facing the crisis of 
democracy and the emergence of a post-secular society. 
With all these issues, where should we start? This chapter will propose to focus 
on three cracks, three internal divisions to the concept of nonviolence which have 
to be healed. In order to offer a way out of such a complex situation, section one 
will focus on problems at the descriptive level, in the deep divisions in describing 
what nonviolent action is. We will highlight the problems concerning the reduction 
of nonviolent action to a behaviour or rigid practices, to a mere means or the 
implementation of an abstract end. Indeed, nonviolent action is sometimes 
dangerously reduced to nonviolent behaviour, meaning that no attention is paid 
to circumstances and ends. At the same time, the reduction of nonviolence to 
correct practices which rigidly implement an ideal is equally risky, as it would 
sometimes mean a too rigid interpretation of the equality of means and ends. 
Instead, section two will focus on the praxeological level, where the risk is 
creating a regressive field. Here, we find that the concern on behaviours and 
practices led nonviolence to focus on disruption, leaving aside a serious debate 
on construction. This lack triggers important consequences. Indeed, principled 
                                                          
40 Many religious scholars developed alternatives to Gene Sharp’s conception of nonviolence as 
set of techniques. For instance, Yoder wrote extensively on nonviolence as ‘genuine love’ directly 
linked with Christianity, which is different from the ‘war without weapons’ approach (see for 
instance: Yoder, J. H. (1997) For The Nations, Cambridge: Eedermans Publishing, p. 101; Yoder, 
J. H. (1994) The Politics of Jesus, Cambridge: Eedermans Publishing). The problem is that these 
interpretations left paradoxically unchallenged the distinction made by Sharp at the political level. 
In other words, they did not try to undermine the (fundamentally theoretical) division between two 
kinds of nonviolence in order to reconcile the two schools of thought. Thus, no real alternative 
has been developed within political science, able to include religious tradition without being led 
by their narratives and theological discussions. In this way, nobody really managed neither to 
overcome the ambiguity nor to challenge Sharp distinction, which is still unchallenged and widely 
used in Politics.  
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and pragmatic nonviolence may risk not to open up to everybody towards a 
shared project, becoming forms of realpolitik or dry moralism.  
The lack of a serious debate on construction triggered problems also in 
understanding the role of religion. Section three will focus on problems at the 
religious level, where religion has been put in an ad-hoc category, principled 
nonviolence. It will show that the division between principled and pragmatic 
nonviolence, between values and techniques leads to a division between religion 
and politics. The research of nonviolence followed a process of secularisation, 
which limited religion to the category of principled nonviolence. Nevertheless, 
research has to deal with the fact that religion has always been present in 
nonviolent action, as well as it never left society. These problems make the 
search for a different approach to nonviolence necessary, in order to reconstruct 
the concept and provide new opportunities for the study of the topic.  
 
2.1. Nonviolent Action: More than a Behaviour, Less than an Ideal 
The cost of the dominant division of the two categories of nonviolence is visible 
in the profound disagreement on what nonviolent action is. The only thing that 
both principled and pragmatic nonviolence have in common is that they refuse 
cowardice. Cowardice is the real opposite of nonviolence for Gandhi. As he 
claimed, “I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and 
violence, I would advise violence” (Prabhu and Rao, 1996:144). The 
incompatibility between cowardice and nonviolence lies in the key feature of the 
former, which is a fear of death. This feeling leads to inaction, passivity, and 
irresponsibility. Running away from a situation of danger, or refusing to help 
others in a situation of need, is totally incompatible with nonviolence. In other 
words, both principled and pragmatic nonviolence reject inaction, the passive 
acceptance of the status quo. Nevertheless, the two categories do not agree on 
what action actually means. The idea of nonviolent action underlying the concept 
of pragmatic nonviolence is closer to ‘nonviolent behaviour’. In other words, a 
nonviolent action is a patterned behaviour which is short of physical violence. 
Thus, it is rational to expect that the focus of this stream of nonviolence is to 
provide new means, new techniques of action able to overthrow a dictator and 
put immense pressure on governments. To the contrary, principled nonviolence 
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looks at nonviolent action mainly as the correct practice, which is the 
implementation of an abstract ideal, value, or principle. For this reason, 
nonviolence is confused with a belief system, a saint-like way of life, and with 
pacifism or religion.  
For what concerns pragmatic nonviolence, the consequences of the reduction of 
the concept of action to that of behaviour should not be underestimated. Indeed, 
the focus on behaviours and patterns of behaviours leads to pay no real attention 
to circumstances and to the ends. Indeed, the critiques noticed that often the 
circumstances decide whether an action is violent or not. For instance, Galtung 
warned that a strike may be violent or not depending on the circumstances 
(Galtung, 1965). Along the same line, Niebuhr had a similar idea when he warned 
that, if “non-violence […] expresses itself in the refusal to participate in the 
ordinary processes of society”, it follows that “it certainly places restraints upon 
the freedom of the objects of its discipline and prevents them from doing what 
they desire to do. Furthermore it destroys property values, and it may destroy life” 
(Niebuhr, 1963:240-1). For instance,  
“a boycott may rob a whole community of its livelihood and, if maintained long 
enough, it will certainly destroy life. A strike may destroy the property values 
inherent in the industrial process which it brings to a halt, and it may imperil the 
life of a whole community which the strike interferes […] the innocent are involved 
with the guilty in conflict between groups, not because of any particular type of 
coercion used in the conflict but by the very group character of the conflict” 
(Niebuhr, 1963:241).  
Turning to the lack of attention to the ends, it is worth noticing that when 
nonviolence is reduced to a set of means, which can be used by everybody for 
any reason, there is the risk of indirectly encouraging the perpetration of systemic 
and symbolic violence. For what concerns the violence of the system, 
nonviolence is accused either of failing social change, or even of perpetrating and 
reproducing violent social structures in other countries. The former critique is 
made for instance by Arendt against the Civil Rights Movement, when she 
claimed that  
“while boycotts, sit-ins, and demonstrations were adequate in eliminating 
discriminatory laws and ordinances, they proved utter failures and became 
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counter-productive when confronted with social conditions—the stark needs of 
the black ghettos on one side, the overriding interests of the lower-income groups 
with respect to housing and education on the other” (Arendt, 1970).  
Instead, the accusation of promoting and reproducing violent structures is done 
by Chabot and Sharifi, while analysing the Green Revolution and the Egyptian 
upsurge. They noticed the extremely close relationship of nonviolent struggles 
with global neoliberal capitalism, by which they mean a paradigm “involving 
ideologies, discourses, and public policies that encourage the spread of free-
market rationality and limit the role of states to promoting economic growth and 
consumerism instead of social equality and human well-being” (Chabot and 
Sharifi, 2013:221). Protestors were looking at political power in a pragmatic and 
state-centred struggle, which did not offer any constructive programme. Had 
nonviolent struggles won, they would have only managed to implement neoliberal 
freedom and democracy, allowing visible and invisible violence of neoliberalism 
to get in (Chabot and Sharifi, 2013). For instance, in countries such as the 
Philippines, South Africa and Serbia, nonviolent struggles “enriched wealthy 
elites at the expense of growing dispossession and desperation among the poor” 
(Chabot and Sharifi, 2013:221). Paradoxically, nonviolence increased the 
violence of inequality and poverty.  
Other scholars pushed these critiques even further, claiming that such a sort of 
nonviolence can even become a tool for imperialism and coups d’état. Nonviolent 
methods can certainly be a weapon which can bring upon liberation and anti-
imperialism41. However, critiques contest that nonviolent methods are the way in 
which US imperialism prospers in a post-cold war era, where military intervention 
is neither possible nor useful. In these debates, funding and other acts aimed at 
helping civil resistance are the new methods to foster an imperialistic project. In 
particular, external funding is a hotly contentious issue in nonviolent 
scholarship42. Apart from funding, some scholars openly considered nonviolence 
                                                          
41 One example of this hope is given by Johansen, Martin, and Meyer, who proposed nonviolence 
as the method to challenge American imperialism undermining its military, economic and 
ideological pillars. To bolster their argument, the three scholars refer to the examples of the 
Vietnam War, nuclear weapons, East Timor, Iraq, Puerto Rico, and the Arab Spring. See: 
JOHANSEN, J., MARTIN, B. & MEYER, M. 2012. Nonviolence versus US Imperialism. Economic 
and Political Weekly. 
42 There is heated debate on whether or not being helped by an imperialist power means being 
part of its project. Some argue that “the money is the message.” In particular, they criticise the 
coloured revolutions - such as the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine and the Cedar Revolution in 
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to be the best method for a “postmodern coup” (Mowat, 2005, Blum, 2005). Gene 
Sharp has been blamed of fomenting rebellions, of being “a puppet master at the 
center of a sinister CIA-led scheme to overthrow governments disliked by 
Washington” by Middle East analysts during the Arab Spring (Engler, 2013:59). 
Stephen Zunes rightly defended the American scholar from the accusations of 
being at the service of US imperialism with an open letter43, claiming that Sharp 
is a theorist, the Albert Einstein Institute a poorly funded organisation, and the 
training given are non-partisan basis. However, the answer of Ciacciello-Maher 
and Golinger touched a key problem: the possibility of using nonviolent direct 
action to overthrow a regime for an imperialistic project44. 
Concerning symbolic violence, the label ‘nonviolence’ can be cunningly shaped 
and used instrumentally to divide and blame the enemy. This is for instance the 
critique of Losurdo against those who, like the US and others, call themselves 
nonviolent and shape the meaning of nonviolent action, while discrediting 
enemies with the general labels of violent (Losurdo, 2010:85). Besides the issue 
of actively shaping the meaning of nonviolence, there is the issue of using 
nonviolent techniques to foster violent symbols and cultures. Indeed, some 
organisations may use these techniques for their sectarian cultural war, in order 
to maintain or establish laws in society, which would hinder freedom of others.  
This is the case of some religious groups for instance. If nonviolence is reduced 
to a set of techniques to seize power without a bloodshed, the risk is to empower 
closed religious organisations with new tools to impose their will to others. This 
means fostering intolerance and conflict even in democratic societies. It may even 
mean fostering symbolic violence. Indeed, religions around the world may find in 
nonviolence a new and effective ‘weapon system’ to legitimize violence; create 
‘true believers’, inciters of intolerance; teach patience and passivity in the face of 
injustice; even promoting romanticism, ignorance, and backwardness in the face 
of knowledge and progress (Hatzopoulos and Petito, 2003:56-108).  
                                                          
Lebanon (see JOHANSEN, J., AND BRIAN MARTIN 2008. Sending the Protest Message. Gandhi 
Marg, 29, 503-519. Page 513). The critiques even dispute the idea that money received from an 
imperialist power would be helpful for the campaign. Indeed, it is often counterproductive to have 
external funding, in terms of audience and message; moreover, it is not true that more money 
(whatever the origin) is equal to success. 
43 The open letter can be found at: http://stephenzunes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Open-
Letter_Academics_Zunes.pdf (Last accessed on the 6th of October 2014). 
44 The exchange between Zunes, George Cicariello-Maher and Eva Golinger is available online 
at the address: http://venezuelanalysis.com/print/3690 (Last access: 21/01/2014). 
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All these critiques are only partially true. These critiques are unfair if we 
acknowledge the fact that many of those who support pragmatic nonviolence 
accept nonviolence as a principle as well. Indeed, Martin claimed that “quite a 
few activists within largely pragmatic social movements are committed to 
nonviolence, but do not advertise their personal beliefs to avoid alienating fellow 
activists” (Martin, 2009). It is clear that individual commitment is a key factor in 
shaping many activists’ approach to nonviolent action. This fact can be extended 
even to some of the key scholars of pragmatic nonviolence, such as Lackey and 
Sharp.  Their commitment for the rise of this stream of nonviolence has been so 
long and intense, in spite of the many difficulties encountered, that both look real 
examples of principled nonviolence. Apart from the actual supporters or scholars 
of pragmatic nonviolence, we should make clear that the scholarship on 
nonviolent direct action cannot be blamed for the fact that it did not manage to 
create in a day different religious attitudes and a different society.  
Nevertheless, the reduction of nonviolence to a behaviour short of physical 
violence risks creating dangerous distortions. If nonviolence is only a technique 
short of physical violence, Cameron is right to use the term ‘nonviolent extremism’ 
to describe groups such as Nazis, Klu Klux Klansmen, or terrorists who incite 
hatred and intolerance in schools, universities and prisons without direct use of 
weapons (Cameron, 2014). It is also correct to talk of the new radical right as 
non-violent basically because they are not considered a problem for national 
security (Goodwin and Ramalingam, 2012), and even to claim that there are “non-
violent forms of right-wing extremism” (Briggs and Goodwin, 2012). A speech full 
of hatred is anyway a speech; nobody is beaten or killed. What is worse is that if 
nonviolence is a technique short of physical violence it is paradoxically correct to 
talk about ‘nonviolent crime’ and ‘nonviolent offenders’. Indeed, why should be 
wrong to consider theft or fraud a part of the universe of nonviolence? Turning to 
the concept of pragmatic nonviolence, the problem is quite similar: the aims are 
not considered. We cannot deny that this concept cherishes the hope that a 
serious offer of efficient nonviolent behaviours will eventually lead to a more 
nonviolent society. In other words, the development of new tools of struggle will 
be sufficient to ‘fabricate’ a different society, to establish democratic regimes. The 
problem is that pragmatic nonviolence does not clearly face the tragedy of 
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winning the war against the oppressor without improving the plight of the most 
oppressed in society.  
Turning to principled nonviolence, the consequences of a reduction of action to a 
correct practice, which follows a list of precepts, are different from the one 
concerning pragmatic nonviolence, but equally worrying. The necessity of 
clarifying the ends of a nonviolent campaign, and especially the values that 
should be placed at the centre of a different society, is crucial for principled 
nonviolence. For this last perspective, structural and cultural violence are 
paramount. Nevertheless, the risk is to focus excessively on ends, on abstract 
speculations for their own sake, making mistakes in the evaluation of the 
appropriated actions able to achieve them.  
In particular, principled nonviolence is rigidly based on the complete equation of 
means and ends, leading to dangerous attitudes, such as withdraw from politics 
or radicalism. It is true that the most famous similitude is provided by Gandhi 
himself, who suggested that we should consider the means as seed, from which 
the plant of the ‘end’ grows up. Unfortunately, the rhetorical device has been 
interpreted by many in quite a strict way. Uniting means and ends was not 
translated as a warning to avoid unrealistic ends, and to care about the context, 
opponents and results. Instead, it meant radicalism, absolute proscription of war 
and violence of any sort in any circumstances. In some cases it also meant 
physical separation from the others, on the basis of the conviction that the conflict 
ends when one of the two participants withdraws. As Stiehm claimed, a pedantic 
interpretation of axioms such as ‘a good tree bears good fruit’ leads to a kind of 
activity which “often takes the form of trying to create a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’”, 
resulting in perfectionism, chiliasm, and anarchistic individualism (Stiehm, 
1968:25).  
This kind of radicalism gives rise to two important concerns. First of all, Stiehm, 
in line with Shridharani twenty years before, made clear that one problem of what 
she called conscientious nonviolence was that “it seems to deny the existence of 
real conflict” (Stiehm, 1968). Gene Sharp went further, claiming that the absolute 
rejection of any sort of violence is not realistic; when nonviolent actions fail, 
people should not give up dreams of freedom from tyranny. Second of all, a 
radical unification of means and ends may backfire on the subject itself. When 
nonviolence is reduced to mere self-purification, the risk is to neglect to treat 
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properly “the irascible, the taste for obstacles, the will for expansion, for combat 
and domination, the death instincts and especially the capacity for destruction, 
the desire for catastrophe” (Ricoeur, 1965:225). The risk is to reduce nonviolence 
to an activity for saints, suppressing completely these aspects belonging to each 
human being will inevitably create new forms of violence. As Lübbe explained, 
“humans tend to be humans, not saints”. The main issue is that “nonviolence 
devotees suppress or deny feelings and impulses that are incompatible with their 
commitment”, which is problematic because they are more likely “to exhibit 
hidden and indirect forms of violence” as manipulation, passive aggression, 
conceit, perfectionism, pride and dogmatism. The consequence of all this is clear: 
“those who cannot love themselves with their flaws are bound to hate the flawed 
other” (Lübbe, 2009:43).  
As we claimed above about pragmatic nonviolence, we should say that also these 
critiques are partially true. First of all, nobody of the most famous actors listed in 
this category interpreted the unity of means and ends in such a radical way. For 
instance, if principled nonviolence advocates “differ from practitioners of tactical 
nonviolence in that the latter may abandon either nonviolence or their objective 
in the face of an inadequate response or violent repression” (Powers et al. 1997), 
then not even Gandhi is in this category, because violence was for him better 
than cowardice. Moreover, Gandhi “drew back from pursuing principle in every 
instance to its logical conclusion” (Bartolf 2000), for example, by supporting war 
on at least three occasions (Bartolf 2000); by supporting cases of violence, such 
as euthanasia; by opposing De Ligt on the opportunity for India to have an army. 
However, Gandhi is not the only example of a nonviolent actor ‘living’ these 
contradictions. For instance, what about those Quakers who decided to serve in 
the military during the two World wars in the XX century (Jahanbegloo, 2014)? 
The same problem arises even with Martin Luther King Jr. He is considered part 
of principled nonviolence. Nevertheless, his principles did not prevent him from 
demanding federal troops or police  for the demonstrations (Ryan, 2002).  
In light of all these examples, what remains true is that such a ‘principled’ 
interpretation of nonviolence runs the serious risk of being a vague concept of 
passivity at the mercy of the powerful of the earth, as Gelderloos claimed (Martin, 
2008:243). In addition if nonviolence is considered a principle, championing 
simply a dogmatic refusal to wage war or use violence at any time, why should 
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we be shocked by Blair’s claim that nonviolence is passé (Sinha, 2013)? Indeed, 
it is right, from that point of view, to forget the impressive number of nonviolent 
struggles and revolutions around the world. They are not ‘really’ part of 
nonviolence.  
Thus, the task is to rethink the concept of nonviolent action. This is the only way 
to bring again together values and techniques of action, without reducing 
nonviolence to a list of patterned behaviours or of correct practices. Through a 
different approach to nonviolent action, we should be able to keep together the 
need of a liberation from physical, symbolic and structural violence, with the 
necessity of proposing a credible alternative path. The alternative theory of 
nonviolent action should able to include the necessity to offer new techniques, 
new behaviours in order to free people from violent patterns of behaviours. At the 
same time, it should also acknowledge that any act carries social, spiritual, and 
even religious meanings. Thus, an act of nonviolence should also include a sort 
of vertical tension toward values, toward spirituality, towards change in society. 
This is the way to follow for nonviolence, in order to keep together means and 
ends. The problem is how to re-describe nonviolence in a way that it includes 
higher means than merely reducing physical violence, without ending up in 
actions based on abstract speculations without any serious hope of changing 
reality.  
 
2.2. Reconciling Politics and Morality: Sharing Construction with Everybody 
If on the one hand the dominant division between principle and techniques of 
action reveals problems in understanding what nonviolence is, on the other hand 
the literature expresses doubts concerning principled and pragmatic nonviolence 
at what we called the praxeological level. Here the risk is witnessing the fall into 
a regressive field of research, which forgets the complexity of the Gandhian 
notion.  
Up to now, the key expression of both streams of nonviolence has been 
disruption. It can hardly be denied that up to now the main concern of the literature 
on nonviolence has been disorder. The two streams of nonviolence share the 
reaction to unjust and authoritarian societies. They both provide strong grounds 
for protesting and crying out the truth. The manifestations of this concern are 
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many, from conscientious objection to the establishment of new and separated 
communities, from hunger strikes to the many actions of civil resistance around 
the world.  
The main reason for focusing on disorder lies in the fact that research on 
nonviolence has focused on counteracting something, either tyrannies or the 
institution of war in general. This is partly due to historical reasons. Before and 
during WWII, nonviolence was part of radical pacifism, which was an important 
but small group focused on overcoming the institution of war. After the conflict, 
the main issue was to answer how nonviolence would have been effective against 
Hitler and totalitarianisms in general. Moreover, Sharp introduced nonviolence in 
an academic world focused on nuclear weapons due to the Cold War, and not 
persuaded that nonviolence would have been useful in dealing with such as tense 
international situation.  
Now time has changed. Nonviolence showed its power to ignite revolutions in any 
corners of the earth, and research showed examples of nonviolent actions 
against Hitler (Sémelin, 1993) and dictators in general (Popovic, 2015), which 
does not stop against the nuclear threat (Demenchonok, 2009). In other words, 
the research on nonviolence showed that it is an important reactive force. The 
result is that now we live a paradox. As Engler claimed, when Sharp started his 
research he had to face the common assumption that nonviolence could work 
only under democratic regimes, while now there is the conviction that nonviolent 
actions do not work where there are already established channels for discontent, 
such as elections or lobbying (Engler, 2013:64). In other words, nonviolence did 
not focus on which sorts of regime should be constructed. It is urgent to focus on 
democracy, paying more attention to which kind of order it fosters.   
In particular, nonviolence should turn its attention to democracy, because the 
condition in which the most advanced political regimes are is far from stunning. 
As it has been claimed above, the hope of pragmatic nonviolence is the 
fabrication of democratic regimes through behaviours short of physical violence. 
Unfortunately, democracy is suffering. A new phase of the research on nonviolent 
action is needed, which is able to help democratic institutions. In particular, 
nonviolence should deal with the grim expectations that have been raised about 
a possible crisis of the western model. Some reassure that citizens still believe in 
democratic values, even though are becoming more distrustful of politicians, 
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parties and public sector. Others instead claim that the crisis is profound 
(Papadopoulos, 2013), leading to concepts such as ‘winter of democracy’ 
(Hermet, 2010), ‘post-democracy’ (Crouch, 2004), or ‘death of democracy’ 
(Keane, 2009).  
A key point that these and other scholars highlight is the passive role of the 
citizens. More and more disaffection against politics and the state is raising. 
Some even claimed that citizens hate politics (Hay, 2007). While Crouch 
described them as passive, quiescent, and even apathetic, Keane recognised at 
least that they created many different power-monitoring and power-contesting 
mechanisms, creating what he called monitory democracy (Keane, 2008:3). 
Nevertheless, the underlying problem of Keane is that “the role of citizens is not 
that of public decision-making but of maintaining checks on executive rule, with 
the use of new communication technologies”(Chandler, 2014:47).  
Besides citizens’ passivity, another problem is the inefficacy of the authorities to 
maintain equality, due to the increasing power of elites. Indeed, democratic 
institutions are "threatened by oligarchic influence" (Engler, 2013:65). “By force 
of capital funding and membership and skilful administration, some holons are 
more equal than others” (Keane, 2008:22). Those elites are able to manage 
manipulated popular demands, making the system work for them.  
Between the presence of these elites and citizens’ passivity lies the crisis of role 
and importance of political parties. They lost loyal voters and they became more 
centralised and professionalised structures, as well as with short term horizon 
(Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002). They are part of the problem, as they are close 
clubs of powerful minority interests. Elections have become something peculiar.  
“While elections certainly exist and can change governments, public electoral 
debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professionals 
expert in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues 
selected by those teams” (Crouch, 2000:1). 
The focus on disruption (with the subsequent lack of an answer to the crisis of 
democracy) led to a second important issue, which has been triggered by the 
focus on behaviours and correct practices. Indeed, the division between 
pragmatic and principled nonviolence runs the risk of regressing into two opposite 
but complementary extremisms. A cynical form of realism may easily emerge 
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from pragmatic nonviolence. The level achieved by nonviolent techniques and 
tactics is high. The work done on how to overthrow a dictator, conduct the perfect 
campaign of civil disobedience, and put pressure on governments, is enormous. 
Yet, the many methods created can worsen the crisis of democracy, becoming 
an efficacious tool for imposing the beliefs of a part of the society, when not a tool 
for destruction and conservation of privileges. For instance, critiques claim that 
the other side of effectiveness is the fact that “a dedicated 5% of the population, 
in conjunction with 90% of the media, economic control of 90% of a nation’s 
resources, and full support of a foreign superpower would be able to dispense 
with a government without recourse to openly violent strategies” (Ciccariello-
Maher, 2008). In addition, nonviolence may quickly turn to violence when 
immediate success is not achieved, falling into absolute Machiavellianism 
(Bharadwaj, 1998). In other words, pragmatic nonviolence runs the risk of 
empowering certain factions against others, without necessarily meaning the 
construction of a different society.  
For what concerns principled nonviolence, the risk is the opposite. This approach 
to nonviolence may easily turn into a dry form of moralism. Strict obedience to 
the identity of means and ends may lead to the development of a dualistic ethics, 
one achieved by the specific group, and another for the rest of the world. This 
creates a distortion in the understanding of the interrelatedness of life. Instead of 
considering the other equally, he or she becomes part of a different group, which 
is simply wrong. In some religious variants, the other is sometimes even destined 
to perdition. This second class of human beings is still connected by God or the 
desire of peace. Unfortunately, it is not enlightened. Thus, the risk is to encourage 
the tendency to eschew public agitation and even political participation, or to 
impose the view of a group to the rest of the population. The risk is to build up 
two ‘cities’, one holding the truth and disgusted by the fact that the others do not 
simply surrender. A profound fracture in the society is far from being a solution to 
the actual crisis of democracy. 
The focus on disruption and the risk of principled and pragmatic nonviolence 
falling into extremisms pose two questions to nonviolence. The first problem is to 
focus on construction, on order. Nonviolence is now widely recognised as a drive 
for change, but is less known as a path for a different kind of order. More 
specifically, it is not enough to think of democracy as a sort of panacea. We have 
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seen that democracy is not in good shape. How would nonviolence contribute to 
democracy, and in particular to solve the problems mentioned above of lack of 
citizens’ participation, dominion of political parties as well as of powerful 
minorities? And in particular, how can nonviolence make this contribution without 
being only a source of instability and confusion?  
This leads us to a further problem to face. The risk of falling into moralism or 
realpolitik are two extremes which share the same key problem. The main 
problem is that the idea of order in their mind, their constructive programme, 
excludes part of the population and this does not help a democracy already in 
crisis. Realpolitik will look exclusively at the interest of a particular group, while 
moralism of that particular sect of perfect. The reason is that the people using 
these kinds of nonviolence have a clear idea of what they want to implement. This 
issue can be translated into Gandhian language as the difference between 
satyagraha and duragraha. These two actions start as a reaction to an injustice 
in the present society. The risk of any attempt to change reality, to build up a 
different society, is to fall into duragraha, which is a sort of action translated as 
stubborn persistence (Bondurant, 1988:42). Duragraha means that in the 
construction of a different society the subjects are led by prejudgments. The 
duragrahi is not genuinely interested in finding the truth; the real interest is to 
implement a prejudgment, an ideal already clear in mind. The point is that the 
duragrahi is certain to already know the truth and the best thing to do. In other 
words, even though they both start from an injustice, duragrahi already know that 
is true and right, and thus already know which society should be built, and when 
to stop in the process of change. The other people either decide to help in the 
process, or are simply considered as on the wrong side. To the contrary, 
Bondurant claimed that “the dynamics of satyagraha are end-creating. The 
objective is, conceptually, only a starting point. The end cannot be predicted, and 
must necessarily be left open”45. Thus, the problem here is: how can we think of 
nonviolence in a way that averts the temptation of implementing a certain kind of 
order, even a democratic one, which a certain group have in mind, and being 
inclusive, sharing the project with everybody? 
                                                          
45 From Bondurant, Joan V., Satyagraha Versus Duragraha: The Limits of Symbolic Violence, 
available on the internet at http://www.mkgandhi.org/g_relevance/chap05.htm. 
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To summarise, the reconstruction of the concept of action should pave the way 
for balancing the focus on disorder with a deeper discussion on which order to 
build. This balance should be found keeping everybody on board in the 
construction of a new open-ended project, in order not to fall into realpolitik or 
moralism. In other words, nonviolence should return to be a progressive field, 
which reconciles realism with morality, order with personal aims and social 
values, in a shared project of change, to be able to contribute to serve the actual 
crisis of democracy.  
 
2.3. Bringing Religion Back In 
The overcome of the regressive character of the distinction, which is easily 
reduced to disruption and duragraha, will inevitably have to deal with many 
issues. However, one of them is certainly paramount: the role of religion. Indeed, 
the West went through an important process of separation between religion and 
politics. The rupture between religion and the public sphere is traditionally 
ascribed to the dramatic event of the Wars of Religion, which devastated Europe. 
From this dramatic event stems the “myth of religious violence” (Cavanaugh, 
2009:4). Indeed, death and hatred have been principles attributed to an “irrational 
and dangerous impulse,” called religion, which had to be controlled and restricted 
in some ways. This interpretation constituted the grounds for the “Westphalian 
presumption,” which is “the idea that cultural and religious pluralism cannot have 
a public dimension, as this would clash with the very possibility of international 
order,” (Mavelli and Petito, 2012), as well as for the beginning of the process of 
secularisation. Even if the definition of secularism is highly contested, and even 
if we are willing to follow Taylor’s suggestion not to take the words too seriously 
as “the name may be the same, but the reality will often be different” (Taylor, 
2009), secularisation redefined the role of religion in society.  
The slow process of secularisation of our society has been examined by many 
scholars in many different ways. Using Ferrara’s scheme (Ferrara, 2009), this 
process is visible on three different levels: political, social, and personal. On the 
political level, secularization meant progressive independence of the state from 
religion. The consequence of this process is twofold. Firstly, “the exercise of 
legitimate state power - what we might call the coercive dimension of law - takes 
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place in secular terms.” Secondly, “all citizens can freely exercise their religious 
freedom and worship one God, another God, or no God at all” (Ferrara, 2009). 
On the social level, religious communities became specialized sub-groups and 
religions affect fewer and fewer social actions, law, politics, and education. 
Besides, religious rituals are less and less important; whereas, more and more 
prestige is given to secular events. Finally, on the personal level, secularism is a 
change in the experience of believing. Indeed, secularism is “a move from a 
society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed unproblematic to one in 
which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the 
easiest to embrace” (Ferrara, 2009:80). In other words, the experience of 
believing has been transformed by the process of secularisation, from being 
something unquestioned and natural, to becoming one of the many choices of a 
pluralist society. Moreover, the faith of the believer is now experienced from within 
an ‘immanent frame’, which is “a whole cultural horizon that identifies the good 
life with human flourishing, accepts no final goals beyond human flourishing and 
not allegiance or obligation to anything beyond this flourishing” (Ferrara, 2009:1). 
As we claimed above, one of the reasons for the success of the divisions between 
principle and techniques, principled and pragmatic, was that a ‘secularised 
concept’ was born. The internal division to the concept of nonviolence was the 
answer to this need. Indeed, the creation of the category of principled nonviolence 
was a way to exclude religions from the political debate about nonviolence. The 
division is partly the result of the process of ‘secularisation’ (Weber, 2003:256), 
which started in the 1930s and reached its peak with Gene Sharp. Religion has 
been completely eradicated from the centre of nonviolence in the political debate, 
in order to allow westerners to consider Gandhian experiments ‘seriously’ 
(Weber, 2004:238). For this reason, Sharp created a different category, in which 
he placed religious, philosophers, and all those thinkers who used different words 
to talk of nonviolence. The result is that within principled nonviolence, we can find 
a chaotic variety of ‘this worldly’ and ‘other worldly’ oriented belief systems 
(Weber, 2004:253).  
Sharp understood that a strong link between nonviolence and religion can lead 
someone to dismiss nonviolence altogether. It can be claimed that it is impossible 
to introduce in the west a concept so much embedded in Hinduism and 
Buddhism. On the other hand, the strong link can lead to the reduction of 
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nonviolence to religion. This is what happened with Christianity, with the reduction 
of nonviolence to the ‘way of the Cross’ and to the imitation of Christ. It is worth 
remembering, using Case’s words, that “Jesus and the writers of the New 
Testament left, not a doctrine to circumscribe, but an ideal to leaven, the moral 
and social life of mankind” (Case, 1923:49). Therefore, the ideal can hardly 
encompass recent phenomena, such as “the passions of the class struggle” 
(Scalmer, 2011:92). Besides, the imitation of Christ can preclude new 
experiments, reducing nonviolence to a simple conversion to Christianity. “After 
all, if the Mahatma’s way was but the method of the Cross, then what better 
means of following its precepts than to join with fellow believers in the 
organization of the established Church?” (Scalmer, 2011:92).  
The separation made by Sharp was part of an attempt to make nonviolence 
independent from any ‘system of belief’. Indeed, the other process of 
emancipation happened in relation to pacifism, as well as any doctrine. Sharp 
revealed in a note his frustration about pacifist groups, being only keen on gaining 
new converts to personal pacifism (Sharp, 1979:252). Even when pacifists 
adopted nonviolence, they did it only as a realistic tool for their own programme. 
Hence, Sharp’s approach can be considered an answer to this attitude to 
nonviolence. Sharp uncovered the fact that pacifism became a ‘belief system’ of 
those who “refuse participation in all international or civil wars or violent 
revolutions, and base this refusal on moral, ethical, religious principle” (Sharp, 
1979:205). The reduction of nonviolence to religion or pacifism runs parallel to 
the risk of reducing nonviolence to socialism, liberalism, or any specific doctrine. 
For instance, the ‘basic understanding of life’ of the ‘way of life’ proposed by King 
Jr., or the ‘ontology of nonviolence’ of Gandhi has been considered “at least 
congruent, if not identical, with the metaphysics of reformed liberalism” (Sturm, 
1991:489-490). This is another attempt to reduce nonviolence to a specific 
doctrine, undermining its dynamicity.  
The attempt to break the strong dependence from religions, ontologies and 
doctrines, was important. Sharp recognized that nonviolence is limited when is 
too much associated with a doctrine, as not everybody is willing to accept the 
whole creed in which nonviolence is embedded. Moreover, breaking the 
dependence from any doctrine paved the way for the interpretation of nonviolence 
through the eyes of science. Already Case tried to “apply the scientific, inductive 
88 | P a g e  
 
method in a philosophical spirit to a field of social phenomena not hitherto 
explored extensively in that objective, impartial way” (Case, 1923:11) because 
human motives and prejudices “often blur for our eyes the true outline of things 
as they are” (Case, 1923:11). Sharp in The Politics of Nonviolent Action subjected 
“the entire theory of nonviolent political action, together with a full history of its 
practice in all part of the world since the time of Christ, to the same cool, detailed 
scrutiny that military strategy and tactics are supposed to invite” (Sharp, 
1973a:XIX). The ‘cool’ and ‘detailed scrutiny’ of Sharp made easier the use of 
nonviolence in the west and its introduction in academia.  
Nevertheless, the concept of secularisation has been recently at the centre of a 
heated debate. Indeed, religions did not fade away, as some expected as logical 
conclusion of secularisation. Religious communities did not diminish their 
vibrancy and commitment, and we assist at the ‘resurgence of religion’. 
Unfortunately, this resurgence has the same features that the process of 
secularisation tried to eradicate: missionary expansion, fundamentalist 
radicalisation as well as the “political instrumentalisation of the potential for 
violence innate in many of the world religions” (Habermas, 2008:18). But this is 
not the end. Indeed, now there are even some religious groups using the lists of 
methods of the pragmatic school to impose themselves again in society. This 
means on the one hand that the paradigm of secularisation has been overcome 
in favour of a ‘post-secular society’, in which religion plays a role. Unfortunately, 
this means on the other hand that the causes of the process of secularisation, 
which is the violence of religion, did not end. Indeed, religions are still associated 
with a good deal of violence in the international sphere (Habermas, 2008, 
Juergensmeyer, 2003). Thus, the problem is: can a different approach to 
nonviolence help religion, as well as other beliefs systems, to find its place in a 
post-secular society? 
Even for what concerns nonviolence itself, religion has and still is providing 
energy to most of the nonviolent struggles around the world. Religion played a 
key role in Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan. At the centre of important actions of 
nonviolence were and still are important religious actors, such as Mother Teresa 
(Jahanbegloo, 2014:147), Desmond Tutu, Martin Luther King Jr., and many 
others. Against the propaganda of the Burmese government that democracy is 
unsuited to their cultural norms, San Suu Kyi turned to Buddhism, showing that 
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the seeds of democracy were already well present (Aung San Suu Kyi, 2010:167-
179). Recently, nonviolence and Christianity, in particular Catholicism, showed 
an interesting collaboration for what concerns the overthrow of dictatorial 
regimes. Nonviolence has been adopted by Catholicism in South America. 
Moreover, religion played a key role in spreading nonviolence in the Philippines, 
took part in the protests in Ukraine and more recently in Hong Kong. 
Unfortunately, the main problem is that debates on religion are still dominated in 
large part by violence, and most of the main religious community never had 
serious and vast reflections on nonviolence. This situation requires an urgent 
reflection on how to acknowledge the centrality of religion in nonviolence, 
remaining a pluralistic concept at the same time. 
Thus, the reconstruction of the concept of nonviolence as a drive for change in 
society should be able to include religion and different ‘belief systems’ in the 
construction of a post-secular society. This requires further analyses on the best 
way to include again religion in the concept of nonviolence, without the necessity 
of becoming a disciple and buying the entire doctrine. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed some of the key problems related to the division between 
principle and techniques of action, principled and pragmatic nonviolence. The 
division in two has decisively contributed to the success of nonviolence, but it is 
time to move on. Section one focused on the descriptive level, where we find a 
divided concept. Indeed, we showed the problems related to understanding what 
a nonviolent action is. Pragmatic and principled nonviolence reduce nonviolent 
action either to a technique, a patterned behaviour, or to the rigid implementation 
of an ideal in correct practices. Thus, a new theory of action should be looked for, 
in order to keep together those who focus on means, on producing new and more 
effective techniques of action to empower citizens, or at least to make them able 
to disobey without using direct violence, and those who focus on ends, on 
liberation from the chains of a cruel symbols and systems.  
Section two turned to the praxeological level, focusing on the necessity of 
enhancing a progressive field, which reconciles politics and morality in an open-
ended project. The focus of the literature on nonviolence has been on disruption 
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up to now, with the assumption that democracy would come out eventually and 
be better in any case. Now, the focus should turn to construction, to order, with a 
particular eye on the way in which nonviolence may deal with a democratic model 
in crisis. In doing so, nonviolence should avoid falling into realpolitik or moralism, 
allowing everybody to participate in the process of formation of a new society. 
Thus, the new concept of nonviolence should be able to balance disorder and 
order in the construction of an open-ended project, without falling in realpolitik or 
moralism.  
The last section focused on a key issue, which should be urgently faced in order 
to put forward a real shared project: religion. Religion, as well as all ‘system 
beliefs’, has been removed from the centre of nonviolence following the broader 
trend of secularisation. Now time has changed, and the debate is on the role of 
religion in a post-secular society. Thus, a different approach of nonviolence 
should include again at its centre religion, without necessarily becoming part of 
an entire creed, and losing its pluralistic nature. This would contribute to help 
religion to find its place in a post-secular society.  
Thus, the task for the following chapters will be to reconstruct nonviolence. In 
other words, the focus will be on providing a different approach to nonviolence. 
This approach has the aim of rethinking the actual division between techniques 
and values in order to reconcile means and ends; overcoming the division 
between politics and morality; and finding a way to re-include religion at the centre 
of the concept of nonviolence. In other words, the process of reconstruction will 
aim at building up a united, progressive, and pluralistic concept, able to overcome 
worrying uses of the term, and face the changing historical environment.   
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3. ALDO CAPITINI’S CONCEPT OF NONVIOLENCE  
The previous chapters showed that nonviolence is a dynamic and increasingly 
important concept. The internal divisions between techniques and values, as well 
as between principled and pragmatic, played an important role in the strife for the 
existence of the concept, but it may now lead to a real stalemate. Nonviolence 
risks the paralysis due to the many problems explained in chapter two. In the 
attempt of finding a way out, this chapter will introduce in the discussion the 
approach to nonviolence proposed by Aldo Capitini (1899-1968). The conviction 
is that the reflections of the Italian philosopher represent a strong starting point 
to reconstruct nonviolence.  
Capitini and Sharp are two very different scholars. Capitini was born thirty years 
before Sharp, on the other side of the Atlantic, and lived both under a dictatorship 
and a democratic regime. Moreover, he is far less known than Gene Sharp, 
especially outside Italy. Nevertheless, both are theorists and activists. For this 
reason, they experienced the same problem: how to introduce nonviolence in the 
west? And in academia? However, Capitini’s answer was very different. Instead 
of dividing the concept in two, the Italian philosopher developed an interesting 
conception of nonviolence which keeps together a vertical, spiritual tension and 
a horizontal, pragmatic one.   
In the attempt to describe his answer, section one will start with a brief 
introduction of the philosopher, concentrating on his encounter with Gandhian 
nonviolence. Out of this encounter, as well as out of the particular historical 
circumstances experienced by Capitini, an original approach to nonviolence 
emerged. With this concept, Capitini intended neither a mere set of techniques, 
nor an abstract principle to implement. Nonviolence emerges from this reflection 
as a tension, a praxis of liberation from the chains of reality and openness to the 
existent. The concept of nonviolence provided by Capitini includes both a 
principled and a pragmatic side.  
Section two will look at pragmatic nonviolence. Capitini thought of nonviolence 
as a method, a logic, or a style of action. Therefore, the list of techniques collected 
by him is wider and more complex than that of Sharp. At the same time, the list 
itself is less important, because nonviolence can assume the most variegate 
forms, as long as it creates what Capitini called the ‘reality of all’. This conception 
of nonviolence leads to a precise approach to power, which again integrates 
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Sharp. Indeed, Capitini talked of two phases of power, the first one called ‘power 
without government’, which will lead to the ‘power of all’ or omnicracy. 
The last section will turn to values and principles. From this perspective, we will 
show that nonviolence as a praxis of openness and liberation includes values 
without being similar to an abstract principle. Instead, Capitini’s idea of 
nonviolence is a craft, a continuous reshaping of human actions towards more 
liberation and openness. Nonviolence emerged as a clear perspective in front of 
a realistic acknowledgment of the drama of human limits, such as pain, mistakes, 
and death. These limits are tackled first with a refusal, which means the refusal 
of both treating a human being as a mere event and obeying the law of nature 
saying that the big fish should eat the small one. This refusal leads to a small 
practical opportunity. Human limits can be faced collectively, deepening the link 
with others with free actions of openness and liberation. From this new 
perspective, the Italian philosopher described a whole process of integration of 
reality made up of three main acts: the ascetic, ethical, and religious. The result 
of these three acts is what Capitini called compresence. 
  
3.1. Nonviolence as Praxis of Liberation and Openness 
The encounter of Capitini with the concept of nonviolence can be traced back at 
least to the 1920s, when the philosopher bumped for the first time into the 
Gandhian project. Gandhi visited Italy in 1931, but its influence on the peninsula 
dated well before this date. Already in 1925 the first Italian translation of Mahatma 
Gandhi: the Man who Became One with the Universal Being by Romain Rolland 
was published. Italian academia did not show particular interest in it, but the 
actions of the Mahatma did not pass unnoticed. The Vatican did not show any 
sympathy for Gandhi, especially because of its good relationships with the British 
Empire, along with its missionary role in India. Gandhi represented a problem for 
the stability of the area and for the missionary activity; he was “the most 
‘dangerous’ political leader of nationalist India” (Prayer, 2009). It was perhaps 
also for these reasons that Pius XI did not accept to meet Gandhi in 1931. On the 
contrary, part of the fascist regime considered him a positive example, due to his 
struggle against the United Kingdom, and for the independence of India (Hayes, 
2011). The encounter between Gandhi and Mussolini will always remain one of 
the strangest pictures in the history of the peninsula. In a private letter to Romain 
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Rolland, Gandhi expressed all his perplexity about Mussolini. “Mussolini is a 
riddle to me”, he said. The Mahatma recognized that he was attracted by many 
of his reforms, defining them as ‘compulsory’. He asked Rolland to make a study 
on him. “His care of the poor, his opposition to super-urbanization, his effort to 
bring about co-ordination between capital and labour, seem to me to demand 
special attention”. He was struck by the fact that “the majority of Italian people 
love the iron government of Mussolini”. Nevertheless, he asked Rolland to 
provide him with an “impartial” study, as he was well aware of the fact that 
“violence is the basis of Western society” (Gandhi, [1931] 1999:297). 
The favourable look of fascism surely helped the introduction of Gandhi in 
academia. It is not by chance that the translation of My Experiments with Truth 
was published in 1931, and with a preface of Giovanni Gentile46, commissioner 
and, since 1932, director of the Scuola Normale in Pisa. The bright students of 
Pisa saw in Gandhi something more than simply an anti-English struggle, 
however. From 1922 to 1928, Lanza del Vasto was studying philosophy in Pisa. 
The philosopher and theologian mixed during his life a complex and original 
philosophy of trinity, which was the topic of his dissertation, with Gandhian 
nonviolence. He has been so much impressed by the Mahatma to decide to go 
to India in 1937 and spend time with him, coming back later with the intention of 
building ashram-like communities in Europe, as well as spreading Gandhian 
nonviolence in the world (Drago and Trianni, 2009). 
In the same period of Lanza del Vasto, Aldo Capitini was studying in the faculty 
of Literature. Originally from Perugia, son of a municipal official and a tailor, 
Capitini arrived in Pisa after a period of self-study of Greek and Latin, which 
compensated his initial technical background. The intense study even caused 
him physical problems, which he interpreted as an important part of his spiritual 
development. In 1924, the same year of the murder of Matteotti, he won a 
prestigious scholarship to study Literature at the Normale in Pisa. 1928 he 
graduated, and in 1929 he got the Specialisation with the anti-fascist Attilio 
Momigliano. Then, he started to work as Administrative Secretary at the Normale, 
while also being an assistant to Momigliano. Capitini was impressed by Gandhi, 
but not by his anti-British struggle. Instead, the Italian philosopher suddenly 
                                                          
46 Gentile (1875-1944) was an Italian idealist philosopher and fascist. He has been described as 
the ‘philosopher of fascism’. He was ghost-writer of A doctrine of Fascism by Mussolini, and he 
wrote the famous Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals, to which many Italian intellectuals adhered.  
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realised the potential of Gandhi’s methods to counteract the rise of fascism, which 
was worrying him. Capitini understood that fascism was providing an answer to 
the hunger of hope and values coming from the Italian society. Unfortunately, the 
answer  pointed towards violence, power, war and risks (Capitini, 2003:27). He 
witnessed the progressive idolatry of the person of Mussolini, as well as a process 
of idolatry of the state, with nationalism and patriotism shaping the population, 
leading to an increase in domestic and international violence and divisions. 
Against such a worrying situation, Capitini realised that nonviolence would have 
been a valid way to reverse the situation, and since 1931 he endlessly worked to 
realise his proposal: freeing Italy via nonviolent non-cooperation. Unfortunately, 
Italy was totally unprepared to react nonviolently against the rise of fascism. 
Capitini claimed that in Italy in 1924, as well as Germany 1933, a vast and well-
organized action from below of nonviolent non-collaboration would have caused 
serious problems to governments, but there was no strategy as well as no 
network of people ready to deploy nonviolent actions. In spite of all this, Capitini 
tried to be the ‘prophet’ of this nonviolent revolution in the Italian peninsula. He 
became vegetarian at the Normale, where he was a secretary, being a scandal. 
Fascism was praising strength and activism, while Capitini was persuaded of the 
fact that saving sub-human lives could induce to refuse killing human beings. 
Then, he refused in 1933 to join the Fascist Party, and he was dismissed from 
the Normale. From 1933 he started a strong anti-fascist propaganda, organizing 
many meetings around Italy in order to help organizing anti-fascist groups. He 
worked to build up a Liberalsocialist movement, but he did not participate to the 
armed insurrection against fascism.  
The opposition to the regime links Capitini with key figures of Italian resistance, 
such as Gobetti, Croce, Gramsci, and Rosselli. While he read Socialismo Liberale 
of Rosselli and Gramsci’s works only later in life, he knew Croce, who helped him 
to publish his first book, Elementi di Un’Esperienza Religiosa in 1937, but he was 
not his follower. Nevertheless, the activity of Capitini is different from all of them 
as nonviolence made him more concerned about a strong relation between 
means and ends. Moreover, he looked at fascism from a different point of view, 
the religious. He realised a crisis in the production of values, and noticed the key 
role played by religion. The continuous closure in conservatism and power made 
the church the third pillar, besides monarchy and culture, of the regime. For the 
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philosopher, the church would have easily defeated the fascist regime with a 
simple but firm non-collaboration (Capitini, 2003:32). In particular, he was 
appalled by the Concordat between the Church and Mussolini in 1929. In that 
occasion, he definitely left Catholicism, and became conscious of something else. 
He ascertained the fact that religion and the Roman institution were two different 
things (Capitini, 2003:32). The Roman institution revealed its complete 
inadequacy, as it did not realise the profound pain that fascism would have 
triggered. Nevertheless, religion could not be reduced to the action of that 
particular institution. Capitini and many others cherished a strong religious 
sentiment, a tension toward some kind of transcendence and values. This 
religious drive could not accept to kneel down in front of the violence of fascism. 
Instead, the religious aspiration towards something absolute and pure became 
the core of Capitini’s opposition to fascism (Capitini, 1950:139). 
The example of Gandhi provided Capitini with a unique perspective in the struggle 
against the totalitarian regime and the Catholic establishment. The Mahatma 
provided Capitini with a strong drive to be used against fascism (Capitini, 
1963:79); it provided at the same time an example of faith and a useful practical 
orientation (Capitini, 1966a:17). Capitini included him in the ‘pure religious spirits’, 
such as Christ, Buddha, and St. Francis (Capitini, 2010), who were also examples 
of a struggle against the traditional institutionalism, along with a call for religious 
reform (Capitini, 2003:33). Nevertheless, Capitini made clear that Gandhi has 
never been “a man who has made absolute revelations, such as to introduce me 
to discard every other moral and religious teacher”. On the contrary, he was 
considered “a living teacher, from whom one may learn and with whom one may 
discuss, not as a saint whom one venerates and recognizes as a figure radically 
superior and of another nature, one whom one cannot fail to venerate” (Capitini, 
1953). In particular, Gandhi’s actions became a model for Capitini. This does not 
mean that Capitini found in Gandhi only a set of techniques which can be more 
effective to overthrow a government. Gandhi’s actions were a practical attempt 
of changing both society and the individuals.  
At the end of the war, Capitini started a long and troubled academic career as a 
professor of moral philosophy in Pisa, and of Pedagogy in Cagliari and Perugia47. 
                                                          
47 The intellectual production of Capitini has been very extensive and varied. One of the key 
interests of Capitini was pedagogy. Here it is worth mentioning: L’Atto di Educare, Firenze:La 
Nuova Italia, 1951; Il Fanciullo nella Liberazione dell’Uomo, Pisa, Nistri Lischi, 1953; Aspetti 
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The career did not stop his mission: deepening the understanding and spreading 
the knowledge of nonviolence. Thus, he founded the Centro di Coordinamento 
Internazionale per la Nonviolenza (Centre for International Coordination towards 
Nonviolence) in Perugia, which organized many congresses on the encounter 
between East and West; he founded in 1952 the Societa’ Vegetariana Italiana 
(Italian Vegetarian Society); he organised the first Italian Peace March in 1961, 
out of which two organisations coordinated by Capitini have been established. He 
also worked endlessly to place nonviolence at the centre of both religion and 
politics, as we will see more in depth in the next chapter. For what concerns 
religion, Capitini led a radical struggle against the continuous acts of closure of 
the Catholic Church since the 1950s48. He heavily criticised Pius XII, blaming him 
of professing a religion “based on dividing people between each other” (Capitini, 
1957:2). Later, Capitini welcomed the 1963 Pacem in Terris and the Second 
Vatican Council; he understood that they marked a watershed in the history of 
the Church49. Nevertheless, he also expressed his doubts on the latter in his 
Severita’ Religiosa per il Concilio, in which he evaluated the significance and 
consequences of the Council. The result was a quite critical book. Capitini 
claimed that too many key issues have been left aside (Capitini, 1966b). In 
particular, the full importance of nonviolence has been overlooked. There is no 
real commitment to use and spread new methods, as well as no real effort has 
been made to reject war, fabrication of weapons, and violence on subhuman 
beings.  
                                                          
dell’Educazione alla Nonviolenza, Pisa, Pacini Mariotti, 1959; L’Educazione Civica nella Scuola 
e nella Vita Sociale, Bari, Laterza, 1964; Educazione Aperta, 2 volumes, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 
1967.  
48 Capitini wrote extensively about religion, with a highly critical attitude. The topics range from 
the doctrine put forward by Pius XII to the role of religion in society; from the issues concerning 
baptized non-believer to the problems around the Second Vatican Council. The books of particular 
importance are: Il Problema Religioso Attuale, Parma, Guanda, 1948; Nuova Socialita’ e Riforma 
Religiosa, Torino, Einaudi, 1950; Religione Aperta, Parma, Guanda, 1955; Discuto la Religione 
di Pio XII, Milano, Parenti, 1957; Aggiunta Religiosa all’Opposizione, Milano, Guanda, 1958; 
Battezzati Non Credenti, Firenze, Parenti, 1961; Severita’ Religiosa per il Concilio, Bari, De 
Donato, 1966.  
49 Pacem In Terris was a papal encyclical issued by Pope John XXIII in 1963. The full title was 
On Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity and Liberty, and it represents a 
watershed because is addressed to ‘all men of good will’ instead of Catholics; it insists that 
responsibility for peace belong to everybody and not only to superpowers; conflicts should be 
solved by negotiation; he emphasise the importance of human rights. For what concerns the 
Second Vatican Council, it was the last ecumenical council, opened in 1962 and closed in 1965. 
It has been extremely important because it proposed a profound renewal of Catholic doctrine and 
practice. 
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Turning to political life, Capitini recognised that the advent of democracy did not 
end up the need for nonviolence50. On the contrary, the limited and fragile Italian 
democracy revealed all the limits of western democracies. The west was still 
centred on violence, which remained one of the most widely used ways to deal 
with internal and international issues. Violence was so entrenched that even 
rebellions continued to hold the myth of violence, with the rising interest in the 
technique of guerrilla. Moreover, the philosopher understood that a democracy 
based on a constitution, along with democratic procedures, was not enough. The 
state, in particular the Italian one, continued to be closed and violent, dominated 
by political parties and clientelism (Capitini, 1950:130). Besides, Capitini 
acknowledged that western democracies suffered the fall into technocracy. He 
raised his voice against the tendency towards the reduction of political issues to 
technical problems, caring only about efficiency.  
All these feature and circumstances constituted the ground in which Capitini’s 
original theory and practice of nonviolence blossomed. Unfortunately, his work 
stopped too early. Due to a mocking fate, Capitini passed in 1968, right in the 
middle of the rebellions that were shacking Europe. However, this was far from 
the end. The Italian philosopher left many pages of reflections and ideas as 
testimony of his efforts, as well as source of inspiration for the next generations. 
In these pages, the idea of nonviolence represents the thread that links 
discussions on the most disparate topics. It is a complex concept, which is quite 
different from the current dominant approach of Gene Sharp. Nonviolence is not 
reduced to a mere set of techniques. It certainly includes techniques of actions, 
but something more is at stake. Indeed, nonviolence includes ethics, morality, 
and even religion, even though it is not a principle which should be obeyed at any 
time. What Capitini calls nonviolence is instead an articulated process of both 
liberation from the chains of reality, and ‘openness to the existent’ (Capitini, 
1962a) (Capitini, 1962b:21). In other words, nonviolence is a process which tries 
                                                          
50 It is impossible to rigidly distinguish between books on strictly political issues and books 
focusing on religion. Thus, we suggest to look at the above books as well as to the following: I 
C.O.S. per la Comunita’ Aperta, 1948; Italia Nonviolenta, Bologna, Libreria Internazionale 
Avanguardia, 1949; Nuova Socialita’ e Riforma Religiosa, Torino, Einaudi, 1950; Rivoluzione 
Aperta, Parma, Guanda, 1956; L’Obiezione di Coscienza in Italia, Manduria, Lacaita, 1959; 
Antifascismo tra i Giovani, Trapani, Celebes, 1966; Le Tecniche della Nonviolenza, Milano, 
Feltrinelli, 1967; and in particular the postomous Il Potere di Tutti, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1969. 
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to keep together the tension towards personal liberation and values, while 
maintaining a profound link with the other.  
In order to understand Capitini’s approach to nonviolence, we should introduce 
some key notions and ideas which characterise Capitini. For a start, we should 
look at his conception of action. With this term, Capitini refers to something which 
is much more than the movement of a body; it is the moment in which new 
meanings may take place, depending on the actual interaction with the others as 
well as other’s understandings. In addition, an act is at the same time limited and 
unlimited. It is limited because it is always realized in a determined context, 
situation, time and place. At the same time it is unlimited, because it always 
transcends itself, creating something new and producing infinite and sometimes 
unexpected consequences. Thus, in any action there is an opportunity of “putting 
an ideal even in the choice of means”, of realising something different, 
contributing to shape human relations. In few words, in any action there is a small 
opening for a ground-breaking choice. This choice is between actions of closure 
or openness, of liberation or slavery, of deepening the link with the others or not.  
Instead of being an event led by nature, a person can choose to recognise his or 
her personal responsibility to either act passively, out of necessity, or to accept 
the challenge, to risk.  
This risk is shaped by another key word of Capitini’s vocabulary, persuasion. 
Nonviolence is an alternative approach to reality, which is centred on the idea of 
persuasion. The term does not mean behaving as if things were in a certain way. 
Persuasion refers to a sort of ‘internal participation’ (Capitini, 1950:57). It is a 
proactive attitude. Instead of passively living life doing things without conviction, 
persuasion requires to ‘live’ the tragedy of reality with transformative, ‘prophetic’ 
attitude. Persuasion means being persuaded, not passively living in the society 
as it appears. It requires a serious effort to live in profundity and authenticity. 
Capitini drew the concept of persuasion from the philosopher Carlo 
Michelstaedter51. Nevertheless, the former introduced in the idea of persuasion 
                                                          
51 Carlo Michelstaedter (1887-1910) was an Italian philosopher and writer, who committed suicide 
really early in his life. The most famous book is his thesis Persuasion and Rhetoric, in which 
persuasion may also be read as possess of oneself, which always vanishes due to the limits of 
human life. To the contrary, rhetoric is merely the apparatus of words, actions, institutions, hiding 
the impossibility of reaching persuasion. 
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of the latter a strong ethical impulse (Foppa Pedretti, 2005:285), overcoming his 
nihilist approach.  
Persuasion is for Capitini a persuaded action of love, of care towards the other, 
in the realisation of values in society. The meaning of the term value is another 
important part of Capitini’s philosophical approach. When he talks about value, 
he does not have in mind abstract ideas, which can be divided from facts. Instead, 
it is the way in which the subject lives, intervenes, shapes facts. Thus, value is 
creation, is liberation from the idea that there is an external and cruel reality out 
there (Capitini, 1998:222). From this perspective, nobody can define a value once 
and for all. Nevertheless, people can participate in the day-by-day construction 
of the good, the beauty etc… The continuous research of persuaded action of 
liberation and openness for the realisation of values in society presupposes a 
certain conception of the person and its relation with the world. This approach to 
nonviolence is incompatible with an idea of person as an individual atom. Instead, 
Capitini talked of a person as an ‘open centre’. The idea of a person as a ‘centre’ 
can be described as a condition, in which people do not hide behind the excuses 
of necessity or private interest; they act authentically, out of persuasion, always 
deepening the link with the others in the production of values (Capitini, 1950:56). 
Anyone can work every day for liberation from human limits and openness to 
others, making a profound transformation of reality.  
This short introduction to the vocabulary of Capitini allows us to better understand 
what Capitini meant when he wrote that nonviolence is a “choice of a way of 
thinking and acting which is not oppression or destruction of any living being, 
especially human beings” (Capitini, 1962b:29). This choice cannot be understood 
as an act of principle, a rigid implementation here and now of a belief system, 
which would easily clash with other human actions, leading to nothing concrete. 
Capitini himself claimed that “those who want to do ‘either everything or nothing’ 
are those who do not do anything at all” (Capitini, 2011:238). Thus, the way in 
which nonviolence acts in the world, how it is able to liberate a closed society and 
to produce a different reality, is totally different. Capitini’s concept of nonviolence 
pays great attention to social consequences, opportunities, and public reason. It 
is not an abstract ideal, but an endless fight to change reality at any moment. For 
Capitini,  
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“it is a mistake to believe that nonviolence is peace, order, work, and quite 
sleeping, marriage and many kids, nothing broken at home, no bruise on the 
body. Nonviolence is not the literal and symmetric antithesis of war: in the latter 
everything is broken, in the former everything is intact. Nonviolence is war as 
well, or better, is struggle, continuous struggle against situations surrounding us, 
existent laws, ours’ and others’ habits, our own souls and subconscious, our own 
dreams, which are plenty of fear and desperate violence. Nonviolence means 
being prepared to see chaos around us, social disorder, arrogance of evil people; 
it means having the prospect of an anguished situation. Nonviolence is right in 
promising nothing to the world, except for the cross” (Capitini, 1948:57-58).  
With the term ‘cross’ there is no intention to adhere to a religion, even though 
religion is included in this interpretation of nonviolence. The Italian philosopher 
wanted only to stress that nonviolence has nothing to do with cowardice, and that 
sacrifice may be required.  
This long quotation makes sense of the realism of Capitini’s conception of 
nonviolence. Nonviolence works right in the middle of society. Nonviolence 
denies neither the existence of endless forms of violence, nor the tragedy of the 
necessity to use certain forms of violence in extreme cases for certain purposes. 
This means that there is no dogmatic opposition between the nonviolent and 
those who use violence.  
“I do not hold in lower esteem those who rationally and out of necessity, suppress 
the existence of a human being. I even acknowledge that I owe aspects of my 
historical life to those who, for instance, fought for my country’s independence 
and freedom, even killing tyrants and foreigners. I respect the father who kills 
those who threaten the life of his child […]. However, it hurts me those who enjoy 
killing for the sake of killing, adding ardour to the rational decision. My religious 
persuasion says that, if something should  be added to rationality, it is infinite 
love; and thus the decision of killing will always tend to become more cautious 
(this is one of the aspects of human development: the acquisition of respect 
towards human existence)” (Capitini, 1998:102).  
Thus, nonviolence walks on the edge of violence, manifesting itself every time in 
different and imperfect clothes. It is a small but ground-breaking opportunity, a 
tension to do as much as possible here and now for openness and liberation 
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(Capitini, 1998:102). For this reason, nonviolence cannot be reduced to the 
imposition of rules, if not indirectly and with personal pain. Indeed, the increase 
of the link between interiority and the others cannot be achieved through the 
imposition of one view over another. Nonviolence is a new direction which 
embraces the whole personal experience (Capitini, 1962a:10-11); it is a life of 
persuaded actions. 
Even if Capitini used this term only few times, it is possible to claim that 
nonviolence is for the Italian philosopher a praxis. The nonviolence proposed by 
Gandhi is a praxis (Capitini, 1999:106), as well as his one (Capitini, 1953). More 
precisely, he talked of a religious praxis (Capitini, 2011:93), which includes the 
whole process described above. It is both the need of non-cooperation and 
commitment towards the others. It is at the same time a constant orientation and 
an always different choice (Capitini, 2011). This approach is able to crudely 
analyse reality, in order to begin a process of change. This new process of 
liberation and openness, this new praxis, is called nonviolence (Capitini, 1953).  
“Nonviolence is not the carrying out of an order, but a conviction pervading our 
mind, our heart and our actions, and it is an open centre; this means that 
everyone may undertake the initiative of unity-love52 without waiting until all are 
loving, and give expression to it in particular ways which he shall decide on with 
full sincerity, and with regret for all limitations and impediments which the present 
state of reality-society-humanity still opposes to the full development of this unity 
between us all” (Capitini, 1953). 
How does this praxis work? The Italian philosopher was very clear in stressing 
the fact that nonviolence cannot work in a traditional way. The praxis of liberation 
and openness cannot fall into dialectics (Capitini, 1963:88). In an article published 
in 1959, Capitini rejects Hegelian dialectics, due to its presumption of including 
everything (Capitini, 1959). For instance, he claimed that in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit dialectics tends to absorb the negative in order to overcome it, in an 
endless progression, up to when reason is reconciled with itself. The fact that the 
progression is the result of a struggle (everything is licit for human progress) 
triggered the many doubts of Capitini, because it may be valid in nature, where 
                                                          
52 With this term we refer to the unity of knowledge and value. Indeed, it is the link between the 
knowledge of God, of the unity with the others, and love. This leads to a religion which is not exact 
knowledge and description of what is God. Instead, the unity with the other and with God is to 
live, to find in practice, in the action of love.   
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human beings are events and the struggle is led by arrogance and vitality. 
Unfortunately, Hegel’s work does not help to find an alternative way to supersede 
conflict other than through the annihilation of others; instead, conflict becomes 
the way for progress. Capitini claimed that the “method of the empire” (Capitini, 
1966b), which expresses itself in burning books, or forcing others to do 
something, should be left aside53.  
Instead, Capitini placed persuasion, the intimate participation with others in the 
production of values, at the core of a different method to live this different 
perspective. The action of liberation proposed by nonviolence works as an 
‘integration’ to the rest of human actions (Capitini, 1998:321). These actions of 
integration are pure, authentic, and without condition. Indeed, they do not hinder 
the receiving being; they do not seek anything from others; they do not aim at the 
annihilation of the others. It is called ‘integration’ because a nonviolent action 
does not aim at demolishing existent institutions or groups. On the contrary, it 
integrates them with a force stemming from within, through open actions that aim 
at giving something more to the state of affairs. The approach of ‘integration’ 
makes nonviolence not a dogma or a casuistic, but a “continuous research, study, 
discover, celebration. Constantly amplifying and deepening the relationship with 
all possible beings, suffering repercussions and giving impulse to recovers, 
discovering that there is always a more authentic nonviolence, and that 
‘yesterday we were violent” (Capitini 1999:136). Nonviolence is the possibility of 
enriching human life with actions of love, of liberation from a cynical approach to 
life, of openness to others in spite of differences. In doing so, nonviolence works 
practically for the formation of another, and qualitatively better, reality, whose 
persistence depends on people’s every-day choice of adhering to truth and to 
unity-love. (Capitini, 1998:13). This reality is called ‘reality of all’.  
                                                          
53 The influence of Hegel in European philosophy has been extremely important. Capitini is one example 
of the Italian reactions to the German philosopher (along with Cesare Luporini, Nicola Abbagnano and 
Luigi Pareyson), as well as to Gentile’s neo-Hegelian idealism and Croce’s historicism. For this reason, it 
should be acknowledged the striking similarity with some of the key critics of Hegel, such as Kierkegaard. 
Capitini and the Danish philosopher criticised heavily the abstract vision of the world offered by Hegel. 
They put at the centre of their writings the importance of human existence against abstract reason, with the 
aim of finding a way to free human being from a condition of suffering. However, Capitini learnt of 
Kierkegaard only later in life (at least after his first book Elementi di un’Esperienza Religiosa) through the 
writings of the Christian Existentialist Nikolaj Berdjaev (and the interest for Boine and Ibsen). Thus, it may 
certainly be claimed that they share very similar views (Capitini even defined himself a ‘Kantian-
Kierkegaardian’), but we should stress that there is no direct influence of Kierkegaard on Capitini (see: 
Foppa Pedretti, C. (2005) Spirito Profetico e Educatzione in Aldo Capitini, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, p. 206).   
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“When we say ‘reality of all’, we refer to something which cannot be measured. 
‘All’ are not only the inhabitants of a place, of a city, of a State, of a continent, of 
the earth; they are all the human beings, with whom it is possible to establish a 
communication in action. But not only; here starts an enthusiastic openness to 
something else, a continuous research, a personal effort which questions 
whether in the ‘all’ others should be included; and thus, those who cannot run an 
active life and an actual exchange, because they are ill, unhappy, crazy, absent 
from community life, from day-to-day friendliness” (Capitini, 1999:136).  
This is enlarged to sub-human beings, as well as dead. Capitini is persuaded of 
the fact that when something becomes truly ‘of everybody’, belonging not to 
someone in particular, it changes in nature. 
From this brief description, it is clear that nonviolence is never perfect and does 
not end anywhere (Capitini, 1962b:29), rather it traces a clear direction for people, 
society, and even for politics and religion. Nonviolence is like music or poetry. 
Indeed, nobody embraces nonviolence in an abstract way, in the same way as 
nobody can pretend to listen or compose ‘the Music’. It is only possible to act in 
particular circumstances, embarking upon particular acts of nonviolence (Capitini, 
1962b:29). At the same time, “it is always possible to do new music, new poetry; 
and the old music and poetry can always be lived more deeply”. For what 
concerns nonviolence, it is always possible to act nonviolently, to create new 
opportunities of liberation and openness. 
The analogy of music may not persuade the many who worked their whole life to 
make nonviolence an effective means, a set of tools which everybody can adopt. 
At the same time, it may represent an outrage to those who suffer the 
consequences of dramatic choices made to implement a pure principle of 
nonviolence. However, Capitini worked his whole life to introduce in Italy 
nonviolent methods of struggle, as well as linked nonviolence with values and 
religion. The fact is that the two components are the result of the praxis of 
nonviolence. Thus, they are both integral to nonviolence. It is the complex praxis 
of liberation and openness which is capable to shed new light on actions and 
values. Yet, how to conceive of pragmatic and principled nonviolence from this 
perspective? This will be the focus of the following two sections. 
 
104 | P a g e  
 
3.2. Beyond Pragmatic Nonviolence: A different Method for the Power of All 
The conception of nonviolence as a praxis of liberation and openness includes a 
pragmatic side. Capitini was well aware of the importance of the many techniques 
which did not lead to physical violence. He even wrote a book on the techniques 
of nonviolence in 1967, with the intent of presenting to the Italian public, in 
particular to students, a new but efficient path for change. He tried to be prophet 
of a new way, a new praxis to change the status quo, which did not fall into the 
too well known patterns of violence.  
This new approach looks at war as a method of action. In other words, war is a 
series of actions of closure, such as battles, bombardments, commercial blocks, 
and espionage (Capitini, 1966a:134-238). This method of action divides and 
exacerbates the ‘field of contention’. In order to deal with such a difficult situation, 
we certainly need a new method action, or what Zunes would call an entire new 
“weapon system” (Zunes, 2000:181). This method may definitely be a game 
changer, and it “may be valid for domestic transformation, or revolutions, as well 
as for the possible fight against invaders” (Capitini, 1999:127).  
Nevertheless, nonviolence cannot be reduced to a list of techniques. Nonviolence 
is a praxis, a tension, a way of doing things. In this sense it is an alternative. The 
aim is not to show different behaviours, but to change human relations. For this 
reason, when he analysed the techniques of nonviolence, the Italian philosopher 
gathered a much wider and complex list of techniques than Gene Sharp, without 
falling into any sorts of contradictions.  
He divided the ‘techniques’ in individual and collective. The individual techniques 
are characterised by the development of a strong personal responsibility, in the 
sense of self-discipline and responsibility towards the others. The first individual 
technique is the act of opening the self to the other, talking to the other in order 
to interiorise him or her, feeling proximity. Then, it includes vegetarianism, the 
overcome of the logic of revenge, the exemplarity of the individual through fast54 
and prayer (as tension of both ritual and spiritual love) and conscientious 
objections. It includes dialogue, which is not interpreted as merely speaking with 
each other. It is instead a kind of authentic and pure exchange based on the 
research of a constructive and shared truth. It presupposes the possibility of being 
                                                          
54 On the practice of fasting, there is a letter exchange between Capitini and Danilo Dolci. 
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persuaded by the other. In this sense it is continuous process of contribution and 
clarification, and it excludes sophisticated uses of the discourse in order to 
prevail. In this sense, dialogue is oriented towards non-lying, which is the contrary 
of consent drawn in a violent way, through manipulation of the other, or even 
worse the imposition a certain truth with intimidations and threat of retaliation.  
The individual techniques are deeply linked with the collective, which share a 
strong drive towards more and better participation of people in the social and 
political life. Here we find non-collaboration, disarmament, negotiations, and 
many traditional collective actions of civil disobedience, such as strikes, reverse 
strikes, rallies, sit-in, and marches. However, it also includes sabotage, which 
means the destruction of means of communication or even weapons of an 
invader army. It also means sabotage of the instruments of an oppressive power 
without persecuting the enemies under dictatorships. Finally, a collective 
technique is also education, which is interpreted as a practical effort to improve 
the quality of the participation of everybody in the society.  
The point is that this mix of techniques and personal features represent the flesh 
and bones of nonviolence. However, nonviolence can never be reduced to them. 
Nonviolence is “openness to existence, liberty and development of human 
beings” (Capitini, 1962a:10-11); ends cannot be sacrificed. Thus, much more is 
required. Nonviolence is a method used to oppose the common practices of 
violence in the present society, as well as the widespread violent oppression and 
exploitation consolidated over time.  
From this analysis is clear that nonviolence, in its pragmatic side, is a method, a 
logic, a style of action, and not a set of techniques. More precisely, it is not merely 
a method to win or solve a conflict; it is an ‘open revolution’, that is a method, a 
style of action, a logic to change reality. It is a work of analysis of existing 
practices, in order to find opportunities for liberation and openness. For this 
reason, this sort of pragmatic nonviolence embeds a vision of power which is 
slightly different from Sharp’s. Indeed, this pragmatic approach to nonviolence 
lead to integrate the concept of ‘people power’ with that of the ‘power of all’. 
Capitini made clear that nonviolence is to be intended as a constant method used 
in social and political struggles, as well as ‘open revolution’ and stimulus to 
planning from below, to decentralisation and control by all. Nonviolence thus is 
not passive in society; it works at the centre of it. It takes initiatives of solidarity, 
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of non-collaboration, of assisting the overwhelmed, of distinguishing between 
sinners and sins, and of the creation of alternatives. It should take into account 
those who cannot participate and implement these techniques, and even the 
enemy.  
The new methods offered by Capitini were based on the conviction that power 
lies not only in the possession of a nuclear bomb or in the affiliation with a political 
group, a certain religion or ideology. Looking at power not as a monopoly of 
institutions, it can be acknowledged that populations hold a lot of power, which 
they rarely exercise, and which should not be necessarily violent. The population 
can decide to obey or not, to give or withdraw consent, to act creatively and 
independently from any decree of the state. There is an infinite group of actions, 
of pressure, of disdain, of sentiments and relations, which are the basis of 
existence of power. Thus, the aim of Capitini was to work against the monopoly 
of power in the hands of a few small elites. Capitini’s approach to power is based 
on self-responsibility and the empowerment of the people. Personal responsibility 
requires a process of internal renovation, rejecting war, destruction, spiritual self-
poisoning, and folly (Capitini, 1999:253). It involves the idea that there is no 
‘definitive’ system of power ruled by ‘necessity’. In other words, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that a new fact could change strong institutions, such as 
parties, revolutions, ideas, and even dissipate the danger of war. For what 
concerns the empowerment of people, Capitini worked to raise awareness within 
the population so that they can withdraw consent from leaders, especially from 
those who intend to bring them into war.  
However, withdrawing consent is not enough. Capitini proposed two key 
elements for a real revolution. First of all, an increasing bottom-up solidarity. 
Secondly, a long work of endless proposals for change (Capitini, 1999:115). 
People need to be encouraged to participate, learning to express their view (and 
sometimes to have one), and exercising their power fruitfully. People need new 
initiatives, proposals and groups, through which they can learn to cooperate, in 
order to put pressure on and reduce the power of those at the top. At the same 
time, they have to be resilient; they should acquire skills and techniques enabling 
them to resist for long time.    
Up to now, this vision of power may appear similar to the pluralistic view of Gene 
Sharp. Nevertheless, this view is incompatible with the idea of a conquest of 
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power by any means, which Sharp does not exclude. For Capitini, nonviolence is 
not a list of methods of action, but a real integration with something new, the 
‘power without government’. This power will be represented by a centre, which in 
extreme cases may be a single person, contributing to the world with persuaded 
actions of liberation and openness, in the opposite way than sects or small groups 
of perfects. This fact changes the social structure, which will de facto be no more 
divided in a group holding power and in another without.  The persuaded person, 
or the prophet, is the highest example of this different power, which does not have 
to be sustained with violence and does not depend from institutions. 
Consequently, this means that the main aim of the power of all is not a change in 
government. In the short term, it is neither necessary to overthrow a dictatorship, 
nor change the people in power.  
In other words, the growth of the power of all may be parallel and autonomous 
from the traditional one. Nevertheless, this first phase will gradually end up in 
another phase, in which the traditional institutions will control very little. The 
reason is that the continuous effort in openness, the training in nonviolent 
techniques, the development of the environment in which people live, as well as 
a different education and solidarity will practically end up the dependency of the 
citizens from their institutions. Even the idea that egoistic and violent human 
beings can only be tamed by the state will fade away.  
Instead, a different society will grow, which is not necessarily a representative 
democracy. Capitini named this new society omnicracy, which means the power 
of all. The term had been used for the first time in a letter in 1956 (Capitini, 
1999:364). Nevertheless, Capitini only started to seriously reflect on that term 
during the 1960s, and it plays a key role in Capitini’s theory. Indeed, it should be 
admitted that the concept of omnicracy is quite vague and undetermined. The 
main reason is that the power of all is not the process of emptying existing 
institutions in order to establish new powerful ones. Instead, the new order is 
based on new social relations, and institutions are marginal, temporary, flexible 
and much less powerful. Thus, it represents the political side of the practical 
revolution of nonviolence in society. It can be described as the political side of 
the ‘reality of all’, and for this reason cannot be fully distinguished from 
compresence, which will be analysed in the next session. Omnicracy can be 
described as the horizontal tension towards increasing inclusion, which balances 
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the vertical tension towards values of compresence (Capitini, 1950:110). 
Omnicracy, the power of all, is a sort of direct democracy. It is the maximum 
openness possible to the others. However, this form of direct democracy will not 
be a “permanent administration by an anonym square, which tramples on minority 
rights and actual oppositions” (Capitini, 1999:111). The reason is that the central 
role of the praxis of nonviolence in the process of formation of this form of direct 
democracy will forge the latter as a continuous work of integration. Indeed, from 
this perspective direct democracy the practical overcome of the omnipotent 
power of a group of technicians based on the myth of efficiency, as well as the 
omnipotent power of a political group based on the myth of revolution (Capitini, 
1999:112).  
 
3.3. Beyond Principled Nonviolence: The Great Refusal and the Craft of Shaping 
Reality 
The pragmatic dimension of Capitini’s nonviolence emerged as a method, a logic 
which may adopt existing techniques as well as inventing new ones. It is not the 
simple application of a technique; it is a process of interpreting and shaping 
reality, with many innovative techniques, in order to foster personal responsibility 
and the power of all keeping the project of omnicracy as open as possible. Thus, 
we are talking of something which is beyond the idea of nonviolence as a mere 
set of techniques, but it does not seem to be a principle or a value as well. It 
includes an end, but it is not something rigidly determined. Therefore, we can 
claim that there is certainly also a ‘principled’ dimension, but is not a classic and 
rigid imposition of a principle from above. This section will describe Capitini’s 
‘principled’ dimension of nonviolence.  
Going back to the initial definition, nonviolence is a tension that enriches and 
directs action. This definition may appear quite vague and confusing. It is so 
because nonviolence does not start with a clear and abstract definition, value, or 
principle to follow. Instead, Capitini’s conception of nonviolence starts by 
requiring a change of perspective in the subject itself. Instead of looking from 
above, from general theories on the meaning of nonviolence, Capitini asks the 
reader to begin from him or herself, along with the persons surrounding them. In 
order to do so, a realistic analysis of each person’s tragedy in life is needed. In 
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other words, nonviolence starts from an honest analysis of reality, and in 
particular, from the acknowledgment of the drama of human finitude. Human 
beings face tremendous limits, such as the possibility of pain, mistakes, and 
death. These limits impact deeply on each person, being at the basis of reactions, 
emotions, dreams and fears; at the same time, they provide a link with the others, 
because the drama is shared by everybody. Human limits, especially pain, 
mistakes, and death, are simultaneously deeply personal and common. For this 
reason, they can represent a valid starting point for a change of perspective. 
The change of perspective, and in particular the perception of unity between 
people’s suffering, is the beginning of the process of nonviolence. Indeed, the 
perception of unity allows human beings to glimpse that it is possible to refuse to 
follow a way of living dictated by mere power relations or passive acceptance of 
the necessity of pain and mistakes, along with the complete disappearance of a 
dead person. A reality shaped merely on these premises is not worth to last, and 
a possibility to react differently to human limits is grasped. Capitini called this 
refusal ‘the great refusal’. The great refusal is first of all a rejection of the reduction 
of a human being to an event (Capitini 2011:7). At the same time, this rejection 
implies also the refutation of reducing human behaviour to the law of nature; a 
reality in which the bigger fish devours the smaller one. In other words, the ‘great 
refusal’ is the refusal to follow common but dangerous reactions to human limits 
and the cruelty of life, because these aspects of human life are insufficient, 
temporary, and able to create a reality which is not worth to last.  
Yet, on what basis do human beings refuse to act following power relations and 
passively accepting human limits? The great refusal is not based on an 
alternative tale, telling us what a human being is, as well as suggesting the ‘real’ 
laws of nature. Instead, the focus is put back into each person’s control. People 
have a great opportunity, as well as a great responsibility. The opportunity is not 
to create an alternative tale to believe, in order not to face reality. On the contrary, 
it is at the practical level that the opportunity lies. It is at the practical level, at the 
level of human actions, that nonviolence suggests a way out. When the personal 
reaction against human limits is closure, a person renounces the opportunity 
embedded in any action provided by the practical link with others, and falls into 
solitude and the dominion of nature. Human limits are accepted and drive the 
individual action towards a withdrawal from reality, inaction, or to a passive 
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following of the external reality. This attitude would lead to violence and 
resignation, and it would not represent a way out of the tragedy of human limits. 
Instead, when a person recognises the link with the others, he or she can decide 
to deepen this link. He or she can choose an act of openness. He or she can 
choose to love, interpreted as agape. This choice opens up de facto a different 
reality, which transcends the material bounds and produce values. Capitini clearly 
stated that the actual “way through of history” is “the sentiment that the world is 
foreign to us when is to be lived without love, without infinite openness towards 
each other, without unity upon many differences and suffering” (Capitini, 
1998:21). This means that the ‘great refusal’ is not a dogmatic credo, which 
should be pushed straight away to the extremes. For instance, the refusal does 
not deny the importance of social and political institutions, even when far from 
being perfect. Capitini was well aware of the importance of the state, with all its 
institutions, including the police and the army. It is true that the army is linked 
directly to the empire, and to a militaristic mentality. It is also true that in the long 
run nonviolence works for the substitution of these institutions. Nevertheless, 
Capitini acknowledged the important role the police play in our imperfect 
society55. The same can be claimed for the army. Capitini even acknowledged 
the importance of religious institutions. Capitini had many problems with the 
Catholic church of the time. However, the Italian philosopher was fully aware that 
religion is also much more; it can provide the society with something important. 
He recognised the importance of the religious ‘optimistic sentiment’, which is 
persuaded of the fact that pain, sin, death, individual limits are not everything; 
they can and should be continuously won (Capitini, 1998:9).  
As described above, the way in which nonviolence orients the practice is 
fundamentally different from an adversarial or dialectical one. There is no match 
to win; there are no opposites to contrast. Nonviolence proposes a complex 
process of addition, of integration. But how does the nonviolent shape reality? 
The key point, or the drama, is to structure reality through good will, humility, 
                                                          
55 It is important to highlight that Capitini has been under surveillance both during fascism and 
later, under democracy. Nevertheless, the Italian philosopher understands that police plays an 
important role, which is different from the excesses of destruction and impersonality of armies 
and war. It is a circumscribed action against those who bring violence in the community. Even 
here, the nonviolent works for reducing the violence of this kind of coercion, but is aware that the 
police represents the last institution which a community would abandon. For more information, 
look at: Scritti filosofici e Religiosi, p. 553; Il Potere di Tutti, p. 112.   
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goodness, artistic beauty, research of truth (Capitini, 1998:181). How values and 
principles are included in the work of nonviolence? Here we should turn to 
Capitini’s description of the ‘religious life’, of the religious praxis, and 
consequently of nonviolence from a religious perspective. Capitini described the 
process of integration of reality by nonviolence as taking place in three different 
acts: ascetical, ethical, and religious. These three acts should not be interpreted 
as three distinct movements of the body. To the contrary, they represent three 
moments, three degrees in the process of deepening the link with the other, as 
well as orienting it towards liberation and openness.  
The first step towards liberation is the ascetic act, which consists mainly of a 
temporary retreat into ourselves. The troubled soul should pass through an act of 
silence, aimed at reconstituting an identity, leaving aside small and nonessential 
issues, and facing directly the tragedy of human limits. With this act, Capitini is 
not encouraging eremitism. He is only claiming that the first liberation is that of 
freeing oneself from acting mechanically, without being persuaded of the 
meaning of our actions. This is an answer to the dominion of exacerbated 
activism championed by fascism, which inhibits reflection and a critical approach 
to actions. This first act is extremely important, because the person is making the 
step to no more exist as a ‘bag of sensations, taste, and vices’. By not simply 
accepting all that happens around him, he becomes a real subject, actively 
present in the world. Indeed, scrutiny brings the recognition that there is 
something profound that differentiates human actions. In particular, the subject 
recognises that some actions are suddenly felt wrong, while others are held 
natural and desirable. This is because any action, any part of reality, carries a 
value. It is undeniable that actions are carried out and evaluated through the 
categories of truth, justice, beauty, and goodness. With values Capitini does not 
intend something measurable, fully describable, nor in the hand of a particular 
authority. Rather, value is a style which cannot be separated from action, and 
which works from the individuals upwards and horizontally (Capitini, 1999). 
Values are the structure, the style which shapes any content. In other words, 
values and reality are not separable in any human practice, as the formers 
inevitably shape the latter. The refusal to act without conviction, without being 
persuaded, with some kind of reflection of the values of our actions, implies a 
continuous and tiring process of analysis of any personal action and conviction, 
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avoiding both impotence and uncontrolled activism(Capitini, 1998). At the same 
time, the ascetic act is the first glimpse of a concrete possibility of liberation. If 
the person cannot shape reality by acting on natural events, the cruel reality can 
be transcended by acting on the ‘structure’ that shapes those events. A serious 
action on values can change human practices, and diminish the power of natural, 
social, and political chains. 
The process of liberation is indivisible from the encounter with the other. Any 
discourse on truth, right, beauty, and good, opens suddenly the human horizon, 
the human reality, to the other. Without this openness to the other, personal 
convictions and values are not tested; they can be only other forms of vice or 
misunderstanding. Thus, the recognition of the self as more than only sensation, 
taste and vices, goes hand in hand with the recognition of the other as more than 
an object. Capitini claimed that the presence of the other is not a simple 
production of the mind, but a real and founded gift, thanks to which an authentic 
reality, which includes value, can exist. The ethical act consists of opening 
oneself up to this ‘gift’. The formation of another reality begins with the 
understanding of the circumstances and scenario that the other person is living 
within. “The reality that I begin to construct begins with the openness to the other. 
In speaking with the other, I begin to participate to the pain, sentiments, ideas, 
beauty, trying to build up a better reality” (Capitini, 1998:347). The subject 
recognises that the other human being can suffer or have joy, act following values 
or not. He can understand a work of art, human passions, along with moral and 
social issues. Most importantly, any human being feel love, which means that he 
or she is open to something. In other words, the encounter with the other’s life is 
an opportunity. As explained above, the subject may reject the other, or starting 
a shared work of the production of values, which will affect every day human 
practice (Capitini, 1998:347). Thus, the ethical act, Capitini argues, is mainly an 
act of love. The image that Capitini used to describe that kind of love is that of a 
mother. It is not a kind of donation; it is infinite openness to a gift, in spite of any 
kind of faith to an idea. This kind of love is not instrumental to the spread of any 
personal truth, descriptions or prescription in which the subject believes. It is 
exactly the reverse. It is a close link with the other. Indeed, the subject recognises 
the ‘shared reality’ with the other as worth more than the natural reality of power 
and arrogance. Even at the risk of his or her own death.    
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The ascetic and ethical acts are therefore the beginning of another reality, based 
on the search for something better and on the prescribed openness to others. 
However, it is not enough. Openness should not be confused with creating a 
larger group, and values with an agreement between friends. Up until now the 
subject has opened itself only to some single individuals. Here intervenes the 
religious act, which enlarges openness to everybody. In the third and last act of 
the nonviolent praxis, a person enlarges their preoccupation, care, and thought 
to everybody. The physical absence of the other is not a problem; the religious 
tension enlarges the ‘mothers’ love’ to everybody. The enlargement of love to 
everybody comes with a recognition of a further level of liberation and openness. 
The subject feels that there is something more than a biological and spiritual link 
between people. An egoistic action does not participate in any important project; 
does not produce values; cannot be shared with others. At the end the subject is 
alone with him or herself. In the action of cooperation in the making of values, the 
subject experiences something different. He feels that the action of value is a 
cooperation between him and the other persons present at that moment, but not 
only that: he is included in a reality in which even those not present are 
cooperating, even the dead. Any action of value represents the deepening of the 
link with the others; it connects the subject with other human beings, and more 
generally other living beings. The subject becomes part of a bigger community, 
and starts to make real the link with everybody. This recognition of an infinite 
openness brings about liberation. “If I open myself to a human being with respect 
and care, then to another one, and in the soul I would be willing to do it for all, 
reaching the horizon of everybody, I cannot accept nature and facts that, without 
understanding, would deprive a part of the beings” (Capitini, 1999:86). In this way, 
an action of value is the overcoming of the chains of natural reality. In an action 
creating values, the subject feels the presence of everybody. The religious act is 
the recognition that an act of value enlarges the love of a mother to everybody, 
including the ‘weak’, the old, the ill, and even the dead. The religious act allows 
to perceive that “any being is active”, as they  do even more than what it appears; 
in the unity with all each being “provides with a contribution which cannot be 
perceived, but is actual as help in the production of values” (Capitini, 1999:36). 
Thanks to this enlargement, the subject feels the participation of everybody in his 
actions; he or she feels to take part in something bigger than a simple movement 
of the body. The other person may be physically absent, because far away or 
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dead. Nevertheless, the action of value includes him or her; the subject feels the 
other vitally present in the action that is doing. 
The result of the integration of ascetic, ethical, and religious acts is a profound 
change of human relations, and consequently of reality. The integration creates 
what Capitini called compresence. Compresence is described by Faracovi as “the 
connection constructed between all men, both living and dead, at that moment 
when they present themselves as moral subjects, in contrast with the given 
reality, and acting as members of an ideal community” (Capitini, 2000:105). It is 
a new moral reality, which reveals itself practically. This new reality is a ‘circle’ of 
living beings producing values, which enlarges every time there is a new born. At 
the same time, the ‘circle’ does not restrict with the death of someone; the 
material presence of the other is not necessary for him or her to be here in an act 
of love, in the production of values. The moral example of someone, or the 
spiritual strength showed by someone in the past, makes this person present 
here and now, even if the body is dead. In doing an act of value, the subject keeps 
him or her ‘alive’.  In this way, he or she produces a different reality.  It is a reality 
which makes sense only in practice. In any action the person can intimately 
participate with everybody in the production of values, even of those who are 
normally excluded because of health, weakness or death, badness or goodness. 
The result is what Gandhi would call unity-love, and Capitini compresence. This 
is the maximum, and always growing, possible openness and liberation. Each 
new-born is included in this practical reality of value-making, while death cannot 
end the moral contribution of a person. 
Compresence is also equal to God for Capitini. Indeed, God is interpreted in 
Capitini’s terms as ‘one-all’. It is not an object; it is the totality of subjects 
producing values. As Bobbio claimed, we should describe Capitini’s idea of God 
“not as totality of the world, of things, God as creator; but God as totality of people, 
of subjects, of ‘you’, and therefore God love” (Bobbio, 2011:36). Thus, God is in 
any act of love which fosters the participation of everybody, as well as in any 
moment in which a community produces values. 
To conclude, the ‘principled’ dimension of nonviolence is a refusal to be led by 
power relations and passive acceptance of human limits. It means taking the risk 
of acting differently, on the basis of the unity of human beings in the ‘tragedy of 
life’, in order to shape differently reality with new occasions for liberation and 
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openness. Thus, nonviolence is not a value which directs actions as a general 
gives orders. In the same vein as the pragmatic nonviolence described in the last 
section, nonviolence is here a value or a principle in the sense of a method, a 
logic, a style of action. Nonviolence directs actions in a similar way like a sculptor 
creates a marble statue. Indeed, for the Italian philosopher reality is like a marble 
statue. Here the power of choice, of a decision, of a judgment is evident, as it is 
impossible to have a marble statue and an intact piece of marble at the same 
time. Decisions are constitutive of reality; they are able to shape reality (Capitini, 
1998:181). In other words, looking from a more ethical and moral point of view, 
nonviolence is a craft, a meticulous work not to fabricate objects, but to shape 
and orient practices towards openness and liberation, after an analysis of what 
we can realistically here and now try to change.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the idea of nonviolence proposed by Aldo Capitini, in the 
conviction of being of great help in our attempt to reconstruct the concept. Section 
one introduced Aldo Capitini, focusing on the encounter with Gandhian 
nonviolence under the fascist totalitarian regime. The reinterpretation of Gandhi 
in such a complex social and political circumstances gave rise to an innovative 
interpretation of nonviolence. With this concept, the Italian philosopher referred 
neither to a set of techniques to seize power, nor to a principle to abide by 
notwithstanding the particular circumstance. Instead, nonviolence is a tension, or 
better a praxis of liberation from the chains of reality as well as openness to the 
existent. The aim of this approach is to build up via facti the ‘reality of all’.  
This interpretation wipes away the ambiguity derived from a strong division 
between pragmatic and principled nonviolence. To the contrary, the concept of 
praxis includes the two dimensions. This means that every person or event is at 
the same time part of principled and pragmatic nonviolence. Nevertheless, these 
two categories acquire very different definitions from Sharp’s. Section two 
described how we can conceive of the category of pragmatic nonviolence from 
Capitini’ approach. With this term we mean a method, a logic, a style of action. 
For this reason, Capitini included in the techniques of nonviolence individual 
efforts to avoid the sentiment of revenge as well as fast; collective actions such 
as strikes as well as education. This quite vague list is not a contradiction. 
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Pragmatic nonviolence will never be a list of techniques. At the same time, it is a 
kind of knowledge: it promotes some techniques as well as provides the 
framework for a continuous work of reinterpretation of existing practices in a way 
to produce events with a strong constructive drive. The aim of this effort is the 
‘power of all’, which is made of a first moment of ‘power without government’, 
which will lead to make institutions always less important and to the establishment 
of omnicracy.  
Instead, section three described how we can interpret principled nonviolence 
from Capitini’s approach. The principled dimension of nonviolence is not a rigid 
implementation of a principle. It is instead a craft, a meticulous work of moulding 
and integrating reality with new opportunities for liberation and openness. The 
starting point is to focus on persons and their limits: mistakes, pain, and death. 
Capitini acknowledged that these limits represent both a challenge shared by 
everybody, as well as an opportunity shared by all. Indeed, human beings can 
decide to directly face these challenges alone, with the inevitable consequence 
of closing down in themselves, in the desperate attempt to survive as long as 
possible, as well as suffering the least possible alternatives. Alternatively, the 
subject can decide to deepen this link with the others, trying to collectively face 
the burdens in life with others. This last choice implies the ‘great refusal’, which 
means the refusal to believe that the death of the body is the end of everything, 
as well as to consider as necessary the laws of nature, which assume that the 
bigger fish eats the smaller one. Out of this refusal, nonviolence emerges as a 
process of liberation from the cruelty of reality, as well as openness to the 
existent. In other words, nonviolence is a work of integration of reality with new 
opportunities of liberation and openness. The integration is described as made of 
three main acts: ascetic, ethical, religious. The integration of these three acts in 
human life demonstrates that cruelty and necessity are not 'necessary’ to build 
here and now, what Capitini called compresence.  
To conclude, this long digression on Capitini’s approach allowed us to portray a 
different scenario for nonviolence. This term is not divided in two categories, or 
in two approaches. Nonviolence is interpreted as a praxis of liberation and 
openness, which has a pragmatic and a principled side. The two dimensions are 
integral to nonviolence. What remains to be seen is how the reality of all produced 
by nonviolence would look like. In particular, it is important to understand how this 
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interpretation of nonviolence is able to reunite means and ends, politics and 
morality, and religion and politics. This will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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4. THE ‘REALITY OF ALL’: PROTEST-TO-PROJECT, TRANSFORMATIVE 
REALISM, AND OPEN RELIGION  
 
In the previous chapter, we introduced a different approach to nonviolence. 
Capitini interpreted nonviolence as a praxis of liberation and openness. This 
praxis is a continuous and meticulous effort to overcome cruelty and necessity 
with actions which embed techniques and values. These actions create here and 
now a different reality, the ‘reality of all’, which is called omnicracy at the political 
level and compresence at the religious. This chapter will focus on describing, 
through Capitini’s example, the way in which his concept of nonviolence answers 
the concerns raised in chapter two. In other words, we will describe how 
nonviolence as praxis reconstructs the division between means and ends, politics 
and morality, as well as how it bring back religion at the centre of society.  
The first section will focus on what we called the descriptive level. We will show 
the way in which nonviolence as praxis resists being reduced either to a set of 
techniques, and thus to a mere means, or the rigid adherence to a creed, an end. 
In doing so, we will show that means and ends are linked analysing the most well-
known nonviolent action created by Capitini: the first Italian peace march of 1961. 
At first glance, it looks like the perfect example of the implementation of a 
technique as well as an example of nonviolent ‘contentious politics’. 
Nevertheless, the march will emerge as much more. Capitini organised an action 
which cannot be reduced to a simple protest, an application of a set of techniques 
to put pressure on governments, and it is ill suited to be described as a common 
example of contentious politics. Instead, we will define the march a protest-to-
project which aimed at transcending the contention, enhancing personal 
responsibility, the power of all, and an open-ended project; a nonviolent action, 
which is a balance between destruction and construction, investing physical, 
political and symbolic level. 
Section two will look at the praxeological level. Capitini’s nonviolence emerges 
as a very progressive concept. We will look at the way in which the praxis of 
nonviolence becomes a truly political approach, with a strong constructive drive 
in-between realism and moralism. Using the title of Capitini’s specialisation thesis 
we will claim that nonviolence leads to a political approach which is a complex 
balance between ‘realism and serenity’, at whose core there is nonviolence. At 
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the centre of this approach there is the project of omnicracy, which Capitini tried 
to realise throughout his whole life. During fascism, omnicracy meant both non-
cooperation and the construction of the liberalsocialist movement. After WWII, 
Capitini worked to integrate the fragile Italian democracy with opportunities of 
participation in political life, with the promotion of the COS (Centri di Orientamento 
Sociale). 
The last section will turn to religion. Capitini showed how religion is a central part 
of nonviolent action, and how nonviolence brings religion back to the centre of 
society. The concept of compresence is at the centre of the encounter between 
religion and nonviolence. Indeed, it represents the maximum openness and 
liberation possible, and it is even described as God, making religion a set of 
thought and actions, in which faith is no longer passive obedience, and the priest 
is substituted by the prophet. Such an ‘open’ religion realises itself in society, 
providing opportunities for openness and liberation. In particular, it provides 
opportunities for the development of values, without clashing with the rest of the 
society. This work is extremely beneficial in politics, as it provides it with the 
necessary vertical tension towards values, in a society in which we experience a 
horizontal tension toward more inclusion and connections. 
 
4.1. Keeping together Obstruction and Construction: Action as Protest-to-Project 
The interpretation of nonviolence as either a set of techniques or a principle to 
implement creates a division between means and ends, and a deeply divided 
field. We have described above that this division is translated in accusation 
against pragmatic nonviolence for being a means for structural and symbolic 
violence. At the same time, the idea of nonviolence as a principle to implement 
runs the risk of non-realistic evaluation of means or abstract speculation, ending 
up either in radicalism or in withdraw from reality. Thus, we proposed in the last 
chapter the conception of nonviolence as a praxis of liberation and openness, 
which in its pragmatic dimension means a method to shape and reinterpret 
actions and practices.  
Yet, how would a nonviolent action look like? In particular, how can this praxis 
avoid being reduced to mere means? In order to answer this question we will 
focus on the most well-known nonviolent action organised by Capitini, the first 
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Italian peace march in 1961. Wittner described the march simply as one of the 
many antinuclear movements of the 1960s (Wittner, 1997:235). Using the 
framework of pragmatic nonviolence, we would say that this event is the 
implementation of a typical nonviolent technique. Using Sharp’s definition, the 
march is a form of procession, with the end of protesting and persuading, which 
takes place “when a group of people walk in an organised manner to a particular 
place which is regarded as intrinsically significant to the issue involved” (Sharp, 
1973b:152).  
The stream of pragmatic nonviolence would also interpret this nonviolent 
technique as a form of ‘contentious politics’ (McAdam and Tarrow, 2000). Thus, 
nonviolent action is a relational mechanism, in a form of contention, a struggle, in 
which the aim is to protest and persuade those in power to change. From this 
perspective, any struggle emerges from a ‘field of contention’, described as a 
“socially constructive set of adversarial relationship that is embedded in a 
legal/institutional system that effectively constrains the strategic option available 
to all contenders” (McAdam and Tarrow, 2000:149). Within this framework, the 
protestors should be able to “restrict the social-control resources that can 
legitimately be used by their opponents while increasing the overall costs of these 
remaining options” (McAdam and Tarrow, 2000:150). The march should have 
been able to restraint physical, political, and symbolic resources of the opponents 
in order to force the government not to take part in any nuclear programme.  
If we analyse the march from this perspective, it may well be described as a 
humble application of a nonviolent technique, or of ‘contentious politics’ against 
nuclear development. The atomic bomb was the symbol of a very complex field 
of contention, dominated by the division between the US and the Soviet Union. 
Europe was weak and deeply divided in supporters of one or the other side. In 
the Italian political arena, the division re-proposed itself in the great rivalry 
between the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party. This division 
overlapped with the still present tremendous crack between the fascists and the 
non-fascists56.  
                                                          
56 A sign of it was the fierce protest of 1960 in Genoa against the alliance in government between 
Christian Democrats and the fascist party MSI under Prime Minister Tambroni. However, the 
antifascist front was no longer united. At the end of the war the unity of the C.L.N. lost strength 
and divided itself in closed groups and political parties, which increased their power over the 
Italian society. 
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Besides, the hierarchies of the most important Italian spiritual institution, the 
Catholic Church, passively adapted to the international and national divisions57. 
Divisions and passivity of the institutions were considered by Capitini the causes 
of the general passive acceptance of the status quo. This attitude is named by 
Capitini the “ideological heaviness” (Capitini, 1962a:17) of Italian society. “Italians 
think that there should be uniformity in absolute, serious matters (religion, politics 
and school), whereas variety is something pertaining to contingent individuals 
and folklore” (Capitini, 1962a:17). In other words, political parties, along with 
ideas such as revolution, state, or even God, were much more important than a 
positive collaboration with the outsider. This was based on the general conviction 
that power relations were similar to the relations in nature, where ‘the bigger fish 
eats the smaller ones’. The consequence was a violent and authoritarian society, 
in which belonging to a group guaranteed existence, and in which any person 
who thought differently was excluded.  
However, there were signs of dissatisfaction. Although the status quo was 
accepted, the desire for peace was still alive (Moro, 2008). In particular, Capitini 
perceived that the pain of the recent war was still vivid. At the same time, he 
witnessed the growing international dissent against the nuclear bomb, and was 
aware of the importance of the petitions of the Partisans of Peace, in spite of their 
close relation with one of the two powers. Unfortunately, dissatisfaction was not 
enough. Across many countries, pacifism was a constellation of divided groups 
(Klimke and Scharloth, 2008:34), united only by the campaigns against nuclear 
armaments. The division represented an obstacle to the formation of an effective 
strategy able to disturb those at the top (Martellini, 2006:66).  
At the national level, the situation was even worse. The Italian peace movements 
were many, elitist, and old, and it was the moment of changing pace or fading 
away58. These fragile signs of dissatisfaction had also to deal with an old and 
                                                          
57 The severe opposition to communism was visible in the strong conservatism and the 1949 
decree of excommunication, which deeply divided Italian society. The decree was ordered by Pius 
Xii, cutting off Catholics from participation in the sacraments and the society of faithful. 
Communism was considered materialist and anti-Christian. Thus, who voted or were affiliated to 
the communist party, as well as those who wrote filo-communist books of magazines were 
excluded from the sacraments. This decree was only one example of the fact that, even within 
the same Christian world, critiques and discussions were not welcome. Capitini experienced it 
personally, as his book Religione Aperta has been put on the index of the prohibited books in 
1956. 
58 There was no single peace movement, but a lot of what Don Primo Mazzolari called ‘merchants 
of peace’. Indeed, the idea of peace was at the centre of endless disputes between and within 
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violent Italian contentious repertoire. In Italy mass protests were in the hands of 
parties (Martellini, 2006:131), and both nonviolence and peace were not in the 
spotlight59.  
Nevertheless, there were important examples of different kinds of protests 
coming from the globe. First of all, the memory of Gandhi’s marches was still 
vivid. The salt march was one of the most well-known moments of India struggle 
for liberty; it was an example of a complicated but fascinating direct action, 
including civil disobedience, the act of marching, and the production of salt 
without paying tax. Moving back to Europe, a global dissent against nuclear 
armament was rising in many countries at the end of the 1950s. The Aldermaston 
marches are the symbols of this rebellion, but signs of unrest were visible also in 
France (Wittner, 1997:195).  
Besides the more ‘political’ repertoire, there was also a ‘religious’ contentious 
repertoire of protest and dissent. Although they were exceptions, antinuclear 
pilgrimages to cathedral towns have been organised in the UK (Wittner, 
1997:193). To look for something similar in Italy, Capitini had to recall the religious 
medieval world, where the first forms of conscientious objections took place, and 
revolutionary figures emerged, such as Francis of Assisi. In particular, Capitini 
evoked the Franciscan opposition to take the oath to the podesta’ in Arengo 
square in Rimini in 1215. The oath implied fighting for the State, and this could 
not be accepted (Capitini, 1962a:15). 
The march from Perugia to Assisi entered right in the middle of the above ‘horizon 
of violence’. In other words, it entered in the middle of contention. However, it did 
so in quite an unexpected way. We would have expected a march with a strong 
contentious flavour, able to use the new weapons available to bypass controls, 
weaken the government, create a stronger pacifist movement, and focus on the 
nuclear issue. Yet, the event was quite different. At the physical level, the march 
limited quite well the violence coming from the state. It avoided problems so well 
                                                          
communists and Catholics. Besides, the most famous Italian pacifists, such as Capitini, Marcucci, 
Pioli were old in the 60s, while Don Mazzolari, Calosso, Fasoli and Tatiana Tolstoj had passed. 
59 The general strikes in 1943 and 1944 against the war were questionable examples, as the effort 
“coincided with workers’ demands for better pay and working conditions, causing a blend of 
idealistic and materialistic interests” MYERS, F. E. 1973. Dilemmas in the British Peace 
Movement since World War II. Journal of Peace Research, 10, 81-90. More recently, a strong 
antifascist sentiment moved people to violent protests against the convocation of the MSI national 
assembly in Genoa in June 1960. A few days later, on 7th of July, 5 people were brutally killed by 
the police during a demonstration in Reggio Emilia. 
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that we can doubt of the willingness of the organisers to use any sorts of moral 
or political jiu-jitzu tu put pressure on government and institutions. Indeed, the 
march was not a real and efficient action of civil disobedience. Following the ‘logic 
of number’, the march itself did not attract a large number of people60 compared 
to the many protests around the world, from the Dandi March to the Civil Rights 
movement in the US. It did not disrupt the everyday activity of a country, as it was 
planned for Sunday. Participants did not show any particular strong commitment 
risking serious repression or violence, as they were careful to avoid any trouble.  
In particular, the march avoided the control of police, questura, and prefetto. 
Concerning the relation with the police, the organisers did their best to avoid any 
problem. Political parties were asked to control their members, and not to answer 
to any provocation. At the same time, Franco Perna61 was in charge of the on-
the-spot inspection with the police and the control during the march. The same 
Perna referred in Peace News that the lack of hostility and violence during the 
march brought some police officers to take part in it, and to a friendly and 
continuous interaction between demonstrators and police (Capitini, 1962a:35). 
For what concerns the questura, Capitini faced tedious meetings and requests 
for information, along with leaks to newspapers of personal information about 
participants and organisers. He even had to wait until the last moment for the 
permission to march. However, he answered without any frustration. He had 
nothing to hide, and thus he could counteract hostility with transparency. 
Capitini’s work was effective also against the prefetto’s use of discretionary power 
against the march. Beside the absence of any communication and help, the 
prefetto sent even a letter to all local administrations, prohibiting the display of 
towns’ gonfalons at the march. This drew the anger of the local administrators, 
who were willing to break the order. However, Capitini proposed to depict big 
gonfalons of the towns, in order to show clearly the presence of the 
administrations, renouncing to fight on such an unimportant issue. His suggestion 
had been accepted by the organiser’s committee, and a letter asking to follow this 
suggestion had been sent to all the local administrations, who agreed. 
                                                          
60 For the Times, the march reached its peak in Assisi, where there were between 8000 and 12000 
participants for the police, and almost 20000 for the communist press. 
61 Franco Perna is an Italian activist. Capitini stressed the importance of his help at the march. 
Indeed, Perna brought the experience of English pacifist demonstrations, as he worked at the 
International Fellowship of Reconciliation in London. 
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Turning to the political level, the careful organisation of the demonstration 
avoided material and political incentives used by governments or parties to 
control the citizens. However, the march did not try to oppose frontally, with a 
strong act of dissent, the solid structure of political identities of the time. Instead, 
the aim was to move within the cracks of the party system without pointing toward 
destroying or substituting them. The march invited political parties, promoting a 
real decertification of radical political divisions. “Peace is too important to be left 
only in the hands of politicians” (Capitini, 1962a:23). Political parties were kept, 
but from being the only channel of any initiative, they became instruments to be 
used for higher motives. They were considered not sufficient to lead society, but 
their network was a valid channel for the development of popular projects. Thus, 
the organisers of the peace march appropriated themselves of the parties’ 
network. All parties had been invited to the march, and they freely decided 
whether to come or not. In the case they did, they had to respect the rigid rules 
put in place by the organisers. They had to make their network available to the 
organisers, and promote the event everywhere. During the demonstration, they 
could not promote themselves. It was forbidden to bring any party symbols, 
whereas 3000 copies of a book on Gandhi were distributed to the participants. 
Besides, the organisers put in place a strong control of any banners and symbols 
present at the march. 
At the symbolic level, the march challenged the symbols of the status quo, but it 
did not oppose openly the Catholic institutions. For a start, the organisers chose 
very strangely Assisi as the end of the march. If the march aimed at opposing the 
religious, as well as secular, establishment, and was against the nuclear 
armament, why ending up in Assisi? It was definitely a strange way to avoid the 
control of and oppose the Catholic institutions.  
The lack of a strong contentious flavour was evident also in the promotion of 
symbols of unity. Firstly, the peace flag, a symbol of union, was used there for 
the first time. Along with the peace flag, many banners have been created directly 
by Capitini with symbolic messages of unity and condemnation of any violence. 
Many songs were invented and promoted during and for the march, with the aim 
of overcoming idealism and political Manichaeism. An entire repertoire of pacifist 
songs emerged, which aimed at overcoming the ‘bubbling rhetoric of hymns’. In 
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particular, during the march Fausto Amodei and Franco Fortini invented the 
“Canzone della Marcia della Pace” (Martellini, 2006, Lenti, 2011).  
In spite of this message of unity, the Catholic institutions tried to oppose it, 
implementing a tight normative control over Italian society. Fortunately, this effort 
was eluded by the march. Indeed, the march took place, and many Catholics took 
part in it, even though the institution did not accept the invitation to take part. The 
Catholic Church was absolutely not in favour of a march on peace, especially with 
the participation of parties and groups closed to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the 
march took place in highly religious places without being confessional. The result 
is that it has been accused of ‘exploiting the sacred’ (Capitini, 1962a:108), 
entering in well-known Catholic places with symbols which are not part of the 
official religion. Even during the march the level of hostility remained high, as it is 
clear by the fact that the friars blocked the doors of Assisi’s basilica, while the 
ecclesiastical hierarchies decided to force people to pray in churches during the 
march, in order to pay a tribute to those Catholics who were suffering in East 
European countries.  
The march even had a political agenda presented and voted by those present: 
the Motion of the People of Peace (Capitini, 1962a:47). Here, we would have 
expected a motion focused on the nuclear issue, and with clear aims and targets. 
Instead, what we discover is a very broad motion, including many different 
problems and not directly related concrete actions. Indeed, the Motion is divided 
into five general principles and ten concrete applications. The leading principle of 
the march was the ‘fraternity of peoples’, which entailed a clear opposition to any 
form of exploitation, colonialism, racism, and imperialism. Those broad concepts 
included the need for reconciling the East, the West, and the African countries; 
the fraternity with people of colour; and the activation of important programs of 
cultural, technical, and economic collaboration. In order to prepare peace during 
peace, the motion recommended working for “a better training for dialogue”, 
which means developing all the aspects that can improve dialogue between 
people. This means working for a sincere openness to coexistence; a pacific 
competition of ideologies, political and social systems; and a better consideration 
of labour, which is a key constitutive element of the society. The third principle 
stressed the importance of the whole population in the realisation of a radical 
change. It would be a mistake to leave the responsibility for peace only in 
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governors’ hands (Capitini, 1962a:23). Thus, the whole population should have 
the opportunity of being constantly informed and frequently consulted. Improving 
the quality of dialogue and increasing participation was not enough. The fourth 
principle called for the union of those willing to resist any war, because peace 
was in real danger. The last principle instead claimed that time has come for the 
promotion of a real nonviolent education, because humanity was finally able to 
appreciate an open education, which tries to renovate a structure full of prejudice 
and privileges.  
However, the Motion did not stop here. The ‘Italian people of peace’ also 
approved ten concrete applications of those principles (Capitini, 1962a:48). The 
first called for the inclusion of all countries in the United Nations, because more 
responsibility and effective cooperation of all nations were urgently needed. The 
second request was for a controlled and complete disarmament, which would 
include the immediate disarmament of both East and West Germany, the creation 
of vast neutral zone, and the elimination of the many missile bases. The third 
point required the interruption of nuclear experiments for non-pacifist reasons, 
and a conference of non-nuclear nations. The fourth request was for a 
convergence of foreign, cultural and economic policies, in order to become closer 
to non-aligned countries, in particular to those of the Bandung and Belgrade 
conferences62. People were also marching for a different structure of countries’ 
budgets, in favour of school, cultural elevation of the masses, and for a serious 
effort in the development of democratic life from below. Furthermore, they were 
fighting against exploitation, and thus they were calling for progress in 
international collective actions and reciprocal help. The march was also in favour 
of periodical and popular information everywhere, proposing weekly tribunes on 
international politics on the radio, opened also to pacifists and neutralists. 
Besides the spread of information, a real and continuous exchange of students 
and workers for long periods was urged. The last concrete application of the 
Motion was instead a close alliance of all pacifist movements for unitary actions. 
From this brief outline of the march, it emerges quite a humble example of 
nonviolent action, with vague aims and weak implementation. The 
implementation of the technique of the march to change the complex field of 
                                                          
62 Bandung Conference (1955) was a meeting of 21 countries of Asia and Africa aimed to promote 
cooperation as well as oppose colonialism and neo-colonialism. The Belgrade Conference (1961) 
was a meeting of 25 non-aligned countries, and the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
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contention of internal and domestic division looks timid and lacking an effective 
organisation. Indeed, it would not come as a surprise to the pragmatic school that 
the march has not been really effective. The demonstration of 1961 seemed to 
have renovated the old and violent Italian contentious repertoire. It is doubtless 
that the many peace marches and the ‘people of peace’ introduced the ideas and 
the techniques of nonviolence across the whole country, providing a new set of 
techniques to canalise for instance the anger of Genoa and Reggio Emilia. 
Besides the introduction of new techniques, a mass movement for peace was 
born, which spread across the country63. Even the Christian Democrats, after the 
initial diffidence, began to join the marches. Along with it, the march started to be 
object of debates in newspapers, with many critiques and sometimes derision 
(Capitini, 1962a:101-165).  
However, it seems that after the initial success, the ideas and the techniques of 
the march have been ignored, neglected, and sometimes spoiled. History sadly 
confirmed the provocation written in an article of The Times in 1961 dedicated to 
the march: “it seems ill adapted to the Italian temperament, which is more at home 
in quick, vocal protest than in long trudge” (Times, September 29, 1961). The 
innovations of the contentious repertoire have been forgotten. Violence continued 
to remain the most widely used tool of making a claim64. At the political level, the 
rise of a mass peace movement connected Italy to Europe and the world in the 
struggle against atomic bomb and war65. Yet, we witness a real counterrevolution 
few years after the march. Party politics heavily entered “in the delicate and 
dreaming world of nonviolent spiritualism, turning upside-down the logics, 
rewriting the rules, and modifying its bases” (Martellini, 2006:142). Moreover, the 
Consulta (which has been established after the march along with the Movimento 
Nonviolento per la Pace) has been literally devoured by politics (Mariani Marini 
and Resta, 2001:99), and it dissolved some years later. Its president, Capitini, 
                                                          
63 A number of peace marches have been organised in many other cities, such as for instance 
Cortona, Cagliari, Marzabotto, Ferrara, Roma, Milano, Torino, and Napoli. 
64 In particular, the march had no important influence on the events of 1968. The most 
discouraging fact is that the category of people more incline towards violence was that of students 
DELLA PORTA, D. & TARROW, S. 1986. Unwanted children: Political Violence and the Cycle of 
Protest in Italy 1966-1973. European Journal of Political Research, 14, 607-632. 621. Capitini 
continuously called for a dialogue with them. He realised the lack of any example of nonviolent 
techniques given to students. The press, political parties and antagonism preferred by far other 
kinds of examples. This was the reason of his expressed concern for the delay in the publication 
of his book Tecniche della Nonviolenza in 1967. 
65 For instance, John Collins sent a letter of adhesion to the march, and a Japanese student of 
the movement for the nuclear disarmament made a speech in Assisi. 
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was forced to resign due to heavy internal and external critiques of political parties 
and closed groups of radical pacifists. The Movement continued with few 
participants, publishing from 1964 a journal called Azione Nonviolenta, but it 
passed periods of real crisis. After the death of Capitini in 1968, years after years, 
pacifism became ‘politically correct’ (Mariani Marini and Resta, 2001:105). The 
whole ethical and spiritual discourse proposed by Capitini and the march has 
been suffocated66; it only remained the political use of peace, the ‘politics of 
peace’ (Mariani Marini and Resta, 2001:102). Even party flags, symbols and 
banners (banned in 1961) reappeared from the following march in 1978. Both the 
centrality of the person and the debates on conscientious objection have been 
overwhelmed by a rise of collectivism that exploded in 1968. The main problems 
were now anti-imperialism and international capitalism, not anymore openness 
and personal development (Martellini, 2006:155).  
Finally, at the symbolic level, the desired revolution did not happen. The new 
culture persuaded only a minority of Catholics (Moro, 2008:388). A new open 
spirituality never emerged in Italy. It is true that Assisi became an important 
symbolic place for ecumenism. It is also true that the church of the 1950s was 
different from the one of today. Nevertheless, we still do not see images of Gandhi 
beside those of St. Francis in a church. Moreover, we still do not see nonviolence 
at the centre of a less hierarchical religious institution, and the infinite respect for 
the other overcoming the ideological heaviness of the Italian society.  
In few words, the peace march looks like a timid, heavily imperfect, and ineffective 
example of march and contentious politics. It was a primitive attempt of nonviolent 
protest in Italy, which broke only for a little while “Italy’s relative silence on the 
nuclear issue” (Wittner, 1997:235). Nevertheless, the ‘mistakes’ or imperfections 
of the march may be looked from a different perspective when we remind the fact 
that nonviolence was for Capitini a praxis, a continuous attempt to find new and 
different ways of liberation and openness, which cannot be reduced to a mere 
                                                          
66 The following editions of the march focused more on the social condition of the oppressed and 
exploited. The reason was not ideological: the focus on these issues allowed a closer contact with 
the spreading sentiment of social injustice (MARIANI MARINI, A. & RESTA, E. 2001. Marciare 
per la Pace. Il Mondo Nonviolento di Aldo Capitini, Pisa, Pisa University Press.). The results were 
many anti-militarist marches, organised with the Radical Party. In the 90s the situation changed, 
with the movement refocusing on nonviolence. Nevertheless, politics continue to heavily influence 
decisions and tactics, without being influenced enough by a nonviolent revolutionary project. 
Politics heavily changed Italian pacifism. 
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technique or means. What if these mistakes were something different? Can we 
envisage a different approach to pragmatic nonviolence from these peculiarities? 
For a start, the demonstration did not merely elude the most serious “combination 
of legal threat and physical force” (McAdam and Tarrow, 2000:150) coming from 
police, questura, and prefetto. It showed that the issue was not the state but the 
self. Indeed, the march tried to repair the division between state and citizens, 
rejecting violence and blaming anyone, and it opened up a channel of openness 
towards the others. In other words, the march was not a means to confront the 
state more effectively; it was the attempt to foster self-restraint and personal 
responsibility. It was not by chance that the organiser was not an extremist or a 
heavily politicised group. The demonstration showed that independent and 
credible organisers, as the Centro di Perugia per la Nonviolenza, were able to 
organise a nonviolent and open mass demonstration, in which people of different 
social classes can be brought together. Indeed, people of any background 
participated to the march; intellectuals and humble peasants marched together 
with political leaders and widows. This represented a distinctive feature of the 
march, in comparison for instance to the more distinctly middle class British 
movements (Myers, 1973:88). More importantly, this means the encounter of a 
mix of different worlds and thus actions of personal liberation, from fasting, 
praying, to dialogue and education.  
All this meant the lack of a clear division between people and state, protestors 
and government, or groups with different ideas. Indeed, the march was open to 
everybody in spite of ideologies and group affiliation. The success of the march 
was in showing that people can act, and even protest, without being only a 
problem of public order, and therefore the point was not to exploit public disorder 
without violence. The aim was to show that policemen were not only street level 
bureaucrats or repressors, paving the way for a different reality, as the marches 
that followed had fewer problems and more influence on the state, while the 
population became less diffident. In few words, the march tried to foster personal 
responsibility in the sense of freedom from the necessity of violence and 
openness to the other, especially to adversaries. 
Turning to the political level, the aim was quite different from political power. For 
a start, the march seemed the occasion for reconciliation. The decertification of 
political divisions allowed the auto-certification of a new identity, the people of 
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peace. The new identity is visible in the many marches organised in the whole 
country after the 24th of September. It was formed by people coming from different 
backgrounds, even different political parties, but sharing nonviolence and 
concerns about peace67. The march also linked together sects and movements 
under the desire for peace. In the arena of peace talks, Italy began to be a smaller 
place than it had been in the past68.  
This attempt of reconciliation did not make the mistake of falling into duragraha. 
It would have been a mistake to shape the ‘people of peace’ as a new closed 
group or the message of the march as a closed project. The march was open to 
everyone and it fostered the empowerment of citizens with new opportunities to 
participate. The barriers against the ‘others’, such as a government, were 
removed, in favour of self-scrutiny and critique. The focus was not on the enemy, 
but on problems. For this reasons, the march have been seen as an ‘itinerant 
assembly’ (Degli Oddi, 2012:168).  
The result of the itinerant assembly has been the establishment of two 
organizations: the Consulta della Pace and the Movimento Nonviolento per la 
Pace. The aim of the former was to be an assembly, in which all the different 
kinds of Italian pacifisms can constantly interact (Martellini, 2006:141). By 
contrast, the Movimento Nonviolento per la Pace gathered the different groups of 
integral pacifists, working for the establishment of a stronger Italian nonviolent 
movement. In other words, the careful political work of the march was 
counterbalanced by an innovative, at least for the time, project of establishing a 
new group. This group was not closed, and did not aim at power or dominion over 
other groups and parties. The aim was not the establishment of two cities. The 
march was an example of ‘power without government’. It was a project to 
empower citizens with new opportunities to participate, with an itinerant assembly 
and open organisations. 
                                                          
67 The march attracted people such as La Pira and Togliatti; some Christian Democrats marched 
side by side with communists MORO, R. 2008. The Catholic Church, Italian Catholics and Peace 
Movements: The Cold War Years, 1947-1962. Contemporary European History, 17, 365-390. 
68 The peace march wanted to become a symbol of union and reconciliation. For this reason, it 
has been repeatedly linked to a symbol of the resistance and the democratic reconstruction of 
Italy, the C.L.N. The famous Italian multi-party entity fought the violence of fascism and 
represented the beginning of a new democratic era. Moreover, the final speech at the end was 
also a symbolic action of unity. Five people from five different political and social backgrounds 
expressed the same desire for peace during the final talks: the liberal-Catholic Arturo Carlo 
Jemolo, the writer Guido Piovene, the communist painter Renato Guttuso, the radical Ernesto 
Rossi and a Japanese student, from the Movement for Nuclear Disarmament. 
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For what concern the symbolic level, the march managed to re-include religion at 
the heart of a real pragmatic nonviolent action. Nevertheless, religion was not 
there to fight against some other groups, or influencing the state to implement 
one of its values. Instead, the march was a calculated attempt to overcome all 
the closures of the Catholic faith. For instance, the choice of marching on Sunday 
symbolised the maximum openness possible69. Sunday is the moment of closer 
proximity with everyone. It is the day in which human beings have time to rest 
and reflect. It is the day in which the moral world emerges, while almost disappear 
the divisions between governors and governed, workers and capitalists, Catholics 
and not, rich and poor, healthy and weak, and even living and dead. 
Unfortunately, the church completely misinterpreted the symbolic choice of 
Sunday.  
Nevertheless, the strong message of unity was reasserted with five minutes of 
silence and pray to pay tribute to all war victims, showing the unity between the 
dead and living for the cause of peace.  In addition, the march proposed new 
reconciling models of conduct, and it integrated the existent concept of sanctity. 
Indeed, two of the most important Italian nonviolent revolutionaries, Danilo Dolci 
and Pietro Pinna, were present at the march. The former was a model for his 
important social commitment in Sicily, and for the total nonviolent ways of 
implementing it. His hunger and reverse strikes and famine marches became 
famous in Italy and the whole Europe. For what concerns Pinna, he was the 
symbol of the fight against military service. He went to jail twice, due to his 
nonviolent struggle. However, his actions substantially contributed to the 
improvement of the laws concerning conscientious objection. For what concerns 
sanctity, its meaning was enlarged to include any ‘pure spirit’, independently from 
the affiliation with any church. In this way, the sanctity of Francis of Assisi and 
Gandhi were put on the same level, representing two polar stars for the entire 
world (Capitini, 1962a:16).  
Finally, the symbolic revolution proposed a new ‘capital’, Assisi. The city has not 
been chosen for strategic reasons. We are not talking about Moscow, 
                                                          
69 As explained by Capitini, “the holy day is more open than the other days […] In that day a high 
unity with everyone can be felt, a more loving and forgiving comprehension, and we come closer 
to the sufferers to establish a more profound unity; we also visit the cemetery with the persuasion 
that in that day the dead are closer to us” CAPITINI, A. 1967. Educazione Aperta, Firenze, La 
Nuova Italia. 
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Washington, or a simple site in which nuclear armaments are stored or produced. 
Assisi was chosen not only because it is central to Umbria and is extremely 
beautiful. Assisi has been chosen because it represented the perfect symbol of 
an ‘open religion’ (Capitini, 1962a:16). Assisi is the place where the most 
important Western nonviolent, St. Francis, was born. Moreover, it was an already 
acknowledged symbol for the celebration of what Capitini called familiarity, which 
means proximity and openness (Capitini, 1962a:16). It was the ideal place to be 
the symbol of a nonviolent reconstruction of Italy and Europe.  In few words, the 
march was the occasion to present an open and really inclusive project. 
Finally, the same Motion of the People of Peace was so peculiar not by chance. 
First of all, the fact that the motion included principles and applications was not 
casual; the motion emphasised the deep link between practice and theory 
(Mariani Marini and Resta, 2001:131), in the same way that the march is 
emerging as a complex mixture of theory and practice. Second of all, the motion 
did not focus only on the nuclear issue because it was not the main concern. 
Capitini understood that nuclear proliferation is the result of the overlap of many 
different problems; causes and consequences should not be confused. At the 
basis of the crisis of the west was the deterioration of human relationships, and it 
is there where people should look at.  
This is the reason why the concern for the atomic bomb was only one of the 
reasons for participating. The protest against the atomic bomb was only one 
aspect of the protest. Indeed, it was not a rhetorical move the choice of dedicating 
the march to the ‘fraternity among peoples’. The march was not looking merely 
at forcing the government to change policies. It was not focused on the ‘fraternity 
of nations’, which has been seriously threatened by the atomic bomb. The march 
was an attempt to intervene against the deterioration of human relations in order 
to foster fraternity. We may even claim that the march was the demonstration of 
the fact that “politics is the technique of the moral life” (Capitini, 2010:9). 
It is clear from this analysis that something peculiar was going on that day. As 
one newspaper article rightly noticed, the march ‘disturbs’, creates uneasiness 
(Capitini, 1962a:105). Here we showed that it disturbs any attempt to label it as 
a simple technique and an example of contentious politics against the nuclear 
development. It was not a good example of contentious politics. It was not an 
efficacious action of putting pressure on another side. It was the betrayal of any 
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existing and dominant ideologies and religions. Instead of supporting one side in 
the fight, the march questioned all the parts, giving an opportunity to reduce the 
hatred. In other words, the march was an example of how to destroy, or transcend 
using Galtung’s vocabulary, the field of contention from within and below.  
This means that the peace march was done not merely to protest against the 
government; it was not merely to protest against the bomb. The march proposed 
something different, a new way of living human relations. It was the practical 
example of a different style of action, a different practical orientation, which 
proposed a different reality, the ‘reality of all’, made of new symbols, songs, 
techniques of action, models, and convictions.  
This means that the march was not really a protest. The intent of the march was 
not really to protest against atomic weapons, or to overthrow the government, as 
well as the Catholic establishment. Then, the march did end up in a ‘particular 
place which is regarded as intrinsically significant to the issue involved’, but not 
in the way Sharp was thinking of it, making us doubting of the idea of labelling 
that event a march.  
On the contrary, the peace march was the actualisation of an innovative project. 
It was aimed at integration of something (Capitini, 1962a:5), at opening up 
existing interactions (social, political, symbolic). Capitini integrated existing 
human relations with occasions of liberations from the necessity of violence and 
the logic that the bigger fish eats the smaller ones. This tension towards liberation 
went hand in hand with a strong focus on openness70. Indeed, the march 
represented a clear implementation of openness as  
“the attitude of establishing relations with others and other things, of not putting 
absolute conditions, not presenting merely the self, of facilitating the larger 
movement possible, the most various encounter, the dialectics between those 
different from us, the addition of the new, the inter-subjectivity” (Capitini, 
1967:41).  
How can this project be described? It cannot be described as a mere means, as 
a protest. It may be described very broadly as an example of protest in the very 
broad sense of “sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, 
                                                          
70 A propose, Capitini referred that in 1933 he elaborated the concept of ‘openness’ walking from 
Perugia to Assisi DEGLI ODDI, I. 2012. Aldo Capitini. Una Vita Nonviolenta, Roma, Aracne.. The 
march of 1961 has been the occasion to enlarge this experience, including everybody. 
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practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in 
institutionalised power relations” (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004:268). It activated 
political parties and institutions, and it wished to have a positive influence on the 
society. Nevertheless, something peculiar was going on. In his study on the 
meaning of the term ‘protest’, Opp claimed that four criteria are shared by almost 
all of the 12 definitions of protest which he collected. Along with the fact that a 
protest is a non-regular behaviour of actors objecting to one or more decisions 
by a target, the scholar emphasised the fact that “the actors are unable to achieve 
their goals by their own effort” (Opp, 2009:34). This is the point which 
differentiates the first Italian peace march from a normal protest. This is the 
challenge that nonviolence represents to any traditional protest. The march tried 
to show that the participants can achieve their goal with their own efforts. A 
nonviolent society can be built via facti here and now, without relying on any 
authorities.  
Due to this strong constructive drive, the peace march can be better defined as 
a protest-to-project. It resembles a protest, but is much more. The peace march 
was a reinterpretation of an existing practice, with special attention to context, 
people, and with a clear project in mind. The march was at the same time a means 
and an end, it represented here and now a different reality, which did not rely on 
others to change the status quo. It was a constructive action, a project of a 
‘nonviolent revolution’, and the de facto establishment of a nonviolent society. 
The march was the first practical step of a constructive programme. 
To summarise, the peace march as a nonviolent action is neither the 
implementation of an ideal in certain ‘pure’ practices, nor a behaviour for Capitini. 
It was not the behaviour of marching without holding weapons toward an 
intrinsically important place to challenge the government the thing which 
characterises the nonviolent character of the march. The Peace March is a simple 
example of a technique becoming nonviolent. The march was a nonviolent action 
because it proposed an open and inclusive project fostering freedom and 
openness. It fostered freedom as personal responsibility, in the sense of both 
liberation from violence and openness to the other; it enhanced openness as 
participation and what we called the ‘power of all’; it promoted an open and 
inclusive project, ‘the fraternity of peoples’.   
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4.2. Nonviolence Between Realism and Serenity towards Omnicracy 
The idea of nonviolence as praxis of liberation and openness reunites in protest-
to-projects behaviours and ideals, techniques and principles, means and ends. It 
is a method, a logic, a style which shapes, interprets and use techniques and 
practices.  
Yet, is this praxis regressive? Does it offer constructive and inclusive open 
projects, contributing to the development of democracy, or it simply falls into 
disruption and duragraha? We believe that Capitini’s nonviolence is very 
progressive. Nonviolence as praxis of liberation and openness starts from a 
reaction to what Capitini called ‘conventional realism’, which reinterprets reality 
from the point of view of force and nature (Capitini, 1999:105). At the same time, 
it is not mere disruption or moralism; it is an effort which remains in the domain 
of realism, even though transformed. Capitini described this effort in the following 
way:  
“Living in the midst of this temporary civilization, we can do no other than take 
elements of the present ‘wellbeing’, even if we are absolutely happy to lose it for 
compresence: we have done our choice. This is the case for what concerns some 
elements, such as private property, the police in defence of our existence, 
isolation of criminals, inequality of salaries, of housing, of goods etc… We accept 
them as offered by the actual society, even if we try to weaken them and bring 
closer to compresence” (Capitini, 1999:108).  
In his specialisation thesis, titled Realismo e Serenità, Capitini understands 
realism as the representation of the inquietude, anxiety, drama, “of the evil and 
sin, of the torment, of the heavy weight of personal responsibility” (Capitini 
1999:59). This drama does not fall into despair or cruelty. On the contrary, it is 
balanced by what Capitini calls serenity. With this term he means the “relying on 
something which reveals a superior existence, a tendency toward the universal” 
(Capitini 1999:59). It is therefore a tension, not another world. It is the tension 
showed by Gandhi, by St. Francis, by Christ, but also by Danilo Dolci and many 
other normal people.  
The balance between realism and serenity is at the basis of a particular 
conception of order. Indeed, central to this form of realism is the awareness of 
the fact that a society is able to last and prosper only when two tensions, a vertical 
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towards values and a horizontal towards others, are kept and can flourish 
together. In other words, nonviolence as liberation and openness is considered 
to be a real force of construction of a new stability. How can nonviolence bring 
stability? Fostering a different kind of power which includes everybody.  
Indeed, Capitini claimed that change cannot be obtained through the old version 
of the struggle for power, hierarchical and violent, which brought Italy and the 
world to the verge of complete destruction. The reason for this is that violent 
revolutionaries begins from the wrong assumption: that the enemy is not willing 
to change, and will never be open to any type of transformation (Capitini, 
1999:116). This presumption closes any possibility for the inclusion of everybody 
in the construction of a new society, even if it cannot be considered a truth that is 
always valid. However, it would not have been enough even if they believed in 
the possibility that the enemy may be partially open. Indeed, revolutionaries 
should not presuppose that the enemy will easily and suddenly change.  
Both these delusions create only further instability, and they should be firmly 
rejected in the name of what we described above as the theory of the two phases 
of power (Capitini, 1999:115), and in particular of a different conception of power 
itself. Power is not only a seat in Parliament, or the rules of a religious institution. 
He instead claimed that  
“power is to be looked at together with many other forces and initiatives, and more 
as the conclusion of a many-sided work of formation of large solidarities, wide 
social campaigns of pressure and non-collaboration, reverse strikes, popular 
assemblies, different initiatives from below, personal refusal etc…” (Capitini, 
1962a:12).  
Nonviolence is the continuous work to create and develop all these sorts of 
initiatives from below. In this sense, this new sort of realism is in line with 
pragmatic nonviolence in offering an alternative to violent disruption. At the same 
time, it offers much more, because these initiatives are transformed in protest-to-
projects to put forward liberation and openness, and thus a new kind of order. 
Indeed, the analysis of the peace march allowed us to acknowledge the strong 
constructive drive of nonviolence. From this analysis, Sharp’s techniques are 
nonviolent only when they are protest-to-projects, when they include means and 
ends. For this reason, Capitini listed many other techniques as nonviolent, such 
as education, or the absence of the sentiment of revenge. The ‘method’ of 
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nonviolence can be found in infinite kinds of actions, as long as they attempt to 
increase liberation and openness, and thus a new order.  
Capitini worked his entire life to build up this different order. Under the fascist 
regime, the philosopher of Perugia pursued this new order fighting fascism with 
many different nonviolent techniques. We should remember his refusal to join the 
fascist party, for which he lost his administrative job at the Normale in Pisa; his 
choice to become a vegetarian against the myth of strength and violence of 
fascism; the request of a strict non-collaboration to a submissive Catholic Church; 
the choice of not joining the armed resistance against the regime.  
This more disruptive part of his work went hand in hand with what we believe to 
be Capitini’s most important nonviolent activity of that period: the foundation, with 
Guido Calogero71, of the liberalsocialist movement. The liberalsocialist movement 
operated in Italy from 1936 to 1943. This movement was the attempt to go beyond 
fascism. At the same time, it was neither the construction of a new political 
doctrine, nor the adoption of an existing one. The aim was to re-establish 
democracy and to clear the ground for an open society, indicating a new possible 
synthesis of the most important contemporary political doctrines.  
The Liberalsocialist movement began after and almost independently from the 
tragic experience of Gramsci and the Rosselli, who died in 193672. Any relation 
with other clandestine movements was too dangerous and difficult, and the one 
with with Giustizia e Liberta’73 was no exception (Degli Oddi, 2012:74). The first 
contacts were made only in the 1940 with the participation of a group of Giustizia 
e Liberta’ in a meeting of the liberalsocialist movement. The position of the two 
groups were not very distant. They both acknowledged that the end of fascism 
was close, and also the absolute lack of preparation of Italy for the aftermath. 
Nevertheless, the solution was different. Giustizia e Liberta’ was more focused 
on the prospect of an armed revolution (Borgogni Migani, 1997:XIV), meanwhile 
the Liberalsocialist movement focused on the ethical degeneration carried by 
                                                          
71 Guido Calogero (1904-1986) was an Italian philosopher and politician. As philosopher, he is 
famous for his studies on ancient logics, which were at the basis of his later ‘philosophy of 
dialogue’. As a politician, he took part in the Action Party and in 1955 founded the Radical Party. 
72 Gramsci died in prison on the 27th of April, due to a cerebral haemorrhage. Instead, Carlo and 
Nello Rosselli were assassinated in Bagnoles-de-l’Orne on the 9th of June by the pro-fascist 
Cagoule group, on the orders of the Italian authorities.   
73 Giustizia e Libertà was an Italian anti-fascist resistance movement, active from 1929 to 1945. 
After 1930 Giustizia e Libertà was inspired by the so-called Socialismo Liberale, which is also the 
title of a famous book written by Carlo Rosselli, one of its founders and leading figures.  
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fascism. Indeed, the internal repression, along with the war in Ethiopia and in 
Spain, was not enough to keep control over the citizens; the attachment to 
fascism was fading away. Renouncing fascism was equal to losing something 
more than a tyrant. Indeed, fascism was also a set of sentimental enjoyments; it 
kindled passion and imagination of many people, and now it should be 
compensated somehow.  
Both Capitini and Calogero noticed that the young generation started to detach 
itself from fascism; that was an occasion of providing them with something 
different. A moral alternative should be proposed, able to attract those 
disillusioned by the regime. For this reason, this movement was not exclusive in 
nature. The participants were mainly academics, publishers, and intellectuals, but 
there were people sympathising for liberalism and socialism, without necessarily 
following any dominant paradigm. For instance, Norberto Bobbio, Cesare 
Luporini, Carlo Ludovico Ragghianti were active participants, even they did not 
want to be labelled liberalsocialists. The result was secret meetings with heated 
debates and discussions all over Italy with people such as Piero Calamandrei, 
Enzo Enriques Agnoletti, Alberto Apponi and others.  
Soon, meetings in different cities were organised, with the participation both of 
Catholics and communists. The aim was to challenge fascism on the ideological, 
cultural and educational level, even with new publications74 and magazines. The 
aim of this effort was a profound renovation of society and politics. In particular, 
there was the conviction that a serious reflection on liberalism and socialism 
would have been able to lead Italy towards the regeneration. Indeed, their two 
most important principles, liberty and equality, should be kept together in a 
different perspective, precisely what they called liberalsocialism. The name 
aimed at giving the impression of melting the two schools together, as well as 
attracting those fed up with extreme market liberalism, as well as left-wing 
totalitarianism (Degli Oddi, 2012:83).   
The outcome was the attempt to go further socialism and liberalism. In particular, 
the result were two Manifestos, written in 1940 and 1941. The beginning of the 
1940 Manifesto was clear:   
                                                          
74 It is at this time that Capitini published Elementi di Un’Esperienza Religiosa, and Calogero La 
Scuola Dell’Uomo. 
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“to whom fight against misery, it cannot be offered and guaranteed, without 
hypocrisy, simple freedom of objecting and voting, of developing and deepening 
personal spirituality. To whom is under dictatorship, we cannot allow, without 
being malicious, an improvement of the economic condition of life, without 
offering at the same time freedom of critique and practice in the communal 
administration of richness” (Capitini, 1966a:120).  
The idea was the creation of a socialist state, with a strong defence of individual 
freedom. Social classes were rejected, as well as bureaucratic and authoritarian 
degenerations. The programme included the collectivisation of the most 
important businesses, as well as the formation of factory councils to educate 
workers (Degli Oddi, 2012:85).  
For what concerns institutions, they were looking for the birth of a fourth power, 
to defend freedom and prevent attempts of conspiracy. In particular, the fourth 
power would have had the role of watchdog of political parties: programmes and 
attitudes, propaganda and underground paramilitary activities. Moreover, 
freedom of press should be protected, looking at owners and economic resources 
of the many newspapers. In foreign policy, liberalsocialism was looking at 
peaceful and harmonized life together of nations. In particular, it envisaged both 
the possibility of a federation of states in Europe, and the reinvigoration of 
international organizations (Degli Oddi, 2012:87).  
Instead, the manifesto of 1941 was shorter and with one important innovation. 
Right at the beginning, there was the distinction between liberalsocialism as a 
movement working for freedom, and liberalsocialism as a political party, which 
will implement the programme once Italy would become free (Borgogni Migani, 
1997:163). Nevertheless, liberty was kept at the basis of living together; socialism 
was understood as the implementation of reforms which derived from the bottom 
of the society. Two years later, Calogero, La Malfa, and Ragghianti published 
together the programme of this new party, the Action Party (Capitini, 1966a:121).  
Within the two manifestos it is still possible to glimpse Capitini attention to the 
revolution of attitudes and conscience. Nevertheless, the contribution of Capitini 
should not be overstated. Capitini did not shape these manifestos as he thought. 
He claimed to have made few contributions only; the more personal views were 
kept in his own writings (Capitini, 1966a:119).  Moreover, the fact that Calogero 
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was much more interested in the juridical and institutional spheres gave him less 
opportunities to intervene.   
This short summary of Capitini’s activities before the end of the war should have 
made already clear at least one thing: Capitini’s nonviolence is always a mix of 
techniques and values, destruction and construction, even when dealing with 
totalitarian regimes. Yet, what about under democratic regimes? Capitini found 
himself part of a very imperfect democracy after the fall of fascism, and he had to 
deal with problems which are very similar to the kind of problems we experience 
nowadays. The young and fragile Italian democracy was made of citizens unable 
to participate; of political parties who focus only on keeping power; of powerful 
minorities who were ‘more equal than others’. What did nonviolence mean in such 
a complex situation? 
For a start, it meant a careful analysis of the situation. Capitini realised from his 
own experience that democracy is not the panacea of all problems. Indeed, the 
heart of democracy, the parliament, is easily influenced by lobbies and particular 
groups; it may abuse the lack of information, swaying towards the formation of 
‘educated people’, who know different ways of influencing the public sphere, at 
the expenses of the education of the multitude; it may become a top-down 
institution due to the dominion of private interests and closed groups, even with 
the bottom-up tool of elections (Capitini, 1999:117). In particular, “it concentrates 
power favouring efficiency to control, and ends up with non-considering means 
and their consequences well enough, in order to pursue an end” (Capitini, 
1999:90).  
How can this trend be bucked? Creating from below omnicracy, the power of all, 
through new opportunities for an always larger and better participation of people 
in the public sphere. How? The first great concern of Capitini was to raise 
personal responsibility. This meant first empowering people with techniques able 
to block armed conflicts and authoritarianism within Europe (Capitini, 1999:94), 
as well as to protest without using physical violence. This does not necessarily 
mean more participation in the everyday life of a community. However, it forges 
people able to both limit bestial instincts and react effectively against injustice, 
when democracy is in peril or an invader seizes power. These are the first steps 
for leaving aside necessity and passivity. 
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In particular, Capitini opposed the rising myth of the time: the concept of guerrilla. 
The idea of the guerrilla was extremely popular, as it spread from urban guerrilla 
put forward by black Americans, to Fidel Castro’s struggle. Capitini was 
sympathetic with the urgency of reacting to oppression, exploitation, and 
persecution. Indeed, nonviolence and the guerrilla both tend to establish a 
different kind of power, risking life with bravery (Capitini, 1999:97). Nevertheless, 
the two methods are different. Once the enemy is detected, the guerrilla requires 
only a massive use of weapons. Instead, nonviolence is a much more meditated 
approach. In addition, the guerrilla does not secure victory; does not reflect on 
the fact that the opposition may have a high profile in terms of values and 
proposal; instead, it may backfire, creating urgency in the population for an 
external reactionary order; may not lead to more freedom of expression, 
information and association. Finally, the guerrilla cannot provide a real revolution 
for Capitini, because too often it relies on protection and armies of other countries, 
being in this way a pre-manifestation or surrogate of war itself. The integration of 
nonviolence means the display of different methods of action rather than war and 
its surrogates. 
Nevertheless, protesting was not enough; the growing apathy of citizens may 
have been limited, but more is needed. Citizens need to learn to rule themselves. 
Yet, how? For Capitini, this urgency did not mean the construction of a new 
political party. Omnicracy, or the power of all, is not a simple change in the ruling 
class. For this reason, Capitini never seriously considered to join a political party. 
In 1943, during a meeting in Florence, he proposed in a speech published in 
Orientamento per una Nuova Socialita’ that liberalsocialism should remain a 
movement, considering the diffusion of ‘centres for a new sociality’. “I remained 
alone” he wrote, and he stopped taking part in the following meetings (Capitini, 
1966a:127).  
He never considered adversaries those who chose to join a political party or 
imagined a different institutional setting. He was simply persuaded by the fact 
that Italy did not need anything of that kind on the short term. What was needed 
was the integration of the work of political parties with new opportunities for 
participation. Political parties in Italy were organisations looking at the 
conservation of power. Capitini knew that “parties exist for ‘power’, to gain or 
sustain it. This is their only reason d'être, leading to Machiavellianism, internal 
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discipline, jealousy, sectarianism, party patriotism (Capitini, 1950:130). Political 
parties are dominated by functionaries and bureaucrats, monopolizing the power 
which should be left to the citizens, namely information, control and participation 
(Capitini, 1999:169).  
Against parliaments’ and parties’ imperfections, Italy needed to develop first the 
‘power without government’ of the citizens. Thus, the new democracy needed a 
deep and slow work of orientation of the consciences. Only a serious work at the 
level of beliefs and attitudes would allow democracy to prosper; there should be 
certainty on the fact that everybody is working toward the same direction, 
although with different beliefs and mentality. This would represent a real step 
forward in the idea of power, from being mere control, to become “capacity of 
realizing projects (even proposing norms), with the possibility of witnessing our 
projects realized and norms obeyed” (Capitini, 1999:160). Capitini’s work of 
increasing power without government took new shapes. He implemented this 
idea in many initiatives of bottom-up collaboration, such as Associazione per la 
Difesa e lo Sviluppo della Scuola Pubblica Italiana, Movimento per una Riforma 
Religiosa, Societa’ Vegetariana Italiana, and the Centre for Religious Orientation.  
Nevertheless, one of the key experiments was certainly the COS (Centres for 
Social Orientation), organised in Perugia and other cities after the war. The 
centres were popular assemblies open to anyone, for the examination of 
administrative, cultural, political, social, technical problems. The logic of those 
kinds of centres was very different from the political party’s one. No badge or 
subscription was required. The aim was to create an open society, one that is 
able to express itself with a coral voice (Degli Oddi 2012:109-119). Those 
assemblies presented an opportunity for people to learn how to act in public, and 
exercise power of pressure and control. The motto of these assemblies was 
‘listen and speak’. After fascism and the authoritarianism of the Catholic Church, 
it was extremely important to educate Italian citizens to open discussions. The 
assembly should have had a real function of accountability and social control, 
because any totalitarianism, coup d’état, or manoeuvre would have been quicker 
uncovered and corrected. Capitini was persuaded that it would have been much 
more difficult to suppress people freedom after Matteotti’s murder, had the COS 
proliferated all over Italy (Capitini, 1950:239).  
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However, the assembly was much more than a place to enhance accountability. 
The assembly was organized to be an exercise in control and democratic 
development, enhancing the participation of citizens in a more transparent public 
administration. The part of the name referring to a ‘social orientation’ should not 
be misunderstood. The idea was not to homologate the citizens to a unique 
thought. The aim was not only to empower the people with occasion to express 
themselves and their needs.  The discussions did not end there. Even though it 
was not a deliberative assembly, there was the possibility to propose, chase 
authority, and clarify contested decisions. Results were published, and opinions 
on certain topics were made public; cooperatives were launched; activities were 
proposed, such as events in libraries or help to students.   
This training in self-rule needed the help of everybody. And everybody were 
actually participating. Indeed, the COS were real centres, as it was a way of 
putting together authorities, intellectuals and citizens. The presence of public 
authorities was extremely important. They were able to bring their opinion and 
strategies on practical issues (from the welfare in the workplace to the new 
harvest, from the construction of a road to an energy plan) and possibilities for 
future projects. It was also important that intellectuals and experts were present. 
The COS was not a sermon, a long speech without debate. There was no need 
of taking care of the rhetorical effects of the words pronounced. For this reason, 
intellectuals were able to bring ideas, culture, daily reflections and readings to the 
general public. Finally, the presence of the citizens (businessmen, workers, 
peasants, housewives etc..) was key to bring concreteness, social needs, and 
simplicity of language to the assembly (Capitini, 1950:259).  
The consequences of this model should not be underestimated. Using Gandhian 
terminology, the COS were an example of enhancing swaraj and sarvodaya. 
Indeed, Capitini believed that in the future those assemblies would become 
autonomous, able to decide without any vertical institutions forcing them to act in 
a certain way (Capitini 1999:117-121). Out of the debates of the COS, 
Movements should live and die on special issues, and political parties should 
orient their programmes.  
The first COS started in Perugia on the 17th of July 1944 in Perugia, straight after 
liberation. It represented an answer to political parties: it was possible to be 
political without belonging to a party. It quickly spread all over Umbria, and even 
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in other regions. Unfortunately, political parties did not tolerate it for long. They 
did not help in their organisation, and they became more and more hostile as it 
became clear that they were not able to control these meetings (Degli Oddi, 
2012:115). After a short period of success, the idea of the COS lost momentum, 
closing down in 1948. 
The COS certainly remained one of the best ways found by Capitini in order to 
implement nonviolence in the aftermath of the war. However, what about powerful 
minorities holding power behind the scene? The COS will hardly change the 
power relations of a country. So, how can we address this situation? Here Capitini 
is clear: the solution does not lie in a change of the institutional design. This 
means that the solution was not the deification of the state in a way similar to 
Hegel. Capitini acknowledged the need of finding something superior, above 
private interest. The state is only an institution based on bureaucracy, with a 
monarch at the top, and wages war (Capitini, 1999:134). Similarly, the solution 
cannot be the construction of a new ideal state, which can be imagined a priori, 
and implemented in society. At the same time, the way out cannot be the 
destruction of the state. Capitini claims first that “the free functioning of parliament 
representativeness is something positive” (Capitini, 1999:117). Then, if we get rid 
of the state, it is likely that human beings will build something similar. The 
excessive emphasis on the state neglects that it is an institution that changes 
over time, and may always be improved. In particular, Capitini considered 
dangerous the progressive idolization of the state, which was increasingly 
reduced to a form of public service. “The fact that the sink will bring water every 
morning has become something crucial, much more than the presence of 
Eucharist in the closer church” (Capitini, 1999:30).  
The only way out of the dominion of powerful minorities is a long and hard work 
of fostering ‘power without government’ until when our democratic order is 
qualitatively changed in an omnicracy. This means a gradual work of opening up 
of rigid and closed institutions “to new turmoil, new needs, favouring freedom” 
(Capitini, 1998:15) and new forms of direct participation to the decision-making 
process. Every institution, from prison to schools, from hospital to religions, 
should be subject to the affirmation of different power-relations, based on non-
subjection; to the growth of personal responsibility; and to the centrality of 
everyone.  
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In particular, omnicracy is a slow bottom-up work of promotion of the model of the 
assembly to integrate the majority rule as well as authority. The assembly is what 
is more similar to the reality of all, a bottom-up inclusive and open project. 
We cannot fully describe what an assembly is, as it depends on the situation. It 
can include group work, commissions of any kinds, and it should be spread in 
any aspect of life, including prisons, hospitals, even in mental clinics. Yet, all 
these different forms of assembly should share two features. The assembly 
should be permanent, and not similar to either the Vatican council, which closed 
after a period, or the soviet in Soviet Union. At the same time, the assembly 
cannot be independent and working through majority principles. It would suddenly 
be replaced by bureaucrats. 
This idea of assembly may make someone think that we are dealing with a new 
kind of authority. However, this is not what Capitini had in mind. The idea of 
assembly by Capitini cannot be compared to the ‘authority’. It works differently. It 
is qualitatively different from the authority of a monarch (Capitini, 1999:119), or a 
small group of representatives. Indeed, it is something that requires much more 
effort and commitment, because a far larger number and typology of people takes 
part in it. Nevertheless, this effort is what makes the assembly qualitatively better: 
“the fatigue of an assembly is far nobler than that man who put a point on the top 
of an i”; the final decision will be shared by everybody. 
Moreover, the assembly should not be confused as the end, because even the 
assembly can become closed and auto-referential. This is the case when it does 
not consider other assemblies, when is based on a majority principle, and when 
it becomes closed, certain of its infallibility.  
The development and spread of assemblies is the way to overcome the dominion 
of small powerful minorities. Indeed, the gradual and progressive introduction of 
nonviolent practices of self-rule avoids violent clashes with the existent elites; at 
the same time, nonviolence empowers the masses, avoiding bloodshed. The 
assembly does not substitute instantly the parliament or any institutions. In the 
worst scenario, when the institutions are closed and arrogant, the work of the 
assembly is of total opposition. In the best scenario, however, the work of the 
assembly integrates the work of the institutions. 
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The hope is that in the long run is possible to overcome the actual forms of 
representative democracy. Capitini is aware of the fact that there will always be 
someone more skilled, as well as more educated than others, in shaping 
conscience. Nevertheless, nonviolence avoids the risk of letting them become a 
closed group, providing revolutionary tools, without supporting the masses to 
return the suffering perpetrated by the old elite. Thus it is an alternative reality 
from that of elites outdoing the masses, which opens up only to include some 
new individuals from the antagonistic class; but also different from masses 
violently outdoing a small group in power (Capitini, 1999:166). 
At the same time, nonviolence does not lead to the complete cancellation of 
competence; it is the infinite practical attempt of giving value to the multitude 
using instruments from below, avoiding that small groups of people tyrannise and 
impose their will on the others. What about efficiency? For instance, Norberto 
Bobbio objected to Capitini’s beliefs that particularism is the enemy of direct 
democracy (Polito, 2012:121). In other words, the risk is that there would be as 
many opinions as people, hindering the achievement of any agreement. It does 
not matter whether efficiency or utility are increased. The assembly can be 
sometimes inferior to any expectations; it is not infallible. But the assembly has a 
value on its own (Capitini:132). In particular, it represents the occasion of a slow 
revolution of attitude. Thus, disadvantages should be accepted.  
All that we described here is what Capitini called omnicracy, a long and complex 
project of enhancing personal responsibility, the power of all, and open and 
inclusive projects. In this sense, nonviolence as praxis of liberation and openness 
is a very progressive conception. It is open to infinite new interpretations, it 
focuses on construction, avoids falling into realpolitik and moralism, and offers an 
inclusive project which contributes to the current crisis of democracy. 
 
4.3. Religion and Nonviolence 
The last section showed a very dynamic concept of nonviolence keeping a 
balance between realism and serenity, and being a force for change with a strong 
positive and constructive dimension. This section will turn to religion. In chapter 
three we described the way in which the ‘principled’ dimension of nonviolence 
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proposed by Capitini included religion. Indeed, religion was the highest act in the 
construction of a different reality, the reality of all.  
The consequences of this interpretation are far-reaching. Nonviolence creates 
neither a new religion nor a new credo. At the same time, religion is not left in a 
corner. Nonviolence as praxis of openness and liberation is intrinsically religious, 
as we have seen above describing the concept of compresence. And this 
religiosity may represent a valid way for religion to become again an essential 
part of life. Yet, nonviolence poses a challenge to religion. The challenge is to 
include in any traditional or new religion a vertical liberating tension towards 
values as well as a horizontal opening one towards the existent. This means 
including the idea of a ‘reality of all’, of compresence. As explained above, in 
doing an act of value, the subject enters in a dialogue with everybody, even past 
and future generations. In this way, he or she produces a different inclusive 
reality, which overcomes death.  
Thus, the reality of all, or compresence, is not to be interpreted as something 
which can be described in abstract terms; it is not even a call for the restoration 
of a golden era; it is instead a tension, the continuous orientation and integration 
of current practices with values. It is thus a clear choice to increase humanity in 
the relationship with others and with nature. Instead of opposition of strengths, of 
attitudes of homo homini lupus, which would not lead to the increase of the reality 
of all, Capitini looks for integration of values to a cruel natural reality. This requires 
the commitment of everybody, because everyone can be an opportunity for the 
further development of a worthy reality, independent from age and strength. In 
particular, commitment is required from those who are sane, adult and strong, to 
share life’s pains and difficulties, and compensate the weakness of the others 
with their actions of openness. This cooperation is the kernel of the reality of all, 
of compresence, and therefore is also central to the image of God.  
The impact on religion of this conception of compresence as creation here and 
now of the reality of all is immense. The concept of compresence is for religion a 
source of dynamism (Capitini, 1998:376), as it put continuous pressure on the 
limits of body and nature (Capitini, 1998:386). It is also a source of creativity 
(Capitini, 1998:339), as it shapes each human being and creates values in an 
infinite and always increasing process. In few words, the concept of compresence 
is a revolutionary drive at the centre of religion.  
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This revolutionary nature of compresence leads to what Capitini called an ‘open 
religion’. Religion is in Capitini’s view “a set of thought and action, of principles 
and acts (which can increase and change) in order to prepare and form a religious 
openness in us” (Capitini 2011:7). Capitini makes clear that only through practical 
commitments it is possible to understand what God is (Capitini, 1998:121). In this 
sense, religion is a ferment, an initiative to be renovated continuously. Religion is 
an “action of the soul” and not something similar to an “arithmetic sum” (Capitini, 
1998:56). In other words, religion without work in society is not religion. It is 
instead another form of superstition (Degli Oddi, 2012:133). Thus, this different 
approach to religion makes of it a force of change to the status quo; religion is 
reality of transformation, of tramutazione (Capitini, 1950:166). It is a vital stimulus, 
invention, sacrifice, individual responsibility; it is the realisation here and now of 
a different reality, in which everybody takes part.   
The consequences of this approach to religion are many. For a start, the concept 
of faith is no longer compatible with blind and passive obedience. Instead, faith 
is interpreted as the impossibility to accept an insufficient reality of divisions, pain, 
mistakes, and death. It is the hope that divisions and closures can and should be 
overcome. This includes a reduction and eventual overcome of the old distinctive 
practices and rituals, which represent occasions for closure and divisions. At the 
same time, a different idea of faith will not concentrate on obeying an authority. 
The religious person is a proactive and committed individual, focused on finding 
new ways of living the unity-love. For this reason, holding faith is equal to become 
a ‘prophet’ in Capitini’s terms. This ‘title’ can be considered in-line with the post-
Vatican II importance of the prophetic mission “that calls for individuals to speak 
out against worldly injustice no matter what the consequences” (Stepan, 
2000:53). However, the prophet is neither sectarian nor a new authority; the 
prophet works to provide everybody with new opportunities for liberation, and it 
does not predict the future (Capitini, 2010:55). It is very different from the priest, 
who belongs to an institution and a tradition; who works with the authorities, 
objectively administering doctrines, formulas, and rituals (Capitini, 1966b:16). 
The prophet dedicates himself or herself entirely to the education of consciences. 
He or she criticises reality, proposing different paths to pursue with rationality and 
faith. Therefore, the prophet will never become a legislator; the aim of the prophet 
is to allow people to better and freely express their own convictions. 
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Consequently, it was not bizarre for Capitini to consider prophets of a nonviolent 
religion the most well-known ‘pure religious spirits’, such as Christ, Buddha, St 
Francis and Gandhi. They represent the authentic religious spirit against 
traditional institutionalism, along with a clear request for religious reform. Thus, 
the main concern of religion is no more to convert and judge who is entitled to 
join the group of the good and who is not; the issue is to enhance personal 
responsibility, along with opportunities for everybody to act for values. In acting 
for the production of values, people feel that they are not alone; they are doing 
something with the rest of humanity, they are participating in something bigger, 
enhancing a new reality, with an enormous difference in quality compared to the 
past. 
At this point, an objection may emerge. How can an open and humble religion 
make sense of the many commands and rules embedded in it? To answer this 
question, we will look at the way in which Capitini looked at one of the key 
religious principles of Christianity, namely the command ‘thou shalt not kill’ 
(Capitini, 1962b:7-14). Traditionally, this command is part of an authoritarian 
approach to religion; it has been imposed on the population by an authority, 
whether through a delegate or a book. The words of the delegate or the book 
itself could decide concessions and limits, right and wrong implementation; it 
could even provide certain individuals or events with some sorts of privileges or 
exceptions. For instance, the authority could decide that abortion should be 
forbidden, while war allowed.  
The idea of nonviolence proposed by Capitini turned this approach upside down. 
The philosopher of Perugia suggested looking at the words ‘thou shalt not kill’ 
from a personal point of view and through the concept of compresence. The 
command ceases to be an authority which rules an entire life; it turns to be a non-
binding interesting occasion for reflection on past and future experiences. This 
does not mean supporting aggression and violence. It means that a person does 
not kill because persuaded that this choice is the best. More importantly, it is 
accepted and adopted because is persuasive, and it is the starting point for new 
personal thoughts and actions (Capitini, 1962b:8).  
This approach does not lead to any limitation of freedom and reason. The 
absence of any authority, whether an institution or a book, describing the correct 
way to interpret any command is a precious occasion for the person, allowing him 
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or her to boost both ‘reason’ and ‘freedom’ (Capitini, 1962b:8). Indeed, reason is 
paramount in the continuous reinterpretation of those words. At the same time, 
the command has become an opportunity for new and creative ways to express 
a conviction, also taking into account the circumstances.  It is no more a problem 
of dogmas, authorities, institutions, allegiance and obligation. The issue is not 
even the fact that we are talking about God’s words. From this point of view, an 
open religion should base its many activities in society on this liberating approach, 
enhancing personal responsibility so that everyone has new opportunities and 
tools to seriously participate in the production of values. A liberating approach will 
permeate the traditional role of preparing human beings for suffering and death, 
implemented not via dogmatic tales, but through proximity and love towards any 
single human being.  
The choice of a different approach to faith and authority has important 
consequences. Indeed, at the social level this approach enhances openness 
towards the others. For a start, openness means recognition of fallibility, of 
humility. Recalling the metaphor of the musician, who tended to realise music 
everyday as best as he could, the nonviolent tries every day to tend to realise 
nonviolence in the best way possible. The result is not always the purest music, 
nor the best nonviolence. However, the effort is important. In particular, religion 
represents an important cultural power, able, in Capitini’s view, to add occasions 
of liberation in society, and making the struggle for peace something heroic 
(Capitini, 1962b:21). Thus, the prophet of an open religion will act in society 
conscious of its fallibility, but nevertheless, determined to make a change 
(Capitini, 1962b:39). 
Radical change is also expected from the institutions. The choice of nonviolence 
implies considering any social relationship not in terms of authority, power, and 
repression, but in a more federative, horizontal and open point of view (Capitini, 
1962b:37).  For this reason, Capitini left Catholicism in 1929, when the institution 
decided to make an agreement with fascism instead of fighting it. This was also 
one of the reasons for his interest in Gandhi, who was trying to free his country 
from the yoke of colonialism. 
Nevertheless, protest is not enough. Open religion is a cultural power, which 
works meticulously in society with actions aimed at openness and liberation. For 
instance, Capitini organised many different conferences in Italy to discuss the 
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idea of a different kind of religion. Out of one of them the Movimento di Religione 
(Movement of Religion) was founded, with the excommunicated ex-priest 
Ferdinando Tartaglia75. The aim was to gather people with different religious 
background in order to talk about the opportunity to overcome religious practices, 
which are too attached to revelation, dogmas and institutions, in favour of a 
religion able to foster liberty and sociality. The religious reform included helping 
the ex-priests, who were not allowed by the Italian constitution to have public jobs 
in contact with the citizens; conscientious objectors, such as Pinna (who met 
Capitini in one of the meeting of the Movimento di Religione, leading to the 
decision of becoming conscientious objector); pacifists and opponents of war. In 
1950 Capitini took part in the World Congress of Religions for Peace Foundation 
in London, where he proposed to build up a Religious and Nonviolent 
International. In order to keep alive dialogue around religious reforms, Capitini 
started in 1951 to write Letters of Religion, which were periodical letters dealing 
with many different religious topics. The harsh critique to religion led him to 
defend an Italian couple, Bellando of Prato, who sued the bishop of their city for 
having accused them of being concubines, as they were baptised but decided to 
hold only a civil and not religious wedding. This led Capitini to write a letter to the 
bishop of Perugia, along with other tens of people, asking to be removed from 
the register of baptised, which was the symbol of being subject to a non-
recognised authority. Later, he published Battezzati non Credenti, in which he 
provided an account of what happened, included the letter to the bishop of 
Perugia, and analysed baptism and the concept of mystical body.  
These actions led to important efforts to spread different values and practices. It 
led to the establishment in 1952 of the Centre for Religious Orientation (COR). 
This project was founded with Emma Thomas, an 80 year-old Quaker. They 
organised weekly meetings open to everybody, independently from religion or 
faith, with the aim to foster knowledge of the many religions of the world, as well 
as stimulate discussions and criticisms of Catholicism. They met each Sunday in 
order to discuss spiritual, social and artistic topics related to religion, with the 
participation and introduction of guests of different religion and faith.  
                                                          
75 Ferdinando Tartaglia (1916-1987), was an Italian priest, theologian, and writer. Due to his very 
progressive ideas about religion, he was prohibited to celebrate the mass, and later he was 
excommunicated for having commemorated the excommunicated Ernesto Bonaiuti.  
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Beyond the COR, Capitini fostered the encounter between nonviolence, religion 
and education. Religion becomes ‘education to openness’, going beyond the 
actual insufficient reality, and the prophet (who promotes personal responsibility, 
values, and liberation) is the teacher par excellence. This meant for Capitini an 
endless work of help to introduce nonviolence in schools and universities. 
Moreover, it meant looking at examples such as the activity of Don Lorenzo 
Milani76 in Barbiana, which impressed for his attention to the weak. The school 
that the Catholic priest ran, along with the writings published, were an important 
example of an open and inclusive idea of education.  
The result of the link between religion and nonviolence included, as we have seen 
for the peace march, the promotion of different models of conduct and an open 
concept of sanctity. For what concerns models of conduct, an open religion 
focuses on action. Thus, it will promote people, belonging already to the religious 
group, who did outstanding work in society. In the case of Catholicism, it is worth 
referring to Mother Teresa and Óscar Romero, but also to look at the many 
worker-priests acting from the 1940s, to don Pino Puglisi77 and the many priests 
killed by criminal organisations.  
Nevertheless, belonging to a religion cannot be the reason for the adoption of a 
person as a model. Thus, religion should encourage people to look beyond. One 
famous example of nonviolence is Danilo Dolci. He is certainly a model for his 
important social commitment in Sicily, and for the total nonviolent ways of 
implementing it. His hunger and reverse strikes and famine marches became 
famous in Italy and the whole of Europe.  
Finally, a nonviolent religion will also promote a different idea of sanctity in the 
social realm. The meaning of sanctity should be enlarged to include any ‘pure 
spirit’, independently from affiliation with any church. In this way, the sanctity of 
                                                          
76 Don Lorenzo Milani (1923-1967) was a Roman Catholic priest. He is famous for his work as 
educator of poor children in Barbiana, a remote village in the Mugello Region. Between the many 
important activities, he was a strong supporter of conscientious objection. He has even been put 
on trial for advocating it in Lettere ai Cappellani Militari. On the relation between Capitini and 
Milani, see: Degli Oddi, I. 2012, Aldo Capitini. Una Vita Nonviolenta, Roma:Aracne, pp. 156-8; 
Capitini, Aldo, Educazione Aperta, vol. 2, pp. 90-97; Giacche’, P. (1991), Opposizione e 
Liberazione, Scritti Autobiografici di Aldo Capitini, Milano:Linea D’Ombra.  
77 Don Pino Puglisi (1937-1993) was a Roman Catholic priest working in Brancaccio 
neighbourhood in Palermo. He openly challenged the Mafia, and for this reason he was 
assassinated on the 15th of September. 
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Francis of Assisi and Gandhi should be put on the same level, representing two 
polar stars for the entire world (Capitini, 1962a:16).  
Thus, an open and nonviolent religion is able to play a key role in society, 
overcoming the marginal role given to it by the process of secularisation. 
Nevertheless, some fears can remain about the role of such a religion in politics. 
Is the renewed role of religion in society a threat to democracy? For Capitini the 
opposite is true. An open religion can provide politics with the most pure and 
extreme examples of compresence, of maximum openness and liberation. In 
other words, nonviolence allows religion to focus on positive integration of 
valuable actions into politics. Religion at the political level should represent the 
‘impatience’ of waiting for the end, claimed Capitini. From this point of view, 
religion represents the occasion of unification of means and ends. This means 
that a nonviolent religion is able to support politics, showing examples of heroism 
of peace. Religion is able to fill the political arena with people working endlessly 
to avoid violence, and  sacrificing themselves for the others and for peace 
(Capitini, 1962b:33). Religion implements here and now peace, love, and liberty, 
in a society which still uses war for peace, violence for love, and dictatorship for 
liberty (Capitini, 1948:35).  
In other words, religion is no longer a problem for politics; it is an opportunity and 
a stimulus. Indeed, the aim is not to impose on others rules and visions of life or 
death. The aim is the moralisation of politics; to propose a new attitude along with 
a lively production of values. This does not mean imposing laws in line with some 
specific religious belief. To the contrary, it means acting showing that love is 
possible, and thus expressing the tension towards values and openness; for 
instance, when politics is driven by a particular set of interests, or when it 
becomes mere dry administration.  
Thus, an open religion is the opportunity to restrain closure and violence in the 
political arena. It surrenders neither to nationalisms, nor to a dry and juridical 
cosmopolitanisms. Indeed, there is no need of waiting for a world government or 
police; the new practices and the new commitment makes real here and now a 
different cosmopolitan reality, in which everybody, even the excluded, take part 
(Degli Oddi, 2012:125-6).  
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4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter described the way in which Capitini’s conception of nonviolence 
answers the concerns raised in chapter two. Nonviolence as praxis of liberation 
and openness is able to reconcile the tensions at the descriptive, praxeological, 
and religious levels. Section one showed that nonviolent action may be described 
as a protest-to-project, which is more than mere behaviour or a rigid principle to 
apply, and which includes both means and ends. We looked at an action, the 
peace march of 1961. The march was much more than the implementation of a 
technique. It was an example of a different style of action, which provided a new 
meaning to the term march and challenged the common idea of a protest. It was 
a nonviolent direct action directed not to put pressure on a challenger in order to 
force him or her to do something. To the contrary, it was focused on the 
participants themselves. It emphasised personal responsibility; it reduced the 
polarisations and encouraged participation at the political level, enhancing the 
power of all; it kept religion at the centre in an open-ended and inclusive project. 
The aim was to foster ‘fraternity among peoples’. In other words, the first Italian 
peace march was not an example of a technique, but of a ‘protest-to-project’, a 
reinterpretation of an already available practice for a practical constructive 
programme, presenting a way towards a more nonviolent society.  
Section two focused on the praxeological level. Nonviolence was the centre of a 
political approach described as ‘realism and serenity’. This approach was at the 
centre of Capitini’s fight against fascism, in particular with the foundation of the 
Liberalsocialist movement. After the war, nonviolence remained at the centre of 
his attempt to integrate democracy with COS and the model of the assembly, in 
order to build practically omnicracy, or the power of all.  
Finally, nonviolence represents an opportunity for religion. Section three showed 
the consequences of the interpretation of religion as religious act. Indeed, religion 
becomes creation, union of thought and actions of liberation and openness; faith 
becomes hope that division and limits can be overcome; the priest is substituted 
by the prophet; the commands become opportunities to enhance freedom and 
rationality; closed models of conduct and confessional ideas of sanctity are 
overcome. The fresh air introduced by nonviolence lead religion to be fully 
dedicated to the integration of society as a vertical tension towards values, and 
to restrain violence and closure of politics.  
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To conclude, the concept of nonviolence as praxis of liberation and openness 
proposed by Capitini reunited means and ends, kept a balance between realism 
and moralism, reintroduced religion at the centre of nonviolence and society. The 
next step will be to reflect further on this heritage. In particular, we should find 
whether this concept of nonviolence is able to answer to the problems outlined in 
chapter two integrating Capitini’s approach with the most recent literature on 
nonviolence. 
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5. RECONSTRUCTING NONVIOLENCE 
 
This thesis started with a concern: the worrying uses of the term nonviolence 
revealed the urgency of creating a united, progressive and pluralistic concept able 
to face a changing historical environment. This triggered a theoretical 
reconstruction of the concept of nonviolence. In particular, the current internal 
split in pragmatic and principled is a problem. It was successful, as it better 
described the concept, spread its use, and introduced to the West a secularised 
version. Nevertheless, there is a heavy cost at the descriptive (division between 
means and ends due to a disagreement on the meaning of nonviolence), 
praxeological (a regressive concept focused on disruption and risking a split 
between politics and morality), and religious (isolation of religion in the category 
of principled nonviolence with consequent division between religion and politics). 
Aldo Capitini’s approach to nonviolence is an interesting way out, but it should be 
developed further. Bernard of Chartres, as John of Salisbury in the Metalogicon 
referred, said “we are like dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of giants; we see more 
things and more distant things than they did, not because our sight is keener nor 
because we are taller than they, but because they lift us up and add their giant 
stature to our own height.” Thus, now the issue is: can we be ‘lifted up’ by Capitini, 
and outline a different reconstructed conception of nonviolence that is united and 
pluralistic, and avoids worrying uses of the term, while acting effectively in a 
changed historical environment? This last chapter will attempt to answer these 
questions.  
The first section will focus on the descriptive level. Starting from Capitini’s 
conception of nonviolence as a praxis, we will better describe the latter in the light 
of the Italian debate over Marxism as a ‘philosophy of praxis’ started by Labriola. 
Praxis will emerge as a non-systematic revolutionary approach, a political 
ideology, a meticulous work of reinterpretation and shaping of reality. Then, we 
will further describe this praxis with the help of Arendt. Nonviolence as praxis is 
a ‘mode of togetherness’, which is different from poiesis (it does not necessarily 
produce democracy) and contemplation (it does not look for contemplative 
absolute truths). At the same time, nonviolence includes these extremes because 
it is an impure praxis made of less than perfect actions in an imperfect world. This 
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fact does not hinder nonviolence to keep its ambition of freedom (or liberation) 
and plurality (or openness).  
This definition will allow us to redefine principled and pragmatic nonviolence as 
inseparable and complementary parts of a unique work of change. Principled 
nonviolence will be reinterpreted as an intentional bottom-up realisation of a 
public principle. This implies enhanced freedom, which may be called an ascetic 
act, or drawing from the literature on nonviolence self-restraint; the openness to 
plurality, or the ethical act, which accepts the risk of openness and tries to actively 
change the status quo; and the excellent actions, which reach the level of 
Capitini’s religious act, meaning to be part of a big community in performing an 
act of value.  
Instead, pragmatic nonviolence will be reinterpreted as practical wisdom, the art 
of judgment which can be drawn from the continuous reinterpretation and creation 
of human practices. This phronesis revolves around some key features for the 
construction of the reality of all: the enhancement of freedom as personal 
responsibility, of plurality with the power of all, and of always new open and 
inclusive projects. Thus, we will show that pragmatic and principled nonviolence 
need each other and work together towards a different reality. 
Section two will turn to the praxeological level, offering a progressive concept to 
overcome the division between politics and morality. Here we will look at 
nonviolence as a different kind of realism. Nonviolence as a praxis of freedom 
and plurality represents an original form of realism, which can be found both in 
Gandhi and in Capitini, and which aims at changing reality on the basis of a 
realistic analysis of the current situation. This approach becomes a different kind 
of citizenship, a diverse citizenship based on praxis instead of status. This sort of 
realism is also capable of answering the concerns about a democracy in crisis. 
We will interpret this crisis as an example of ‘order without life’, and we will show 
that the phronesis offered by nonviolence is not only a useful path towards 
democratisation. Nonviolent phronesis offers the integration of freedom and 
plurality to the democratic order in crisis. This means offering freedom as self-
restraint as well as enhancing personal responsibility against the apathy of 
citizens. It means offering plurality as an ethical act and enhancement of the 
power of all to face the dominion of political parties. Finally, it means offering 
excellent actions and support for new inclusive and open projects against the 
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existent dominion of powerful minorities. Walking this path, nonviolence is able 
to construct via facti a different society, in which an ‘order with life’ is established.  
Finally, section three will focus on religion. Religion is reconceived in terms of a 
‘religious act’, unity of thought and action at the centre of a post-secular society. 
Indeed, religion as such is able to integrate the ‘immanent frame’ with self-
restraint, the society with ethical acts of openness to plurality, and pushes for the 
‘spiritualisation of politics’ through excellent actions, without imposing law or 
using coercion. This means the definitive defeat of the myth of violence 
associated with religion, as well as an overthrow of the current dominion of the 
‘Westphalian Presumption’, which assumes that religions should be kept in the 
private sphere as they represent a threat to the international order. Instead, the 
practical approach for nonviolence opens up the possibility that religions can build 
a new bottom-up presumption, which we called the Assisi Presumption. 
 
5.1. Nonviolence as Impure Praxis 
Nonviolence needs a united and pluralistic conception, to avoid being reduced to 
mere behaviour or principle, means or end. A new conception of nonviolence 
should include the capacity to offer new techniques as well as social, spiritual, 
and even religious meanings. We believe that Capitini’s definition of nonviolence 
as a praxis of liberation and openness represents a valid starting point for finding 
a solution, but it has to be extended and integrated.  
For a start, what do we mean by praxis? In choosing the term praxis, Capitini was 
aware that this term meant something more than simple behaviours or principles, 
and that he was linking nonviolence to a larger debate (Lobkowicz, 1967). In 
particular, Italy was the arena for a heated debate on the topic since the end of 
the XIX century. The debate was sparked by the interpretation of the Theses on 
Feuerbach, in particular thesis three, in which Marx talked of “umwälzende 
praxis”, or revolutionary praxis. One of the most famous Italian Marxists of the 
time, Antonio Labriola, gave great weight to this idea, interpreting Marxism as a 
real philosophy of praxis in his 1897 Socialism and Philosophy. The concept of 
praxis was the way to overcome the opposition between theory and practice in 
the interpretation of historical materialism. Here praxis was not practice; it was 
the mediation between theory and practice, past and present, what has been 
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done and the actual life, meaning what people are doing at the moment. Thus, it 
was important to link theory and practice, morality and the real evolution of 
society. At the same time, stressing the importance of praxis was a way to 
engender the philosophical autonomy of Marxism, without falling into the more 
orthodox Marxian economic materialism, which was associated more closely with 
Engels. Labriola proposed a non-totalizing philosophy, which rested on a tension 
towards transformation, new interpretations and critiques; it was an immanent 
philosophy, going “from life to thought, and not from thought to life: this is the 
realistic process” (Labriola, 1980).   
Labriola’s interpretation was opposed by Giovanni Gentile and Benedetto Croce. 
The former, in his translation of the Theses on Feuerbach in 1898, interpreted 
praxis as form, which was distinguished from matter. In this way, the dualism, 
which has been overcome by Labriola, comes back. For Gentile, Marx is turning 
Hegel upside down in the sense that matter is the beginning instead of ideas, 
while praxis is reduced to the metaphysics of thesis, antithesis and synthesis78. 
Instead, Croce reduced praxis to the opposite of theory. For the Italian 
philosopher, the concept of praxis is interchangeable with that of practice, and 
therefore, it is a manifestation of the spirit.  
Opposed to both Gentile and Croce’s interpretations was Gramsci, who went 
back to the original text in Notebook seven, and came up with a different 
interpretation (Haug, 2000). Praxis was the overcome of the dualism between 
matter and spirit. It is activity in concreto, always related to a certain already 
organised matter, the force of production, and thus to nature already transformed 
by human beings. Like Labriola, Gramsci put the concept of praxis at the 
beginning, and not as the result of the dialectical unification of matter and spirit. 
The concept of reality, which is comprised of a mix of matter and form, individuals 
and society, is always changing and evolving, and thus is described as impure 
and complex. For this reason, Gramsci talked of impure act or praxis, as we are 
referring to something real, at work, always in a historical form depending on the 
circumstances. In other words, the concept of praxis was a dynamic concept 
                                                          
78 Later, Rodolfo Mondolfo contributed to the debate, but the dualism between human will and 
reality remained. For Mondolfo, the issue is that Feuerbach had a naturalist point of view, looking 
at the dualism between human being and external world, while for Marx and Engels the problem 
was historical, with a focus on future human activity in relation to the results of past activities. This 
was for Mondolfo the revolution of the praxis. 
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based on social relations, at the basis of theory and practice, continuously 
changing and acquiring new meanings79.  
The concept of praxis continued to capture the attention of the Italian thinkers 
even after the war. In particular, the concept of praxis was at the centre of an anti-
metaphysical effort which overcame what Pitkin would call ‘process thinking’, “the 
conviction that we are the helpless products of causal forces, historical or social, 
which leave us no choice or capacity for initiative” (Pitkin, 1981:340). This 
includes Marxism, as well as Croce’s historicism and Gentile’s actualism. For this 
reason, praxis became the centre of important philosophical contributions in the 
1950s, in particular by a friend of Capitini, Mario dal Pra80, and by Giulio Preti81. 
Unfortunately, we do not know the exact opinion of Capitini concerning this 
debate. Nevertheless, this small digression may be useful for us, as it allows us 
to further extrapolate upon the analysis of Capitini, developing what is already 
implicit but partly unexpressed in Capitini’s writings. The idea of praxis of Capitini 
was the rejection of the ‘process thinking’ as the approach to praxis of Labriola, 
Gramsci, Dal Pra and Preti. It considers nonviolence to be a way of non-systemic 
                                                          
79 Unfortunately, Gramsci’s interpretation of praxis entered the Italian debate very late, due to 
what has been called the ‘camouflage thesis’. The first edition of the Prison Notebooks has been 
published between 1948 and 1951, but the editor Platone believed it to be a camouflage phrase 
for Marxism-Leninism. He even occasionally replaced the term philosophy of praxis with Marxism 
or historical materialism. Even Gerratana, who edited the critical edition of the Prison Notebooks 
in 1975, did not interpret the philosophy of praxis as a “possible re-working or further development 
of Marxism in which ‘orthodoxy is essentially left aside” HAUG, W. F. 2000. Gramsci's "Philosophy 
of Praxis". Socialism and Democracy, 14, 1-19.4. 
80 Mario dal Pra (1914-1992) was an Italian philosopher. On the concept of praxis, Dal Pra wrote 
many articles in the 1950s: M. Dal Pra (1950) A proposito di trascendentalismo della prassi, 
Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia, 5:305-309; M. Dal Pra (1952) Ancora trascendentalismo 
della prassi, Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia, 7:130-134; M. Dal Pra (1954), Discussioni e 
chiarimenti sul trascendentalismo della prassi, Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia, 9:278-284. 
These articles are important because describe an original philosophical approach named 
‘transcendentalism of praxis’, by which Dal Pra unified theory and praxis in an anti-metaphysical 
approach. On this idea look: Parodi, M., Selogna, C. (2008), Per Una Filosofia Minore: Mario dal 
Pra e il Pensiero Debole, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 24(4):771-789. Dal Pra was part of 
Liberalsocialist Movement founded by Capitini. Later in his life, he wrote on Capitini in: Dal Pra, 
M. (1944) Valori Cristiani e Cultura Immanentistica, Padova: Dal Pra, M. (1988), Momenti di 
Riflessione sull Esperienza Religiosa in Italia tra Idealismo e Razionalismo Critico, in La Filosofia 
Contemporanea di Fronte all’Esperienza Religiosa, Atti del Convegno, Reggio Emilia 25-29 May 
1982, Parma:Pratiche. 
81 Giulio Preti (1911-1972) was an Italian philosopher. Aldo Capitini cited many times one the 
most famous book of Preti, Praxis e Empirismo, published by Einaudi in 1957. Here, philosophy 
of praxis is an orientation towards interpretation and change of the world, in which interpretation 
and change, or theory and practice cannot be separated. The first chapter of this book revolves 
around Marxism and the the philosophy of praxis. In particular, it shows that the version of the 
philosophy of praxis found in the earlier Marx, which is different from the one found in the later, is 
closed to Dewey’s pragmatism. For Preti, pragmatism, logical empiricism and Marxism were 
philosophies of praxis. Dewey is an important author for Capitini. 
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thinking, a political ideology82, whose key feature is its subversive and anti-
metaphysical nature, of continuous reinterpretation and critique. The praxis of 
nonviolence is an orientation towards interpretation and change of the world, is 
always in becoming, and the idea of reality that follows is extremely dynamic. We 
can even claim that the praxis of nonviolence may be interpreted as the moment 
in which theory and practice are generated, and not as something that follows 
them. In other words, praxis is the endless effort of creation of a value and of 
better practices. Thus, the choice of Capitini to link praxis and nonviolence was 
extremely innovative83, because it gives a certain ‘philosophical autonomy’ and a 
revolutionary character to the latter. Nonviolence emerges as a non-systematic 
revolutionary approach, which creates and reinterprets theories and practices, 
and which cannot be reduced to mere behaviours or ideals. 
Unfortunately, this definition is still quite vague, and Capitini, as well as other 
people who linked praxis and nonviolence after him84, never explored this 
                                                          
82 As we explained in the introduction, we refer to the interpretation of ideology provided by 
Michael Freeden. Ideology is neither an illusion nor a dogma, but an “understanding of the political 
environment of which we are part, and have views about the merits and failings of that 
environment”.  
83 The relation between nonviolence and Marxism has been object of debate in Italy. Look for 
instance: Fondazione Centro Studi Aldo Capitini e Movimento Nonviolento eds. (1981), 
Nonviolenza e Marxismo, Atti del Convegno di Perugia ottobre 1978, Milano:Feltrinelli and to 
Badaloni et al. (1977), Marxismo e Nonviolenza, Genova:Lanterna. A propose, Norberto Bobbio 
wrote about this topic in: Besides, Alberto L’Abate also argued that there are important things in 
common between Gramsci and nonviolence in: Gramsci e la Nonviolenza, Antologia Premio 
Gramsci – XII Edizione – Ales – Gennaio 2012, Sassari: Editrice Democratica Sarda, 375-432. 
For a summary of his position: https://www.transcend.org/tms/2012/08/gramsci-and-nonviolence/ 
(accessed on the 2nd February 2015). 
84 For instance, Weber talked of the ‘Gandhian praxis’ (WEBER, T. 2001. Gandhian Philosophy, 
Conflict Resolution Theory and Practical Approaches to Negotiation. Journal of Peace Research, 
38, 493-513.) of satyagraha, not only as “a method of conducting conflict”, but “a way of life, of 
living within the truth”. In 1983, Pantham claimed that Gandhian social theory and action is a 
“mode of action”, a praxis which “offers guidance in transforming what he called the ‘nominal’ 
democracy into a truer or fuller democracy” (PANTHAM, T. 1983. Thinking with Mahatma Gandhi: 
Beyond Liberal Democracy. Political Theory, 11, 165-188.). More recently, James Tully 
interpreted Gandhian nonviolence not as a status but a praxis. With this term the author means 
not the passive process of taking a practice of civic activity as a form of organisation; he means 
the continuous process of forming and negotiating practices of actors and activities in context. 
Within this praxis, nonviolence represents one of the “most important activities today” (TULLY, J. 
2008. Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 2, Imperialism and Civic Freedom, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.). Similarly, talking about satyagraha, Mantena argued that it has 
been wrongly associated with moralism, or to a set of actions which rigidly excludes any direct 
violence at all. Instead, the term refers to a ‘practical orientation’, a “strategic interplay of 
nonviolent techniques, methods, and stances that in themselves have to be as various and 
dynamic as the nature of political conflict itself” (MANTENA, K. 2012a. Another Realism: The 
Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence. American Political Science Review, 106, 455-470.). Nonviolent 
action is “a non-instrumental form of consequentialism that sought to curtail and mitigate endemic 
violence and sustain progressive change”(MANTENA, K. 2012b. Gandhi and the Means-Ends 
Question in Politics. www.sss.ias.edu/files/papers/paper46.pdf (Accessed on the 31st January 
2015).). Thus, satyagraha as a ‘practical orientation’ includes both values and methods of action 
162 | P a g e  
 
relationship. In particular, we are interested in the issue: in what sense is 
nonviolence more than a behaviour and a principle? In order to help us draw out 
this implicit dimension of Capitini’s choice to link praxis and nonviolence, we turn 
to Hannah Arendt’s concept of praxis. She held a very similar but more precise 
conception of praxis, which may help us to make some step further. Indeed, when 
Arendt talks about praxis she refers to a key part of vita activa (opposed to vita 
contemplativa, which is the ideal of contemplation of an absolute truth), in 
particular to “the activity tied to the condition of plurality” (D'Entrèves, 1994:65), 
with social and political life. This means that praxis is neither labour nor work. The 
three are very different. “Labor is the activity which is tied to the human condition 
of life”, while “work the activity which is tied to the condition of worldliness” 
(D'Entrèves, 1994:65). Labour focuses on “the biological process of the human 
body” (Arendt, 1998:7), on the satisfaction of the vital needs. In other words, 
labour is an endless process, which should always be implemented because 
human beings always need primary goods, trapping people “in the recurring cycle 
of labouring and consuming” (Yeatman et al., 2011:27). Instead, work transcends 
the function of nature. It “begins in the planning of the first step of creation of an 
article of use or of beauty, and ends in the completion of the act of fabrication” 
(Yeatman et al., 2011:28). It has a definite beginning and end. It is “the building 
of the world,” as the products comprise of the world in which human beings live. 
This is the reason why its human condition is ‘worldliness’(Arendt, 1998:7). 
The distinction between praxis and both contemplation and work may be 
extremely beneficial for both understanding the peculiarities of praxis and its 
relation with behaviour and principle. Indeed, action is ‘antithetical’ (Bernstein, 
1977:146) to the concept of behaviour. Instead, it is “essentially a public and 
political category” (Bernstein, 1977:147); it goes on between human beings. At 
the same time, it is not a practice that rigidly follows a principle. Action is a mode 
of human togetherness, which necessarily leads neither to the production of any 
goods, nor to any particular practice. One consequence is that action has different 
                                                          
within the political conflict. Even those who do not talk directly about praxis may find in this term 
an effective way to describe what they mean. For instance, Ricoeur agreed that Gandhi’s 
struggles are an attempt to bring goals and means together “in an action which is at one and the 
same time a spirituality and a technique”(RICOEUR, P. 1965. History and Truth, Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press.). In a very similar way, Hildegard Goss-Mayr claimed that for her 
“nonviolence is a life attitude, not just developing specific methods. Injustice will always reappear 
and it will be a long-term task” (KURTZ, L. R. 2001. Hildegard Goss-Mayr. Peace Review, 13, 
457-461.). 
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principles and criteria in comparison to work. Work is judged by the ability to “build 
and maintain a world fit for human use and for human enjoyment.” To the 
contrary, action is judged “by its ability to disclose the identity of the agent, to 
affirm the reality of the world, to actualize our capacity for freedom and to endow 
our existence with meaning” (D'Entrèves, 1994:66). In other words, action is the 
moment in which human beings differentiate themselves from animals and Gods. 
In particular, action has “the central place in the hierarchy of  human activities” 
because it has “the potential to realize our highest human capacities, such as 
freedom and individuality” (D'Entrèves, 1994:66). In other words, praxis is not 
simple behaviour, and at the same time it is not an ideal to implement rigidly in 
life. To the contrary, praxis is a mode of human togetherness, the moment in 
which the highest human capacities may realise, and mere existence can be 
endowed with meaning.   
Thus, nonviolence is a praxis in the sense of it being a non-systematic 
revolutionary approach to ‘human togetherness’, which reinterprets and shapes 
theories and behaviours. This interpretation allows us to better understand the 
problem of the definitions of nonviolence as either a principle or a set of 
techniques.  The division between principled and pragmatic nonviolence 
resembles the division between theoria, vita contemplativa, and poiesis. On the 
one hand, principled nonviolence is treading dangerously towards vita 
contemplativa. Nonviolence interpreted as an abstract principle, a universal rule 
with which judging any action clashes with an on-going and always changing 
reality and especially with acts of cruelty and violence. The risk is the creation of 
close groups of perfects, and the withdrawal from political life, towards 
speculation for its own sake culminating in contemplation of a formal truth. 
Instead, new standards of political life, new principles and values arise within 
political actions, and thus nonviolence has to be anchored to action, to praxis. On 
the other hand, pragmatic nonviolence shows the tendency of reducing itself to 
poiesis, to fabrication. Pragmatic nonviolence assumes that the use of certain 
tools will bring about a particular, and better, outcome. The concept of praxis 
proposed by Arendt reminds us that its aim is the realisation of a worthwhile good. 
This means that the aim is not the construction of an institution (i.e. a democratic 
state), but of more and better concerted actions, which are the key for the 
conservation and well-being of any institutions. Therefore, techniques of action 
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and principle should be kept together, because they are the products of the same 
praxis.  
Thus the concept of praxis represents the way in-between vita contemplativa, or 
the contemplation of the absolute principle of nonviolence, and poiesis, or the 
fabrication or instrumental actions. Yet, does it manage to reconcile the means 
and ends? We believe that nonviolence as praxis keeps the tension between 
means and ends, without focusing merely on one or the other. Nonviolence 
cannot separate clearly the means and ends without running the risk of ‘changing 
the tiger, but not the tiger’s nature’. Sharp’s idea of nonviolence did not give 
enough importance to the ends of an action; rather, his concerns concentrated 
on instrumental actions. On the contrary, political practices and conflicts are 
dynamic processes, and the choice of the means interacts endlessly with the 
particular end at a certain moment in time. Indeed, not being able to understand 
the needs of society at any given moment is likely to endanger the reputation of 
even the noblest means available. At the same time, the way in which an end is 
pled and pursued can create resistance, be counterproductive and lead to totally 
different and unexpected consequences. Thus, when the end justifies the use of 
all means, or the means are chosen independently from the ends, there is the 
risk of falling into a dangerous vortex of ideologies, violence and pretension of 
infallibility. The more we move toward those extremes of vita contemplativa or 
fabrication, the greater the risk becomes of falling back into violence, separating 
means and ends, and forgetting the unpredictability of the outcome of an action. 
Instead, the present interpretation of nonviolence as a philosophy of praxis, a 
non-systematic revolutionary approach to the mode of human togetherness, is 
centred on a different idea of action, which takes into account both means and 
ends. 
Does this mean that the work of Sharp should be judged as mere fabrication, and 
thus excluded from our concept? Absolutely not. Nonviolence will never stop 
being unquiet, working at the extremes of fabrication and vita contemplativa. 
Indeed, nonviolence crosses the private, social and political spheres. 
Nonviolence without Sharp’s work would be reduced to mere dialogue between 
pure souls about abstract love or peace. This would be a paradox, as nonviolence 
cannot reject the social struggle, which is where it was born. Gandhian 
nonviolence was born in a struggle against colonisation, which included issues of 
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economic and social independence. South American Catholics used nonviolence 
in their social and political struggle. The same can be said for many nonviolent 
actors. Thus, it is true that nonviolence as a praxis works at the level of human 
relations, aware that governments and institutions are formed and conserved by 
concerted human actions, based on at least some kinds of recognition by citizens. 
Yet, the concept of nonviolence includes extreme actions, in which the existent 
social and political world should be demolished. The many struggles for 
independence and liberation around the world are certainly part of the praxis of 
nonviolence. In extreme cases, nonviolence can even mean a violent behaviour, 
or even death. Nevertheless, nonviolence does not delude itself into thinking that 
a nonviolent technique, or even violence, will eventually solve the problems of 
colonisation, exploitation from a class, or even slavery. Nonviolence has a strong 
constructive concern: the actual means should already include a proposal of what 
the aftermath of the struggle should be. The reason being that nonviolence is 
much more than a technique of action; it is a positive driver, the courage to 
interpret and intervene to foster liberation and openness. It is the opportunity for 
change, for ‘transcending the conflict’, as Galtung would say. Nonviolence is an 
action, which may coincide with a particular method of action or its opposite 
depending on the situation. It may be a strike or a reverse strike, standing still or 
protesting, non-cooperation or cooperation.   
At this point, an objection may emerge. Indeed, it appears that we are going 
against Arendt’s conception of praxis in saying that it includes the extremes of 
fabrication of democracy and contemplation. However, our interpretation is based 
on two assumptions. The first is that the concept of praxis proposed by Arendt is 
useful to us if it works not merely within a communicative model, but also in an 
expressive one85. The latter kind of model of action is agonal and heroic; “politics 
is viewed as an agonal encounter between actors who strive for recognition and 
glory” (D'Entrèves, 1994:11). Concerning nonviolence, it includes real struggles 
between sectors of the population for being visible and recognised as a political 
                                                          
85 I am aware of the critique of insensitivity to moral consideration of Kateb in his 1997 article: 
Freedom and Worldliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt, Political Theory 5(2):141-182. I am 
also aware of the reduction of Arendt’s action to a communicative model given by Habermas in 
Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power, Social Research 44(1):3-24. For an answer 
to these critiques see: Canovan, Margaret (1983), A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note 
on Habermas and Arendt, Political Theory 11(1):105-116; D’Entreves, Maurizio Passerin (1994) 
The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, New York:Routledge, p. 90-95 and p. 99-100. 
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and social actor, as well as human beings. To the contrary, a communicative 
model of action is accommodational and participatory; “politics is viewed as the 
collective process of deliberation and decision-making that rests on the arts of 
persuasion and mutual accommodation” (D'Entrèves, 1994:11). This is much 
closer to discussions about principles and forms of nonviolence visible in less 
extreme and more democratic environments. 
The second assumption is that the praxis of nonviolence is impure. Indeed, it 
includes less than perfect methods of action and interpretations of the principle. 
The reason for this is twofold. For a start, nonviolence as a praxis is a driver which 
is fully mired into everyday human life. This means first and foremost that it deals 
not only with the force of production, but with the tragedy of humanity, in particular 
pain, mistakes and death. It is not by chance that one of its opposites is 
cowardice, which we can describe as the acceptance of necessity and of the 
cruelty of nature. The other reason is that the circumstances of life are not perfect. 
Nonviolence is an action within an imperfect society, which rarely produces 
perfect behaviours, absolute principles, and even pure modes of human 
togetherness. Thus, nonviolent praxis directly faces the environment of violence 
and imperfection, slowly trying to build up an alternative with new methods and 
new interpretations of the principle. 
Working between struggles, deliberation and decision-making, nonviolence 
makes sense only if it is conceived of as being an impure praxis. Indeed, it ranges 
from small issues tackled in a collaborative environment, to important actions of 
liberation and openness, keeping together reason and passion, action and talk, 
conflict and deliberation, recognition and participation. It would be a mistake to 
expect only pure actions of nonviolence. It would be a mistake to expect that a 
rigid adherence to a principle, as well as to a list of methods of action, will lead to 
pure forms of nonviolence. It would be a mistake to think of nonviolence as limited 
to overthrowing regimes. Even in democratic regimes, during rational democratic 
discussions to achieve consensus, nonviolence may well be present. Indeed, the 
praxis of nonviolence acknowledges that “agreement, when it occurs, is always 
non-consensual to some extent” (Tully, 1999:170). Thus, echoing Gramsci, and 
more recently Bernard Williams (Hall, 2015:8), we can claim that nonviolence 
makes sense only if conceived of as an impure praxis. Depending on the 
circumstances, nonviolence changes radically. What remains constant is an 
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impure praxis, a courageous, imperfect and criticisable effort to reduce violence 
as well as create a different society. 
The fact that nonviolence is impure does not mean giving up its ambitions, or its 
ends. To the contrary, it is by action that human beings can create something 
new, strive for more liberation from the chains of reality and openness to the 
existent. In order to better describe these two tensions, we will again refer to 
Arendt. The concepts of liberation and openness outlined by Capitini strongly 
resemble what Arendt called freedom and individuality, or plurality. Indeed, 
freedom is not mere liberum arbitrium; it is far from being a reduction to a life of 
pleasure; it is exactly the opposite of reducing human action to a passive follower 
of necessity. “Freedom emerges out of – or merges with – necessity” (Bernstein, 
1977:146). This means that an action is free when it is an interruption of 
necessity, of both the biological necessity embedded in natural life, which is a 
force that leads to death, as well as of the historical necessity. Arendt recognised 
that these forms of necessity exist. Nevertheless, human beings do not have to 
suffer them passively. Freedom is “the capacity to begin, to start something new, 
to do the unexpected, with which all human beings are endowed by virtue of being 
born” (D'Entrèves, 1994:66). Nevertheless, freedom cannot be achieved without 
plurality. It is only through the other’s sight and judgment that action becomes a 
meaningful activity. Action can only exist in a context defined by plurality. 
Freedom is the “public, political intercourse with one’s peers, as a reciprocal 
sharing of words and deeds, as the mutual endeavour to reach agreement on 
matters of collective concern” (D'Entrèves, 1994:177), which cannot be realised 
without the “paradoxical plurality of unique beings” (Arendt, 1998:176). Plurality 
is “the fact that men, not Man, live on earth and inhabit the world” (Arendt, 1998:7-
8). It is both equality and distinction (Arendt, 1998:175-6); it is the 
acknowledgment that human beings belong to the same species, and therefore, 
they are sufficiently similar enough to understand each other; at the same time, 
“no two of them are ever interchangeable, since each of them is an individual 
endowed with a unique biography and perspective on the world” (D'Entrèves, 
1994:70). Plurality is required when acting in order to preserve “the world of 
human affairs from the corruption and decay it would be subject to were it left to 
the automatism of natural processes” (D'Entrèves, 1994:67).  In other words, 
plurality is the conditio per quam of political life; “we are all the same, that is, 
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human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever 
lived, lives, or will live” (Arendt, 1998:8). 
To summarise, nonviolence emerged in these pages as an impure praxis 
enhancing freedom and plurality. With this term we mean a non-systematic 
revolutionary philosophical approach, a day by day work of reinterpretation and 
shaping of reality in different contexts and times, with different ideas and 
techniques, in order to foster freedom from necessity and plurality, which is the 
openness to the ‘paradoxical plurality of unique beings’. This mode of human 
togetherness includes moments of dramatic disruption of the status quo. The 
reason is that nonviolence is always an impure praxis, because it is an effort that 
deals with the tragedy of humanity and takes place in a less than perfect reality. 
This means for instance that social struggle, and thus the work of the pragmatic 
school, are and should be fully included.  
At this point, another objection may emerge. We claimed that nonviolence is a 
praxis that is more than mere behaviour or principle. At the same time, we kept 
the tension between a principled and pragmatic dimension with the adjective 
impure. This is not enough, because our interpretation of nonviolence comes 
before the division between principled and pragmatic, meaning that it will 
inevitably change them. Yet, how? How are these two categories reinterpreted 
on the basis of our explanation? 
At the basis of Sharp’s definition of principled nonviolence lies some kind of 
obedience to a creed. Our conception of praxis rejects this approach. It also 
rejects any conception of nonviolence which involves “finding and cultivating an 
ostensibly non-violent region of the soul and learning how to live accordingly to 
its dictates” (Butler, 2009:171). Instead, we espouse that principled nonviolence 
is found in action. This means that principled nonviolence emerges from the unity 
of spirit and matter, action and values. It also means that it emerges from human 
tragedy, by which we mean the recognition of the imperfection of human beings, 
for instance in pain, mistake and death. This means also understanding the 
possibility of one’s own violence. As Butler rightly claimed, “violence is not 
foreign,” there are violent aspects even in the norms that shape any human being 
at the beginning of their journey, as well as there is the drive of aggression, of 
rage (Butler, 2009:170). Yet, there is a third point, which is already present in the 
idea of praxis: the interrelatedness of life. Nonviolence as a praxis includes the 
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idea that the life of each human being is related, at least in the fact that we share 
our limits. This means that ‘principled nonviolence’ is incompatible with forms of  
‘moral sadism’, meaning “a violence that righteously grounds itself in an ethics of 
purity wrought from the disavowal of violence” (Butler, 2009:177). Instead, 
nonviolence acts in the real world, which is dynamic and comprised of human 
relations.  
Within this framework, principled nonviolence may be reconceived as an 
intentional bottom-up action of actualisation of a public principle. For a start, it is 
a decision, a more or less intentional choice not to possibly accept the status quo. 
It is a principle in the sense of a “fundamental conviction that a group of people 
share,” which “moves human beings to act” (Cane, 2015:61). This conviction is 
that the current situation is intolerable. In particular, as Ricoeur would say, 
nonviolence emerges from the ‘intolerance of the mixture’ between violence and 
nonviolence (Ricoeur, 1965:233). Here we may say that nonviolence emerges as 
a conscious action, which is sparked by the intolerance of the mixture of passivity 
and freedom, closure and plurality, in a certain circumstance, and which aims to 
foster openness, or plurality, and liberation, or freedom. 
This action involves first what Capitini called the ‘acetic act’, which is similar to 
the concept of freedom, and also what the literature on nonviolence may call self-
restraint or self-limitation. Nonviolence requires self-restrain in at least two ways: 
refraining from aggressiveness and refusing to act without conviction. It is 
certainly required to halt personal aggressive, irrational, and brutal instincts. As 
Butler explained, “non-violence, when and where it exists, involves an aggressive 
vigilance over aggression’s tendency to emerge as violence” (Butler, 2009:170). 
Galtung described the drive of aggression as a sort of ‘self-assertion’, which 
implies an effort to change social relations. However, it turns into a problem when 
“it becomes a drive to hurt and harm others because they stand in the way of 
one’s own self-assertion” (Galtung, 1964:95). In other words, nonviolence is “a 
mired and conflicted position of a subject who is injured, rageful, disposed to 
violent retribution and nevertheless struggles against that action (often crafting 
the rage against itself)” (Butler, 2009:171). This idea implies that each person has 
a responsibility “to protect the other against its own destructive potential” (Butler, 
2009:177), because any action has effects on other human beings, causing 
unexpected reactions and processes.  
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However, pushing the idea of self-restraint a bit further, we claim that it means 
something more. Self-restraint is the moment in which a human being refuses to 
act without conviction, without being persuaded, and acknowledges that reality 
cannot be separated from values. This description may be linked with what 
Ricoeur would call “l’homme capable”, capable “of initiating new actions that are 
imputable to one as freely chosen activities” (Kaplan, 2008:3). A capable person 
is one who is able to do things, such as speaking, acting, suffering, recounting 
and being responsible, without forgetting his or her human vulnerability, or what 
Butler would call precariousness (Butler, 2009:181). 
Besides self-restraint, the actualisation of nonviolence is also what Capitini called 
the ‘ethical act’, which is motherly love, or openness to the other, to plurality. The 
other person is not an image of the mind, and is much more than her or his ideas; 
he is a gift. This idea of love includes the features that Martin Luther King  listed 
when describing it (King, 2010). It includes the capacity to forgive, which does 
not mean ignoring what happened, but averting the mistake of letting the event 
becoming a barrier, hindering reconciliation. Moreover, love implies the 
understanding that the other is more than his or her deeds, and that humiliation 
of the other should be avoided, as it could worsen the situation. These features 
are far from constituting a ‘belief system’. Forgiveness, reconciliation and 
avoiding humiliation are central to nonviolent struggles around the world, if they 
want to be a solution and not mere disruption. 
Nevertheless, the ethic act is also a great risk, which is intentionally taken. In 
comparison with the passive acceptance of the status quo, it is a risk to suffer, 
physically or not depending on the circumstance, and even to die. The risk is not 
only restrained to the self. It includes the risk of losing a friend or a fellow 
campaigner. This is evident looking at the many nonviolent revolutions around 
the world, at the Peace Corps, and at the actions of saints such as Francis of 
Assisi. For this reason, we agree with Devji about the fact that nonviolence 
implies the conviction that life is not an absolute value (Devji, 2011:270), as well 
as with Shridharani when claiming that nonviolence keeps open the drama of life 
or death (Shridharani, 1939:246). Does this claim clash with what is commonly 
described as the ‘sacredness of life’ (Abu-Nimer, 2015:39), which is considered 
to be a key feature of principled nonviolence? The answer is yes, if life means 
merely the survival of the body, and thus ‘sacredness of life’ means dogmatic 
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preservation of bodily life in any case. Instead, sacredness of life is at the centre 
of nonviolence if it means the refusal of reducing human beings to events, and 
therefore, it means the rejection of considering them as mere bodies to be kept 
alive. 
Not merely an action of freedom, or of self-restrain, and a risky ethical act of 
openness to plurality, the choice of nonviolence is also an opportunity. Indeed, 
nonviolence is an opportunity, a different perspective, a creative activity of 
interpretation and intervention in the world, realising an open and inclusive 
project. This does not mean focusing on the mental construction of the idea of a 
better world to eventually be ‘put in practice’. Nonviolence suggests the reverse. 
For instance, Havel explained that it is much better if “through the fact of your 
existence in the world, you create the idea or manifest it – create it, as it were, 
from the ‘material world’, articulate it in the ‘language of the world’” (Havel, 
1990:12). In this way, we can put “personal experience of human beings as the 
initial measure of things” (Havel, 1987:149). Instead of looking at general 
arguments of an abstract necessity based on hypothetical abstract case 
scenarios, human conscience and personal experience become central in the 
political sphere.  
The idea of a ‘religious act’ proposed by Capitini brings the action of nonviolence 
to an advanced level that is completely compatible with what we have described 
up until this point. As described above, action is always in a chain of actions and 
reactions, and thus nonviolence is already a collective enterprise. Capitini 
claimed that this collective enterprise includes the actions of those who are dead, 
and even those who are yet to be born. This sounds less dogmatic if considered 
from the point of view of the idea of praxis. Any principle is the sum of endless 
actions and reactions, and within this chain of events the actions of value 
performed by the dead still count; likewise, the intervention of future generations 
is already visible in current actions. For this reason, death is overcome practically 
in acts of values. In excellent actions we are part of a bigger community, which 
transcends the actual presence of its members. The lack of this religious 
dimension would make nonviolence purposeless. For this reason, present, past 
and future generations are part of any excellent action including self-restraint, the 
ethical act, and an open project.  
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The result of this excellent action is the bottom-up creation, or actualisation of a 
public principle. However, what do we mean by this statement? Public principle 
should be distinguished from particular motives, such as non-participation in a 
war, refusal to ever touch a weapon, mere non-lying or non-collaboration. The 
reduction of nonviolence to a particular motive would be dangerous. Arendt 
clearly stated that action “acts into a medium where every reaction becomes a 
chain reaction and where every process is the cause of new processes” (Arendt, 
1998:190). If nonviolence is reduced to a motive, it would lose its meaning when 
the latter was achieved, missed, or not appropriate anymore. It would be similar 
to saying that nonviolence misses its constructive drive, which cannot be limited 
to the fabrication of something, either the perfect revolution or a road. Moreover, 
nonviolence would be blind to the actual circumstances, which may dramatically 
change. When an end is discovered to be invalid or even counterproductive, it 
should be reconsidered. Finally, the focus on particular motives would inevitably 
move the attention to those who are against or even ruined the plan. This would 
represent a great mistake, as a key feature of nonviolence is turning the attention 
from the person to the actual issue.  
For this reason, nonviolence is a principle that includes the opportunity for further 
reassessment and modification of aims. It is a different perspective, a principle, 
but only in the way in which Arendt refers to it86.  
“In distinction from its goal, the principle of an action can be repeated time and 
again, it is inexhaustible, and in distinction from its motive, the validity of a 
principle is universal, it is not bound to any particular person or to any particular 
group” (Arendt, 1978:152).  
This means that the principle of nonviolence is something that inspires people, 
without prescribing particular goals. It may inspire actions, and it becomes 
                                                          
86 The concept of principle in Arendt has been object of extensive discussion, which is not the 
main issue here. This thesis is inspired by the interpretation of principle in Arendt provided by 
Lucy Cane in her article Hannah Arendt on the Principles of Political Action, and the working 
paper by Wolfhart Totschnig titled Unpredictable yet Guided, Amoral yet Normative: Arendt on 
Principled Action, available online at the address http://ptw.uchicago.edu/Totschnig11.pdf (last 
accessed on the 4th February 2015). Both these scholars try to move forward from earlier debates 
on the topic, and underline the irreducibility of Arendt’s interpretation of principle to simple moral 
principles as we are used to see. For instance, see: Kateb (2000), Political Action. Its Nature and 
Disadvantages, in: The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. By Villa, D., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 130-148; Benhabib, S. (1988), Judgment and the Moral Foundations 
of Politics in Arendt’s Thought, Political Theory 16(1):29-51.  
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manifest only when placed into action. Nevertheless, it judges any goal to the 
extent to which it exemplifies and sustains a principle in a particular set of 
circumstances.  
Let us retrace our steps. Principled nonviolence is not about a moral standard, a 
sentiment, a motive, and it does not prescribe or hinder anything. It emerged as 
an intentional bottom-up actualisation of a public principle, an excellent action, 
which is at the same time freedom, or self-restraint, plurality, or ethical openness 
to the others, and an opportunity to enter into a bigger community that transcends 
the actual presence of its members. The key feature of nonviolence as a public 
principle is the ability to judge a certain goal or a certain customary behaviour as 
adapt or not in a certain situation, fostering freedom and plurality. Nonviolence is 
a principle which shapes, reshapes, and reassesses customs, and therefore, it is 
more a question of judgment than of ‘belief systems’.  
Judgment should not be confused with the kind of criticism made “to show hostility 
and contempt to speak or even to think negatively and critically” as that “would 
be to give in to the spiritual flaws that underlie violence, to have the wrong 
conception of moral judgment” (Bilgrami, 2003:4161). Nonviolence looks at 
universality, because the other is important, but it does not fall into what Bilgrami 
would call ‘universalisability’, which implies the attempt to force the other to 
accept our own view. From this distinction it does not necessarily follow that 
nonviolence is only an exemplary action without “a clear sense of its political 
relevance” (Mantena, 2012b:15). The opposite is true. Nonviolence as a praxis 
intervenes in reshaping and transforming political relationships. This intervention 
means having the capacity to stick to an idea or action in certain moments, and 
to not give up easily. This is the reason that led many works on nonviolence to 
compare it with military virtues. Indeed, intervening in action to foster a principle 
requires courage, prudence, and loyalty. We agree with Shridharani in claiming 
that “like war, Satyagraha demands public spirit, self-sacrifice, organization, 
endurance and discipline for its successful operation” (Shridharani, 1939:19). 
These virtues are required exactly because nonviolence is a public principle. 
Recently, nonviolence has been described as the decision to “walk the line” 
(Butler, 2009:182), to reject necessity and cruelty by attempting to be virtuous. 
Walking the line means first “to live the line, the impasse of rage and fear, and to 
find a mode of conduct that does not seek to resolve the anxiety of that position 
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too quickly through a decision” (Butler, 2009:182), most of the time a violent 
action. At the same time, this different mode of conduct should not be confused 
with purity. Indeed, as Ricoeur asks, “what advantage is there for a man to refuse 
to kill and accept death in order not to soil his hands? For what does his purity 
matter? Is he pure if all others are unclean?” (Ricoeur, 1965:228). Nonviolence 
is valid only if it intervenes in reality, if it is an action aimed at changing the status 
quo. In other words, “if non-violence is to have meaning, it must fulfil it within the 
history which it at first transcends” (Ricoeur, 1965:228). Nevertheless, this has 
nothing to do with utopianism, with a naïve approach to life like the Candide of 
Voltaire. As Vaclav Havel would claim, “a heaven on earth in which people all 
love each other and everyone is hard-working, well-mannered, and virtuous, in 
which the land flourishes and everything is sweetness and light, working 
harmoniously to the satisfaction of God: this will never be”. Nevertheless, “it 
makes sense to wage this war persistently” (Havel, 1992:16). 
If principled nonviolence is reinterpreted as the intentional bottom-up action of 
actualisation of a public principle, such as a decision to ‘walk the line’, pragmatic 
nonviolence also acquires a different meaning. Our approach rejects the idea that 
a technique of action, independent from the context and the subject’s intention, 
may be considered nonviolence. Nonviolence as a praxis certainly includes the 
many techniques listed by Sharp, as well as the many studies on contentious 
politics. Nevertheless, the analysis of the Italian Peace March made clear that a 
protest-to-project cannot be reduced to the implementation of various behaviours 
extracted from a list. Instead, it was an attempt to enter the many cracks within 
Italian society to shape and reinterpret certain ways of doing things. In other 
words, it is possible to claim that nonviolence as an impure praxis is the decision 
to act in the real world through ‘protest-to-projects’, and thus through 
reinterpretation and shaping of old practices, as well as the establishment of new 
ones.  
The substitution of the term behaviour with the term practice may look pedantic. 
Nevertheless, the fact that pragmatic nonviolence looks at practices implies some 
key theoretical stances. Indeed, the focus would be less on singular behaviours 
of individuals and more on current and possible ‘social relations’, patterns of 
actions, realities, or ways of doing things. First, this means that any analysis 
should look at both the local context, as any practice is contextually embedded, 
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and at the general context, because we are talking about patterns of actions. 
Practices are performances between other performances, and this means that 
they have “no existence other than in their unfolding process” (Adler and Pouliot, 
2011:7). In their unfolding, practices wave together the discursive and material 
world, acquiring different meanings depending on the particular circumstances. 
At the same time, these performances are, and should be, socially recognized 
and socially meaningful, as well as be more or less ‘competent’, which means 
that they have to stem from detailed knowledge of the actual situation, along with 
the other current practices. Second, when we talk about practices we refer to a 
flow of practices eliciting practices eliciting practices. Practices are “socially 
meaningful patterns of action” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011:6) working within a 
complex net of other practices. Thus, it would be wrong to isolate the ‘physical 
level’ from the moral and religious, as well as not trying to enlarge the debate at 
the level of social processes. Finally, from the perspective of an analysis of 
practices the aim is not to tell the truth about how the ‘real’ nonviolent process 
works, but to be useful in making sense of all these practices. 
The point of view of practices may result useful for our discussion on nonviolence. 
From the analysis of Capitini, pragmatic nonviolence emerged as a logic, a 
method, a style of action. Here, we can go further, saying that the analyses of 
excellent actions are building a logic, an approach, a certain kind of ‘knowledge’ 
through which we can interpret (and direct) current practices as well as establish 
new ones. These practices are the most different, ranging from examples of 
community organisations, techniques to overthrow or defend regimes, models of 
education, approaches to deal with the excluded and the weak in society. 
Nevertheless, there are common points.  Drawing from the example of the peace 
march, we can suggest here some coordinates, some key points in the way in 
which nonviolence shapes and reinterprets practices. These coordinates may 
represent a framework with which nonviolence interprets and intervenes under 
particular circumstances. The underlying rational of this framework is the refusal 
of oppression and division, which are produced by, or at the basis of, certain 
practices. This means that the first coordinate is a realistic analysis of the 
situation in order to find cracks and forms of oppression as well as the right time 
and place for a possible action. As the peace march was backed by an analysis 
of the many practices that were dividing Italy, in the same vein pragmatic 
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nonviolence starts with a detailed analysis of the current practices, which does 
not stop at the physical level. 
After this analysis, nonviolence looks for a second coordinate, which is personal 
responsibility. Does the current practice enhance or impair personal 
responsibility? With this concept, we mean both the capacity of being able to 
choose and cause our own actions, as well as being morally accountable. Its 
meanings remind us of the idea of self-restraint as refraining personal aggressive, 
irrational and brutal instincts, and refusing to act without conviction as well as 
without values. This is also called by the scholarship ‘nonviolent discipline’. Thus, 
nonviolence fosters a work of preparation and knowledge of the many habits of 
society; the awareness of the unintended consequences of any human act, 
especially the violent ones; the exercise in operational planning, the deep 
importance of pride and egotism over reason and rationality in the conflict for 
power. It stresses the importance of developing the capacity to choose and 
deliberate, “the capacity of self-advice,” and is destined for immediate application 
based on a praxis (Couceiro-Bueno, 2011:187). Nonviolence takes so seriously 
personal responsibility that in extreme cases it even requires that life be put at 
risk, in particular the agent’s life.  
The stress on the person is balanced by an equal focus on the others, on 
everybody. Indeed, the third coordinate focuses on the power of all. In particular, 
is the actual practice enhancing or marring the ‘power of all’? How can we move 
forward with the power of all in this situation? These questions include an analysis 
of actions fostering plurality. It means reflecting on numbers; on ways of 
empowering citizens with instruments of participation; on decreasing the impact 
of repression as well as accelerating defection of the adversary; on the kind of 
leadership in place; on the ways in which confrontations may be solved while 
maintaining a link with the enemy, ‘transcending the conflict’ when possible. This 
does not mean an a priori and dogmatic rejection of any form of violence. As 
Galtung perfectly claimed violence may be introduced “like an induced TBC once 
a week producing anti-bodies that may also prevent cancer of the prostate” 
(Webel and Galtung, 2007). The struggle is in finding new actions that will spread 
power and empower citizens, without causing deeper fractures and hatred in 
society.  
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Finally, the last coordinate is to have an open-project, a ‘grand strategy’, a vision 
of tomorrow which is always in progress and in need of the positive contribution 
of everybody. Any excellent action is not the realisation of a personal plan; it is 
not closed to the possibility of further reconsideration of the ends to produce a 
new society. Thus, the problem does not end with overthrowing a dictator, having 
the right to vote, spreading vegetarianism or even establish democratic 
institutions; in fact, these are temporary ends, which represent only the beginning. 
Nonviolence is the conviction that only through sharing responsibility (in common 
projects) practices can last. This paradoxically means that no practice is 
necessary. There should always be the possibility to recognise that ‘yesterday 
we were violent’, and to stress the creative power of human beings in society. 
This is a great opportunity, as it means that a lasting order can be created through 
a continuous renegotiation of practices (it is not enough to have the number to 
protest; the participation of the largest amount of people is needed to create 
stability), and thus through a constructive programme. This is the way for the 
construction via facti of a different society. This fourth coordinate inevitably 
includes a reflection on symbols and cultures. Is this practice imposing a specific 
culture, religion, doctrine, project or idea? Indeed, nonviolence as a praxis of 
liberation and openness challenges reality in finding practical ways of adopting 
values, without forcing others to convert themselves.  
To summarize, nonviolence as a praxis seeks ways to intervene in reality making 
realistic analyses of a situation, enhancing personal responsibility, the power of 
all, and by creating open and inclusive projects. This framework cannot be 
described as a rigid doctrine. Instead, this product of the praxis of nonviolence 
can be conceived of as an ‘art of judgment’ on how to act, what to look at in 
particular times and in a particular place. Consequently, when we think of 
nonviolence as an impure praxis we think of a ‘style of action’(Galtung, 1965:230), 
a “style of activism” (Clark, 2015:58), a blueprint (Popovic, 2015), which is already 
an ideology, if with this term we mean a non-systematic approach to, or a 
mapping of, reality. With Saul Alinsky, we can say that nonviolence is “you do 
what you can with what you’ve got” (Clark, 2015:58). This style acknowledges the 
uncertainty of the future. The wisdom of nonviolence depends on the self in a 
world that is beyond our control. There is a possibility to learn, but it makes no 
sense to rigidly repeat patterns of behaviours. It is the unity of life and experience 
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which provides us with the tools necessary to act. In other words, the kind of 
knowledge that is created is not a sort of technical knowledge, or techne’. It is a 
mistake to look for a fixed list of nonviolent practices that can always be used 
independently from the circumstances. At the same time, the kind of knowledge 
created cannot be defined as being general, theoretical, context-independent 
knowledge, called episteme (Brown 2012:446). The analysis, interpretation, and 
reshaping of existent practices, as well as the construction of new ones, moves 
the stress towards the ‘art of judgment’, which balances techniques and values.  
The fact that pragmatic nonviolence cannot provide us with a list of things to do 
does not mean that it produces no knowledge at all. Nonviolence has the potential 
and actually produces a sort of practical wisdom, of phronesis. Phronesis can be 
defined as “concrete, practical, context-dependent knowledge” (Brown 
2012:446). It has to do with deliberation on “the truth, involving reason, concerned 
with action about things that are good or bad for a human being” (1140b5). It is 
also about “knowledge of the particulars, since it is concerned with action and 
action is about particulars” (Brown, 2012). Theorists draw a certain kind of 
knowledge from nonviolent actions. This acquired knowledge is not a simple list 
of methods to use. It includes many methods of struggle, but also trainings on 
resilience, suggestions on how to interpret (in a more efficient way) a situation, 
examples from the past from which to take inspiration. From a continuous process 
of reinterpreting old practices and proposing new ones, a new very effective 
‘wisdom’ is developed. Thereby, nonviolence produces a sort of phronesis. 
Phronesis  
“unquestionable involves learning to do things as they should be done and to face 
complex situations: it is foresight for the future, the capacity to learn lessons from 
the past in order to foresee what lies ahead in a world full of uncertainty” 
(Couceiro-Bueno, 2011:187).  
Re-conceiving pragmatic nonviolence as a sort of phronesis triggers important 
consequences for its relationship with the principled dimension. Indeed, the 
pragmatism of this category means that there are no systems of belief to adhere 
to. However, it does not mean that this approach may not be described as a 
political ideology. Indeed, pragmatic nonviolence is still part of a non-systematic 
revolutionary approach that interprets and intervenes in a dynamic reality. In other 
words, pragmatic nonviolence is part of the idea of nonviolence as a praxis. This 
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means that the two categories, principled and pragmatic nonviolence, live 
together and necessitate each other. Any action that aims to realise the public 
principle of nonviolence represents an attempt to interpret and reshape current 
practices. Thus, the more principled nonviolence works in its research of 
virtuosity, in its reflections and deeds, the more the phronetic knowledge of 
pragmatic nonviolence is enhanced. In particular, the serious commitment of 
principled nonviolence is necessary in order to work for years on finding 
alternatives and less violent ways of living together. It is not surprising to find that 
at the centre of the pragmatic school of thought there are scholars such as Sharp 
or Lackey, as well as actors, such as Gandhi, King, San Suu Kyi and many others, 
who are so much committed to look like clear examples of principled nonviolence.  
Turning to pragmatic nonviolence, its practical wisdom is necessary to shape and 
reinforce new generations, new choices, and new commitments. The actual level 
of practical wisdom, the actual knowledge of new and old practices, represents 
the basis for any individual choice to walk the line, for the implementation of any 
values or principles. Any judgment is formed and transformed in light of other 
people’s opinions. Pragmatic nonviolence includes new methods of education, of 
community, as well as conflicts of political action. This background may be crucial 
in many cases to shape, help and foster principled nonviolence.  
Thus, principled and pragmatic nonviolence are different perspectives of the 
same impure praxis of freedom and plurality. Freedom is fostered by actions of 
self-restraint and analyses of practices enhancing personal responsibility; 
plurality is shaped through ethical acts and the research on the power of all. The 
aim is common: an open-ended and inclusive project, which is enlightened by 
always new excellent actions. 
To conclude, this section offered a way to overcome the division between 
behaviour and ideal, as well as the means and the ends produced by Sharp’s 
definition. We interpreted nonviolence as an impure praxis, a non-systematic 
revolutionary approach to enhance freedom and plurality. This definition allowed 
us to reconceive principled and pragmatic nonviolence as an intentional bottom-
up action of actualisation of a public principle, and a practical wisdom, a 
phronesis. Thanks to this reinterpretation, the right balance between the means 
and the ends was achieved. Principled and pragmatic nonviolence are 
complementary, two sides of the same coin, two ways of looking at the same 
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revolutionary praxis. Nonviolence is now a reunited concept, a force for change, 
which can no longer be confused with pure souls or new weapons deployed for 
old ends.  
 
 5.2. Transformative Realism for Order with Life 
Nonviolence as praxis of freedom and plurality is a valid way to overcome the 
division between behaviour and ideal and to reconcile means and ends. However, 
we believe that our approach to nonviolence is also helpful to overcome the 
problems at the praxeological level as described in the second section of chapter 
two: avoid the focus of disruption, as well as the risk of falling into duragraha.  
Let’s begin with the first issue, which concerns the political attitude of 
nonviolence. It is already quite clear that nonviolence as a praxis does not focus 
on the destruction of a society, but it is inherently constructive, embedding an 
alternative path. Some may interpret this constructive drive, this lack of distinction 
between means and ends, as the proof that nonviolence may be reduced to a 
form of ‘prefigurative politics’ (Smith, 2015, Yates, 2014). As we claimed above, 
the meaning of this term is quite vague. It is mainly opposed to strategic politics, 
in which there is no means-end equality, and it broadly refers to the “attempted 
construction of alternative or utopian social relations in the present, either in 
parallel with, or in the course of, adversarial social movement protest” (Yates, 
2014:1). Nonviolence as praxis has certainly a lot in common with this approach, 
but it is now clear that it cannot be reduced to that. It has already been described 
how nonviolence is more than a way in which a protest is performed, as it is much 
more than a set of techniques. Besides, it is true that nonviolence is an inspiration 
for the building of alternative movement or institutions. However, not all 
alternatives are nonviolence, and nonviolence is not always an alternative. There 
are occasions in which alternative institutions proposed by some movements are 
clearly the opposite of a praxis of freedom and plurality. For instance, the article 
of Yates looked at the practice of squatting, which is quite distant from the ‘style 
of action’ proposed by nonviolence. Finally, we already described that 
nonviolence does not look for utopias to implement here and now; it is a 
meticulous work of reinterpretation and shaping of practices. This also means 
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that nonviolence may sometimes be much closer to the police which re-
established the order, rather than to a movement which went too far.  
It should be clear now that nonviolence may manifest itself in actions of 
prefigurative politics, but it is much more than that. Nonviolence is a praxis. It is 
excellent actions and practical wisdom, aimed at reinterpreting and shaping 
reality enhancing freeom and plurality towards an always inclusive and open 
project. At the political level, we are referring to those activities that are “not only 
linked to understanding, explaining and acting in international relations but also 
transforming those relations to help constitute a more ethical, just and sustainable 
world order” (Gill, 2012:506). Thus, we are dealing with a real transformative 
political approach, which has been described by Capitini as walking in-between 
‘realism and serenity’.  
Taking seriously Capitini’s suggestion, we easily find that many of the people 
cited earlier have been described as realist. For instance, Gandhi has been 
described by Mantena as a political realist (Mantena, 2012a). The same label has 
been attached to Gene Sharp (Engler, 2013) and James Tully (Honig and Stears, 
2011, Finlayson, 2015). Even Hannah Arendt has been described as a realist 
(Bernstein, 1977). It is not the place here to debate to what extent these persons 
are really realist. What matters is that these authors may help us to portrait some 
key features of this new kind of realism.  
For a start, nonviolence as impure praxis of freedom and plurality is certainly a 
realism which is grounded in reality but open to novelty and virtues, as Bernstein 
defined Arendt’s approach (Bernstein, 1977:151). Her “counsel of realism” was 
in fact to “look for the unforeseeable and unpredictable”, without withdrawing from 
the political arena. In the same vein, our interpretation of nonviolence works in-
between realism and serenity, between reality and openness to novelty and 
virtues. This means that it is not able to prescribe any precise solution before a 
serious analysis of the situation. Nonviolence takes into account the key concerns 
of political realism, such as circumstances, agent capacities, interests, and roles 
(Philp, 2010). It does not forget the importance of starting from “an account of our 
existing motivations and our political and social institutions (not from a set of 
abstract ‘right’ or from our intuitions)” (Geuss, 2008:59). At the same time, 
nonviolence does not accept any sorts of eternal necessity, which would guide 
events, as well as any claim that nothing new happens under the sun. Exactly the 
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opposite. It is in action that there are opportunities for change, novelty and 
freedom.  
Mired in reality and craving for change, our interpretation of nonviolence is 
incompatible with arrogant attitudes of thinking of someone as being super 
partes. To the contrary, nonviolence presents a courageous way to be concrete 
and ‘partisan’, preparing an “ethico-political response” to the many problems of 
society (Bell, 2008:5), in particular those of state authority and the modern nation 
state, taking the vantage point of the victims. Being partisan means, as Arendt 
warned, being aware of the fact that it is extremely difficult to know “whether the 
virtues of political action or its terrible vices will be manifested” (Bernstein, 
1977:151), and nonetheless trying to do something.  
This attempt has been marvellously described by Karuna Mantena. Recently, she 
made explicit that Gandhi should be interpreted as the proponent of a different 
kind of transformative realism. At the centre of this realism there is a peculiar 
interpretation of means and ends (Mantena, 2012a). Gandhi brought to the fore 
a new approach to the dyad means/ends. Instead of drawing normative 
guidelines from existing beliefs and constraints, resulting therefore in 
conservative actions, Gandhian realism, as well as Capitini’s and Arendt’s ones, 
analyses existing beliefs and constraints to prepare a reaction (Mantena, 
2012a:462). From Gandhi’s perspective, what is becomes the more suitable 
means for an end, and thus it is a description linked to an action and a purpose. 
It is still a description, based on what actually happens around us, but it enters in 
a circle thanks to which it can change. Similarly, what ought to be starts by 
meaning pursuing one end through the right action, on the basis of the best 
description of reality possible (Mantena, 2012a). In other words, ends are the 
consequences, and not general and abstract ideas to implement.  
This approach is exactly how nonviolence works. Indeed, it implies profound 
attention to strengths and limits of human actions, but at the same time it 
struggles to move beyond. It is from this realistic approach, which emphasise the 
potential of action along with the link between means and ends, that nonviolence 
offers new opportunities, redrawing the classical boundaries of politics. We have 
already clarified that the boundaries between the social and the political are not 
respected by nonviolence. Nonviolent social struggles turns the social into 
political. This means first that nonviolence as impure praxis creates space for 
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politics even when there is none. Arendt claimed that nonviolence needs some 
pre-existing “space of politics and therefore for power” (Frazer, 2008:102). 
Indeed, she claimed that nonviolence could not have been effective against anti-
political regimes, such as Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia. This idea is based 
on the fact that Arendt reserved to violence the role of dealing with cases of 
extreme violence, as well as to open up space for politics. Instead, nonviolence 
as praxis starts from the belief that this assumption is not absolute. It is true that 
violence may be required in some precise circumstances, but this can change in 
future. Nonviolent research already revealed the success of some nonviolent 
actions against Nazism. These episodes are the signal that Arendt’s assumption 
is already not an absolute truth. Indeed, the praxis of nonviolence is a meticulous 
work which makes this assumption more and more contested.  
The redrawing of the boundaries of politics go together with the redrawing of the 
boundaries between private and public. This means that nonviolence is a praxis 
which looks at progressive inclusion in the public sphere of actors who were 
excluded or simply not taken into consideration before. Indeed, nonviolent actions 
also comprises of conflicting actions, in which emerge new identities as well as 
ways of life once invisible and excluded (Norval, 2012). Besides, the progressive 
shaping of reality through virtuous actions will inevitably include those who cannot 
take part in public life, such as the ill, the weak, the old, the child, and even the 
past and future generations. Therefore, nonviolence is based on the necessity of 
de-reification of the private/public dichotomy (Pantham, 1983:174), promoting the 
idea that personal judgment and the state are not two opposing forces. The state, 
with its many institutions and bureaucracies, as well as its radical groups, is 
constructed from the practices of citizens, officials, protestors, politicians and 
professionals, who chose to accept the status quo or walk the line. New choices 
to walk the line, as well as new practices, may create a different society. 
To summarise, nonviolence as impure praxis develops a transformative kind of 
realism, which is grounded in reality but looks at novelties; reinterprets is and 
ought as the analysis of means towards ends; enhances the political and enlarges 
the public sphere. In other words, the kind of realism developed by the praxis of 
nonviolence aims to integrate the status quo, which is somehow imperfect, with 
new ways to live and enlarge the social and political life of a community. In this 
sense, nonviolence represents the integration of what James Tully called ‘diverse 
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citizenship’. In his Public Philosophy in a New Key, the American scholar found 
in Gandhi an example of ‘diverse citizenship’, which is a kind of ‘global citizenship’ 
looking at citizenship not as a status but a praxis. With this term the author does 
not mean the passive process of taking a practice of civic activity as a form of 
organisation; he means the continuous process of forming and negotiating 
practices of actors and activities in context. We can add that this activity is not 
opposed to the idea of citizenship as a status. To the contrary ‘diverse citizenship’ 
works to create, defend, or reinterpret some status, in particular on behalf of those 
who cannot participate.  
Within this praxis, Tully claims that nonviolence represents one of the “most 
important activities today” (Tully, 2008:294). It is important because this kind of 
practical citizenship does not aim at imposing one precise vision of citizenship 
and peace, whether through coercion or discussion. It is not based on 
augmenting antagonism, distrust and fear. To the contrary, nonviolence is a 
different way of building up a peaceful society, contributing to overcome distrust 
and powerlessness. Nonviolence is therefore an approach whose premise is the 
existence of some sort of civic relationship in any culture, along with a 
“courageous and disarming comportment of groundless trust” (Tully, 2008:294-
5), which alone can initiate a “reciprocal, pre-linguistic response,” which is the 
basis for any relationship and negotiation.  
This different kind of citizenship leads to the formation of trust among citizens, 
and to the empowerment of people. Trust is one of the key factors in organising 
a revolution. For instance, it is not by chance that the core founding members of 
the Serbian Otpor! Movement were all close friends since high school. “The close 
interpersonal ties the members shared laid the foundation for the core activist 
group that would go on to plan the nationwide movement”. This is extremely 
important as there was a kernel of trust which spread. “This meant that the 
amount of time activists spent together strengthened the bonds between them 
and increased the likelihood of success” (Popovic and Alvarez, 2015:108).  
Trust and empowerment will inevitably have a revolutionary impact on the society. 
They will produce more and more “features of social life – networks, norms and 
trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
objectives” (Putnam, 1996), it will enhance the “sense of belonging to a 
neighbourhood, caring about people who live there, and believing that people 
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who live there care about them” (Portney and Berry, 2001:71). In particular, it will 
enhance reciprocity, without forcing anyone. In one concept, the risky praxis of 
nonviolence creates social capital. This means that nonviolence will not end with 
the obsession of the substitution of those in power with a different group. The 
conquest of an office is not the aim of the praxis of nonviolence. To the contrary, 
the integration of social capital into society will qualitatively change the different 
institutions, making them less and less central for the good of the community. 
Thus, the impure praxis of nonviolence integrates society with diverse citizenship 
and social capital. The problem now is: it is clear that the risks of falling into 
realpolitik and moralism is averted, but what about the crisis of democracy? The 
crisis of democracy manifests itself in the apathy of citizens, who in the best case 
scenario are merely able to monitor those in government; in the defence of 
positions of privilege by political parties; and in the inefficiency of governments to 
constrain powerful minorities. How is nonviolence going to deal with these 
issues? From the perspective outlined up to now, we can claim that democracy 
is dangerously evolving into what Havel would call a new form of ‘order without 
life’, in which there is no place for the ‘aims of life’, humans’ dreams of peace and 
self-realization, dignity, free expression, expression of individual, group, or 
spiritual interest, harmony with one’s self, security (Tucker, 2000:157). 
Nonviolence is precisely the effort of bucking these trends as well as moving 
towards a different direction freedom and plurality. Principled and pragmatic 
nonviolence work together to overcome citizens’ apathy, the dominion of political 
parties, and the private interests of powerful minorities.  
Indeed, citizens’ apathy is contrasted with an enormous work to foster freedom. 
This means first and foremost the analyses and improvement of current practices 
enhancing personal responsibility. The many revolutions around the world 
allowed millions of people to make a short step toward personal responsibility, 
from a condition of passive obedience and acceptance. Here the commitment of 
Gene Sharp and the pragmatic school has been and still is invaluable. The spread 
of a new phronesis, of techniques of civil disobedience has allowed people to 
protest effectively without using bullets and knives, putting at risk the existence 
of entire countries. Dictatorships have been overthrown, and battles have been 
won for the recognition of rights and minorities. Besides, the successes enhance 
trust in nonviolence, which in turn helps spreading this form of practical wisdom. 
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All this makes of nonviolence a real source of democratisation, and a starting 
point for something new.  
Nevertheless, the apathy of the citizens require also new actions of self-restraint. 
For what concerns democracy, these actions cannot be reduced to the spread of 
practices of dissent. These kinds of actions are important, especially to avoid 
democracy to fall back into dictatorship. However, nonviolence offers more. New 
actions are needed, which continuously retrain personal aggressive, irrational, 
brutal instincts as well as enhance values and personal persuasion. In other 
words, nonviolence lies in actions showing alternatives to necessity and cruelty 
and aiming at knitting the social rift. No fight against oppression or violence 
should forget that the aim is knitting the social rifts showing alternatives to 
necessity and cruelty. This implies a complex work both on citizens and on 
politicians. For what concerns the former, the process of knitting the social rift 
starts with actions paving the way for the substitution of the principles of control 
and discipline with those of self-control and self-discipline. Along with it, work 
should be done for the flourishing of a “culture in the widest possible sense of the 
world, including everything from what might be called culture of everyday life – or 
‘civility’ – to what we know as high culture, including the arts and sciences” 
(Havel, 1992:12). Turning to politicians, the necessity for realpolitik and the myth 
of always dirtier hands of politicians should be reversed with actions of always 
more self-restraint and accountability. For instance, in the first days of democracy 
in Czechoslovakia Havel was preaching that the tendency towards always ‘dirtier 
hands’ may be reversed by the concepts of ‘tact, proper instinct, and good taste’. 
“It is simply not true that a politician must lie or intrigue“ he claimed. It is “utter 
nonsense, spread about by people who – for whatever reasons – wish to 
discourage others from taking an interest in public affairs” (Havel, 1992:10). In 
particular, good taste is extremely important, in that “it means having a certain 
instinct for the time, the atmosphere of the time, the mood of the people, the 
nature of their worries, their frame of mind”. This is more important than for 
example holding a degree in political science. Good taste embeds qualities like 
fellow-feeling, the skill to talk to others, insight, the capacity to grasp quickly both 
problems and human characters, the ability to make contact, and a sense of 
moderation (Havel, 1992:11). 
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This complex work of freedom as self-restraint and enhancement of personal 
responsibility goes hand in hand with a long and hard work of plurality as ethical 
acts as well as enhancement of the power of all. This perspective does not 
distinguish between actions against and in favour of the state, because 
nonviolence looks at mode of human togetherness, at integrating human 
relations. Focusing on political parties, our perspective acknowledges that we are 
dealing with a very imperfect practice of participating in power. The literature on 
nonviolence share a negative evaluation of political parties. If we look at the 
medium and long term, most authors and activists would subscribe the Manifesto 
On the Abolition of All Political Parties written by Simone Weil (Weil, 2013), as 
well as the harsh critiques to parties’ behaviour by Havel.  
Nevertheless, nonviolence does not offer utopian alternative institutional 
architectures to implement. The aim is not to get rid of the enemies, to dominate 
over them. Nonviolence works integrating the existing reality with actions of 
forgiveness, reconciliation, avoiding humiliation. For what concerns political 
parties, nonviolence looks at overcoming strong divisions friends/enemies, 
creating actions which include more and more citizens in the decision making 
process, having the model of the assembly as inspiration for many different 
attempts to change the actual ways of doing things. This means on the one hand 
what Havel would call ‘anti-political politics’. With this term he meant both a 
method of spiritual survival under coercion and a political strategy of enhancing 
participation and liberty. It is an indirect, sometimes imperceptible work directed 
towards the reconstruction of civil society. This work manifests itself in a galaxy 
of different groups, associations and movements, ranging from Solidarity in 
Poland (Michnik, July 18, 1985) to the many transnational movements around the 
world. The many networks and movements promote a pro-active attitude, 
creating forums or experiments of communities, and contribute to the diffusion of 
techniques of nonviolent actions (on obviously different degrees), empowering 
citizens with tools to dissent. Here is where the pragmatic school did an 
invaluable job of analysis of more effective ways to act in order to put pressure 
on governments, and where there is already a debate about forgiveness, 
reconciliation, and avoiding humiliation.  
Instead, less studied are focused on attempts to propose different kinds of 
parties, showing that nonviolence cannot be reduced to fight against political 
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parties. Thus, we witness movements becoming parties, as well as parties 
becoming explicitly nonviolent. The German Green Party of Petra Kelly (Kelly, 
1984, Kelly, 1994), and to less extent also more recent parties such as Podemos 
and The 5 Stars Movement, may be considered examples of the first group; the 
Nonviolent Radical Party Transnational and Transparty is an example of the latter 
(Radaelli and Dossi, 2012). They are attempts to radically reinterpret and shape 
political parties with many features which enhance the power of all. They tend to 
transcend classical political cleavages in different ways, sometimes accepting 
only people who have never been members of a party; other times opting for non-
exclusive membership. They all fight for greater transparency and accountability. 
Some focus on territory, for instance with citizens’ councils; others on new 
technologies, as the Meetup and software such as Liquid Feedback; other focus 
more on helping right’s campaigns, fostering large and flexible networks. The aim 
is to ‘transcend the conflict’, creating a closer relation between representatives 
and citizens. Drawing the concept from Kelly, these parties can be rightly 
considered examples of ‘anti-party parties’, meaning a party which tries “to 
transform power in order to enable people to achieve self-determination in their 
lives”, as well as is  
“capable of choosing between morality and power, which uses creative civil 
disobedience to combat every form of repression, which combines audacious 
imagination with efficient working methods, and which recognizes the link 
between world peace and peace in every individual” (Kelly, 2001:159). 
The difficult job of enhancing personal responsibility and the power of all aims at 
promoting an inclusive open-ended project. Our approach may accept to refer to 
extreme disruptive actions as excellent actions in extreme circumstances. 
However, excellent actions are actions of extreme freedom and plurality, which 
include everybody, including past and future generations. For these reasons, 
nonviolence as a praxis of freedom and plurality aims to integrate the actual 
reality of domination of the private interests of small minorities. Yet, how? An 
inclusive open project may include some changes in the actual architecture of the 
state. Nevertheless, this cannot be the main issue, because we cannot confuse 
principles with goals or motives. This means that the solution of producing new 
and more stringent legislations against the dominion of giant corporations 
(Crouch, 2004) may be useful, but it is insufficient.  In the same vein, nonviolence 
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is not necessarily equal to ‘strong democracy’. There is obviously a strong link 
between the two, as the former is working towards something similar to a  
“self-governing community of citizens who are united less by homogenous 
interests than by civic education and who are made capable of common purpose 
and mutual action by virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions 
rather than their altruism or their good nature” (Barber, 2003:117).  
Yet, nonviolence is a realistic and impure praxis. It does not emerge from 
legislations or abstract visions of society; it blossoms from a bottom-up work of 
enhancement of personal responsibility, the power of all, and an open and 
inclusive project. It deals with a far from perfect world, and many times with 
heavily oppressive and violent regimes. Thus, nonviolence can prosper under 
any kind of regimes. It is a continuous work of bottom-up reinterpretation and 
shaping of current practices.  
What does this mean in relation to the power of elites, with skilful administrations 
and capital funding? It means creating new opportunities to keep everybody on 
board. Economically, it means creation and spread of new bottom-up ways of 
funding projects, running banks or business, creating and acquiring energy. It 
means reconsidering responsive theory and all the presuppositions on 
punishment, looking for alternative ways for compliance. It means fostering 
different ways to ‘transcend the conflict’, defending a country as well as 
intervening in international crises. 
All these efforts inevitably trigger some internal clashes. However, the aim is not 
to initiate a clash, based on principles, with experts and bureaucrats. They are 
necessary in this struggle; they are the necessary pillars of support for the 
construction of a new society. Thus, nonviolence does look for a new relationship 
between experts and citizens. These attempts of integrating power do not lead to 
a full rejection of technology or expertise. Capitini explained quite well that 
participation should not substitute for expertise. The aim is to integrate technology 
and expertise with the maximum of participation possible. In other words, the aim 
is to enhance and spread values, culture, art, education, aesthetics, in order to 
diminish the heavy price to be paid for progress. Moreover, simplification of life is 
to be praised, as well as it should be encouraged some sorts of rotation in those 
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technical jobs which do not require high expertise. This and other ideas would 
avoid fostering a closed and powerful group of experts and bureaucrats.   
Does this mean that a simple increase in participation is the panacea? Not at all. 
Nonviolence acknowledges that participation cannot be considered a panacea. 
We agree with Barber that there is an enormous distinction between masses, 
people, and citizens. People are not yet citizens as they do not belong to a mode 
of social being made of participation and community, and masses “are only 
nominal freemen who do not in fact govern themselves” (Barber, 2003:154). 
Nevertheless, the ‘diverse citizenship’ approach recognises the difficult and 
complex process of citizens’ formation. The aim of Capitini’s Liberalsocialist 
movement was to prepare citizens morally and intellectually, in order to be able 
to propose a real alternative to fascism. Besides, the diverse citizenship 
prospered by nonviolence acknowledges the fact that some cannot be full 
citizens. In this category we include many foreigners, the poor, the weak, the ill, 
and even the dead and the future generations.  
Therefore, actions enhancing participation both qualitatively and quantitatively is 
what nonviolence proposes. Thus, nonviolence may be considered a non-linear 
approach to politics, which does not seek institutional and constitutional solutions 
to the problems of democracy; the starting point of the non-linear approach is “the 
problematic of the social production of reflexive autonomous subjects” (Chandler, 
2014:46). The starting point is empowering individuals and communities, able to 
respond the world enhancing freedom and plurality. For this reason, “the 
democratic state thereby no longer stands above or separate to society but works 
to facilitate a more responsible or reflexive operation of plural and differentiated 
private judgment” (Chandler, 2014:43). The result is that nonviolence looks at 
democracy as “adaptive learning in societal sphere”, no more representation and 
contestation only (Chandler, 2014:50), and not necessarily as strong democracy. 
In practical term, nonviolence propose many examples of politicians87, 
businessmen, shareholders, leaders of local communities, workers or 
unemployed, who adopted and reinterpreted nonviolence in their own community 
and for their own aims. This is still a very understudied and underrated field of 
                                                          
87 There is no study which tries to compare and show similarities between the work of presidents 
such as Vaclav Havel or Zoran Djindjic; of party leaders such as Kelly or Pannella; of ministers, 
diplomats and others, who adapted nonviolence to institutional work.  
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nonviolence, mainly because of the present focus on protests and dissent. 
Nevertheless, they are the epitome of nonviolence as a phronesis.  
Nonviolence as impure praxis of freedom and plurality is a kind of ‘adaptive 
learning’ to overcome people’s apathy, the dominion of political parties as well as 
of powerful minorities. This means that nonviolence does not defend democracy 
a priori. The praxis of freedom and plurality, with its realist approach to problems, 
working in society through the continuous renegotiation of old practices as well 
as the establishment of new ones, looks also beyond democracy. Nonviolence is 
certainly compatible with discussion, deliberation, consensus, respect of rules, 
majority government, tolerance of minorities, and control of the government. 
Nevertheless, nonviolence establishes a ‘permanent tension’ in democracy 
(López, 2010:410), which does not exclude a priori to overcome democracy. In 
other words, nonviolence as a praxis of freedom and plurality reveals itself in a 
work of integration to democracy, of enhancement of the horizontal tension of the 
society towards inclusion, decentralisation and sharing of power, which aims at 
changing qualitatively democracy. Gandhi himself was looking for a radical form 
of democracy, “which he referred to as purna swaraj (complete or integral 
democracy), ramarajya (sovereignty of the people based on pure moral 
authority), or sarvodaya (a social order promoting the good of all)” (Pantham, 
1983:165). This radical democracy is described  not as a pyramid, but as an 
oceanic circle (Gandhi, 1997), ever-widening from the person to the ‘villages’, or 
more generally, the community and the world. More recently, Havel talked of 
‘post-democracy’ (Havel, 1985), which is something quite different from the post-
democracy described by Crouch. The new regime of post-democracy cannot be 
achieved through violence. What is needed is a continuous personal, bottom-up 
reconsideration, integration and a progressive substitution of the historically 
violent institutions, including those of the military, political, and even religious 
orders. This idea is close to Galtung’s nonviolent horizontal society (Galtung, 
1992), and to Capitini’s omnicracy. All these terms refer to the same work of 
change in the modes of human togetherness, change in the relations between 
human beings.  
To summarise, nonviolence as praxis of freedom and plurality is offering a 
challenging but stimulating path of ‘adaptive learning’ to the current democratic 
crisis of democracy, aimed at rebalancing what Havel called ‘order with life’. This 
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path offers self-restraint and personal responsibility; ethical acts and the power 
of all; excellent actions and open and inclusive projects, which may even 
overcome democracy as we know it now. 
 
5.3. Religion and Nonviolence: Towards the Assisi Presumption 
The balance between order and life, the process of adaptive learning should 
include everybody. Thus, it should include religious groups as well. As we have 
seen, the predictions of an extinction of religion revealed incorrect, and now 
religion is coming back in political science. Here we may even claim something 
more: a public dimension of religion is necessary for nonviolence and the 
construction of a new post-secular society.  
In order to do so, religion has to debunk the current ‘myth of religious violence’ 
and the linked Westphalian presumption. This is possible only through the change 
of perspective offered by nonviolence. Indeed, religion is more than ideas and 
ethical knowledge claims (Dillon, 2012), it cannot be reduced to “materially 
existing institutions organized for the pursuit of ‘religion’” (Hatzopoulos and Petito, 
2003:86); it is not a “menu of ideas and principles” (Hatzopoulos and Petito, 
2003:27). In other words, religion cannot be considered a “set of privately held 
doctrines or beliefs” (Hatzopoulos and Petito, 2003:25), or a choice of allegiance 
and obligation. Insufficient, as well, is the pre-modern definition of religion as a 
community of believers. Instead, the praxis of nonviolence looks at religion as a 
set of thought and action, principles and actions which is directed first and 
foremost to prepare a personal openness. From this perspective, religion is 
reinterpreted as what we called the ‘religious act’, the purest moment of freedom 
and plurality, the deepening via facti of the link with other human beings. In 
particular, it represents the choice of reducing the necessity of death, pain, and 
mistake through free and open acts of freedom and plurality. An open nonviolent 
religion is therefore the purest moment of self-restraint, of ethical act and open 
project.  
A religion interpreted in such a way would represent a valid practical answer to 
the role of religions in a post-secular society. Indeed, religion would heal the 
wounds created by the process of secularisation, which separated religion from 
the rest of society. The three levels of division described by Ferrara, the political, 
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social and personal, can be now healed via facti. At the personal level an open 
religion does not aim to put an end to the ‘human flourishing’ described by Taylor. 
The religious act does not clash with the immanent frame because it manifests 
itself as an integration, a new and unexpected opportunity. It is an excellent action 
limiting aggressive tendencies as well as moving beyond the necessity of acting 
like a ‘bag of sensations’. Thus, a nonviolent religion would integrate the myth of 
human flourishing. In particular, the prophet of an open religion can provide 
humanity with a further opportunity, with an important assistance to the secular 
framework. The ‘human flourishing’ is destined to clash against pain, mistakes, 
and even death. The religious can intervene at this point, showing that life cannot 
be reduced only to despair; that there is opportunity to integrate this harsh reality 
with an act of value, in which we perceive a profound connection with the others. 
This opportunity does not constrain itself to these extreme moments. These 
moments may represent the beginning, the bases on which to continue 
strengthening human relations, creating another reality, which grows out of the 
infinite interdependence between everybody.  
Thus, the dilemma is no more to convert and judge who is entitled to join the 
group of the good and who is not; the issue is to enhance personal responsibility, 
along with opportunities for everybody to act for values. In acting for the 
production of values, people feel that they are not alone; they are doing 
something with the rest of humanity, they are participating in something bigger, 
enhancing a new reality, with an enormous difference in quality compared to the 
past.  
The choice of enhancing actions and personal responsibility constitutes an 
important change of focus of religious institutions. It means leaving aside the past 
focus on dogmas, along with the obsession in predicting how things will be. This 
is not what religion can offer to a post-secular society. Instead, the opportunity 
provided by religion is practical. It consists in enhancing personal responsibility, 
which means the skills for acting under personal persuasion, as well as being 
morally accountable to the rest of the society and beyond. This is translated in 
actions which do not depend on beliefs and convictions of the receiver. It is true 
that everyone shares the same human limitations; some are even hit harder by 
life, physically or psychologically. Nevertheless, a nonviolent religion shows that 
everybody can share a key opportunity in any action: transcending human limits 
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by participating in the construction of values. The cruelty of the material life can 
be overcome by an act of love and openness, creating here and now a new reality 
that transcends nature and materialism.  
Turning to the social level, religion offers ethical acts of openness to plurality. It 
has already been described that an open and nonviolent religion can neither 
survive nor make sense at the margins of society, due to its inescapably social 
character. This means that religion lies in acts of forgiveness, reconciliation, and 
avoidance of humiliation. These risky and courageous actions are destined to 
buck the trend of closing down into small groups and sects, without generating 
further violent clashes with other groups. This means not being limited to 
ceremonies and rituals, but promoting federal structures, change from vertical 
diktats to further occasions for discussions, and the promotion of models that 
make peace heroic. Instead of being a divisive force, religion becomes a true 
force of debate and cohesion.  
Finally, at the political level religion turns upside down the spread conviction to 
be only a threat for the international order, because it has nothing to do with 
privileges, the creation of religious states, or the imposition of its own truth to 
everybody. Instead, religion embraces fully the chance of a ‘diverse citizenship’, 
becoming the Avant-guard of freedom and plurality. Thus, there will be no interest 
in both trying to gain privileges in democratic institutions, and using the coercive 
power of the state to implement their beliefs; this is not the right path for change. 
Nonviolence agrees with the idea of Stepan that “religious institutions should not 
have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them to mandate public 
policy to democratic elected governments” (Stepan, 2000:39).  
At the same time, the nonviolent praxis goes further than mere “twin tolerations”, 
both of freedom for democratically elected governments and freedom for religious 
organizations in civil and political society (Stepan, 2000:40). The reason is not 
only that an open and nonviolent religion does not look at creating a state, 
perhaps a religious state (Juergensmeyer, 1995). It does not surrender to 
nationalisms, even when life is at stake, and at the same time avoids the flaws of 
a dry and juridical cosmopolitanisms, as there is no need of waiting for a world 
government or police. The choice by religions of the praxis of nonviolence would 
make of it no longer a problem for politics, but a needed opportunity and a 
stimulus. Capitini reminded us that the new practices and the new commitment 
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makes real here and now a different cosmopolitan reality, in which everybody, 
even the excluded, take part (Degli Oddi, 2012:125-6). The aim is not to impose 
on others rules and visions of life or death. The aim is the “spiritualization of 
politics” (Jahanbegloo, 2014:180); to propose a new attitude stimulating a lively 
production of values. This does not mean imposing laws in line with some specific 
religious belief. On the contrary, it means expressing the tension towards values 
and openness day by day, shaking the society when politics is driven by a 
particular set of interests, or when it becomes mere dry administration. Religious 
organisation are already doing important effort in peacebuilding and 
peacekeeping (Alger, 2002, Hermkens, 2007). Nevertheless, religion can 
contribute even more towards openness and liberation towards a new ‘order with 
life’. It can provide examples who are willing to sacrifice their lives proposing a 
different society. It can provide examples who are able to make peace something 
heroic. This role may be implemented both domestically and in the world, for 
instance providing a crucial help in the development of armies of peace, such as 
the International Peace Brigades (Checa Hidalgo, 2008). 
Pushing the argument a bit further, this new practical citizenship paves the way 
for the de facto disempowerment of the Wesphalian presumption, which assumes 
that religion should be kept in the private sphere as it would represent a threat to 
international order. At the same time, it provides the basis for another belief, 
called here the Assisi Presumption. This presumption claims that an open 
nonviolent religion is able to offer key help to the flourishing of an open society 
and democracy. A nonviolent religion is the best set of thoughts and actions able 
to create a new reality, which includes everybody. The contribution of a nonviolent 
religion is important to avoid perpetration of violence by authoritarian regimes. At 
the same time, religions would not constitute an element of division in society. 
They are able to work fully to keep values and morality central to society, offering 
the needed tension towards values in an always more global and inclusive 
society. In other words, the clash of civilization is replaced by a religious 
collaboration in the construction of a new reality.  
Assisi is the perfect symbolic place for this presumption. It has been chosen not 
only because it is central to Umbria and is extremely beautiful; Assisi represented 
the perfect symbol of an ‘open religion’ for Capitini (Capitini, 1962a:16), because 
it is the place where the most important Western nonviolent iconic figure, St. 
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Francis, was born. It is a symbol for the celebration of what Capitini called 
familiarity, which means proximity and openness (Capitini, 1962a:16). Moreover, 
we can say that Assisi still represents a different way of living religiously, based 
on humility and ecumenism, free from extremisms, such as a Manichaean 
dualism or an exacerbated asceticism, and close to everybody, not only the elites.  
To conclude, the interpretation of nonviolence as praxis reinterprets religion as a 
set of thoughts and action, as the ‘religious act’. This opens up an interesting path 
for healing the wounds of the process of secularisation, casting religion at the 
centre of society and politics. The Assisi Presumption would represent the definite 
overcome of the myth of religious violence, along with its most well-known 
products, secularisation and the Westphalian Presumption.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter had the ambitious aim of reconstructing nonviolence, overcoming 
the division between means and ends, politics and morality, and religion and 
politics. Healing these wounds will give new strength to nonviolence, in order to 
avoid worrying uses of the term, reunite the field, and face a changed historical 
environment.  
The first section overcame the distinction between behaviour and ideal, 
reconciling the tension between means and ends. We reinterpreted nonviolence 
as impure praxis, a non-systematic revolutionary approach, which represents an 
everyday work, with different techniques and ideas, of reinterpretation and 
shaping of reality, to enhance freedom and plurality. This praxis is impure, as it 
takes less than optimal forms due to the hard environment, but it always look at 
freedom and plurality.  
This approach helped us in reconceiving principled and pragmatic nonviolence 
as inseparable and complementary parts of a unique work of change. Principled 
nonviolence has been reinterpreted as an intentional bottom-up actualisation of 
a public principle to reinterpret and shape reality. This ‘excellent action’ implies 
the ascetic act or self-restraint, meaning both control over personal 
aggressiveness and refusal to act without conviction, persuasion, and value; the 
risky ethical act of openness with motherly love to the others, looking at new 
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possibilities for forgiveness, reconciliation, and avoidance of humiliation; the 
chance of a ‘religious act’, which is the realisation of a link with everybody. 
Instead, pragmatic nonviolence is centred on practice. It is a phronesis, an art of 
judgment drawn from the continuous reinterpretation and creation of human 
practices. This phronesis revolves around some key features: a careful analysis 
of the status quo, the enhancement of personal responsibility, the power of all, 
and the construction of open and inclusive projects. Thus pragmatic and 
principled nonviolence work together towards a different reality, the reality of all. 
Section two focused on the division between politics and morality. Nonviolence 
represents a practical way in-between realism and moralism. It is an approach 
grounded in reality but open to novelty and virtue, able to reinterpret any practice 
as a possibility for change, to redraw the boundaries of politics, and to shape a 
‘diverse citizenship’ which fosters trust and social capital. This innovative 
approach is able to reunite ‘order with life’, helping the current crisis of 
democracy. It provides practical ways to enhance personal responsibility against 
the apathy of the citizens; it enhances the power of all in many forms, ranging 
from movements to new kinds of political parties; it gives people more 
opportunities to participate against the dominion of powerful minorities. The result 
is not the establishment of a precise architecture of the state. Instead it is the 
growth of ‘order with life’.  
In section three we turned to religion. Nonviolence interprets religion as ‘religious 
act’, as the deepening via facti of the link with the others. This approach may be 
the basis for a new post-secular society, in which religion integrates the 
‘immanent frame’ with self-restraint and personal responsibility; goes back at the 
centre of society with ethical acts of openness to plurality; and pushes for the 
‘spiritualisation of politics’ abstaining from coercion and imposition of laws. This 
will pave the way for the practical construction of the Assisi Presumption, by 
which we mean the idea that an open religion is key for the flourishing of an open 
society and better democracy.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis started with the conviction that nonviolence is at the beginning of a 
new fight for its existence. The history of the term started with the innovative 
interpretation of the concept of ahimsa by Gandhi, with its meaning emerging 
from the struggles against colonisation, especially in India. The Mahatma offered 
to the West a concept, a theory, an efficacious technique, and a whole 
vocabulary, with words such as Satyagraha, swaraj, sarvodaya, and constructive 
programme. In the beginning, the West tried to resist this innovation, reducing the 
concept of nonviolence to more common terms such as civil resistance, passive 
resistance, and non-resistance. Nevertheless, the first battle was won. 
Nonviolence began to be used, especially by activists and pacifists, but it faced 
another challenge. While it was perhaps a useful tool for protesting under 
democratic regimes, nonviolence was ignored by academia and it was criticised 
for being useless against dictators and extreme conflicts, such as in WWII and 
the following Cold War. Nevertheless, the key contributions of scholars such as 
Galtung, and especially Sharp, proved the contrary. Nonviolence was there 
during these extreme conflicts, and it was a valid alternative against dictatorship 
and international crises. This paved the way for the introduction of nonviolence 
as a sub-field of many different areas, such as security studies, peace studies, 
and social movement studies.  
The relative success of nonviolence came with a cost: the division of nonviolence 
into two. On the one hand, is a principle; on the other hand, are the techniques 
of action. At first, this resulted in a strength, but it has now become a problem. In 
particular, we highlighted that the rise of troubling uses of the term urges the 
creation of a unified and pluralist concept, able to face the changing historical 
environment, with the crisis of democracy and the emergence of a post-secular 
society. For these reasons, we highlighted the necessity to reflect again upon the 
meaning of nonviolence.  
This thesis addressed these concerns ‘reconstructing nonviolence’. In other 
words, we believe that only a different unifying definition of the term will represent 
a decisive contribution to solve all these issues. This new definition should help 
to heal the division between the principled and pragmatic dimensions, avoiding 
worrying uses of the term, reuniting the field, and being fit for democracy and 
post-secularism. We believe that our conception of nonviolence as an impure 
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praxis is able to contribute to this debate. Nonviolence emerged here as a praxis, 
a rising political ideology, a continuous effort to reinterpret and shape reality in 
order to always find new occasions for freedom, or liberation from the cruelty of 
existence, as well as plurality, or openness to the other. This conception redefines 
and keeps together two complementary dimensions, principled and pragmatic 
reconstructed. The principled dimension is reinterpreted as the actualisation of a 
public principle, which gives rise to new practices; the pragmatic dimension is 
practical wisdom drawn from the analysis of those new practices, and is a key to 
providing new stimuli for innovative choices.  
The journey to arrive here started in chapter one with an analysis of the success 
of the concept of nonviolence. Today, this concept is used in many different ways. 
Nonviolence is used to describe ways of overthrowing dictators; defending a 
country against invasions or internal coup d’états; protesting effectively against a 
government; regulating society; implementing a kind of everyday revolution, and 
is linked with pacifism and religious ideals. Among the many reasons for the 
growing use of the term, a key role has been played by the acceptance of a 
definition of nonviolence as either a principle or a set of methods of action. The 
tension between these two perspectives can be traced back to the introduction of 
the term non-violence in the West during the 1920s and 1930s. We described the 
opposition between those who interpreted non-violence as a substitute for war or 
for violent protests, such as Shridharani and Gregg, and those who interpreted it 
as a pacifist or a religious principle at the basis of a radical personal, social and 
religious revolution. This division continued to be recognised by the vast majority 
of those who wrote on nonviolence. However, it is thanks to Gene Sharp that the 
distinction between principles and techniques of action became more polarised, 
and it has been crystallised in the categories of principled and pragmatic 
nonviolence.  
Some of the key reasons for the success of this division are the following: For a 
start, nonviolence was easier to describe, operationalise, and to associate with 
people and events. On the praxeological level, more and more groups could 
adopt the term, either averting discussions about values or about effectiveness, 
and it rejected the conviction that nonviolence was effective only with democratic 
regimes. Finally, at the religious level, the Western process of secularisation 
required to find a secularized notion in order to be accepted and taken seriously.  
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The result is that nowadays the two categories of principled and pragmatic 
nonviolence dominate, and represent two very different approaches. Pragmatic 
nonviolence is an approach interested in developing new and more efficient 
techniques by which citizens can gain social and political power. This means to 
foster the ‘people power’, which is the power of the people to dissent. To the 
contrary, principled nonviolence is an approach focused on describing and 
implementing the principle of nonviolence. This approach is based on person 
power, meaning the power of each individual to change reality, and it is typically 
associated with pacifism and religion. The result is that in contemporary debates 
nonviolence is split into two.  
If this split benefited nonviolence by allowing it to be part of many different fields, 
it also carried with it some important costs. We now find ourselves with new 
worrying uses of the term and a regressive and divided field of research, unable 
to face the crisis of democracy and contribute to a post-secular society. In order 
to move on, we focused on three wounds to heal in chapter two. For a start, 
section one showed that there are important issues at the descriptive level, where 
we find a divided concept. Indeed, principled and pragmatic nonviolence have in 
common the rejection of cowardice, or inaction. Nevertheless, they reduce action 
either to behaviours or to the rigid implementation of an ideal with certain 
practices. This leads to a dangerous division between the means and the ends. 
While pragmatic nonviolence overlooked the importance of circumstances and 
ends, unconsciously paving the way to terms such as ‘nonviolent extremisms’ 
and others, principled nonviolence focused excessively on the ends and abstract 
speculations, sacrificing an honest evaluation of the means, and leading to 
ineffectiveness and the accusation of conservatism.  
A second problem, outlined in section two, related to the regressive character of 
nonviolence at the praxeological level. Due to many different factors, both 
streams of nonviolence focused mainly on disruption, leaving aside a serious 
reflection on order and construction. In particular, further analysis is needed of 
which type of democracy to construct. The democratic model is in a period of 
crisis, due to the passivity of citizens, dominion of small minorities, and 
inefficiency of political parties. In such a difficult time, nonviolence tends to be a 
further problem for democracy as it risks falling into realpolitik or moralism. In 
other words, it risks falling into stubborn persistence in implementing a project 
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considered valid by someone in advance. Satyagraha, in contrast, is the research 
of including everybody in an open project.  
Finally, section three outlined the last key problem: the exclusion of religion and 
‘belief systems’. The category of principled nonviolence followed the process of 
secularisation of the West. Nowadays, times have changed. Religion did not 
disappear, and the debate has turned to focus on its role in a post-secular society. 
For this reason, an alternative definition of nonviolence should re-include religion, 
in order to suggest to the former a way to become central in a post-secular 
society.  
To provide an answer to these problems, we turned in chapter three to Aldo 
Capitini under the conviction that his thoughts may offer a precious contribution 
to the field. Section one showed that the Italian philosopher interpreted 
nonviolence as a tension, a praxis of liberation from the chain of cruelty and 
openness to the other. This praxis has a strong constructive drive, which looks at 
building up via facti the reality of all. This concept does not distinguish clearly 
between pragmatic and principled; they are integral to nonviolence. 
Nevertheless, we tried to find a pragmatic and a principled dimension. For what 
concerns the former, we showed in section two that nonviolence cannot be 
reduced to techniques of action. Instead, it is a method, a logic, a style, a way of 
doing. This kind of wisdom includes techniques but those are not simply 
implemented. They become nonviolence when reinterpreted and shaped by such 
logic. Instead, the principled dimension of nonviolence emerged in section three 
as a craft, an act, and a meticulous work of integration of reality. The starting 
point is the acknowledgment of human limits, and the choice to act to deepen this 
link with the other, trying to collectively face the burden. This leads to the  refusal 
to believe in death as the end of everything, and in the laws of nature as 
something necessary. The consequence is that principled nonviolence is a 
process of integration of reality divided by Capitini in three acts: ascetic (retreat 
to free the subject from the dominion of necessity), ethical (the openness to the 
other), and religious (the unity with everybody in a virtuous action). These acts 
are not movements of the body, but moments of the process of integration into a 
new reality. The aim, the connection with everybody in a virtuous action, is 
described with the concept of compresence, which is the moment of maximum 
practical liberation from the chains of reality and openness to the existent. 
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Chapter four explored in depth the consequences of the concept of nonviolence 
proposed by Capitini. In particular, it provides an answer via examples to the 
issues raised in chapter two. For what concerns the problems described at the 
descriptive level, we analysed the first Italian peace march in 1961. This example 
showed that nonviolent action cannot be reduced to a simple implementation of 
a technique, a means, or a normal example of contentious politics. A nonviolent 
action is instead a protest-to-project, an event with a strong constructive drive 
and the attempt to create a different reality, not a simple way to put pressure on 
someone else to make him or her do something. Turning to the praxeological 
level, nonviolence emerges as a particular kind of realism. This approach does 
not fall into realpolitik or moralism, and it keeps a balance between ‘realism and 
serenity’ towards the construction of day-by-day via facti of omnicracy. This 
meant non-cooperation and the foundation of the liberalsocialist movement 
during fascism. After the war, Capitini’s transformative realism meant actions of 
integration of a far from perfect democracy. In particular, the Italian philosopher 
integrated the violent contentious repertoire and the myth of guerrilla warfare with 
the promotion of nonviolent techniques of action; the actual political parties with 
the COS (Centre for Social Orientation); the dominant majority rule and the 
institutions with the idea of the assembly. Finally, nonviolence introduced 
compresence to religion, reframing it as a mix of thoughts and actions aimed at 
preparing personal openness. This led to interpreting faith as a hope for change 
and personal persuasion, commands as free and non-binding occasions for 
reflection, authority as prophetic work of helping liberation and openness. This 
approach led to the creation of the Movement of Religion, the composition of the 
letters of Religion, as well as to many struggles for conscientious objection and 
non-domination of the church. It also led to the foundation of the COR (Centre for 
Religious Orientation), the link with innovative examples of education, as well as 
to new models of conduct and concepts of sanctity.  These activities were aimed 
at casting an open religion at the centre of society and as an important player in 
the renovation and health of politics. 
Drawing from the framework provided by Capitini, we offered a new interpretation 
of nonviolence that was able to overcome the divisions outlined in chapter two 
and provide new strength to the concept of nonviolence. In other words, our 
interpretation was aimed at reconstructing a united, progressive, and pluralistic 
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idea able to reconcile means and ends, politics and morality, and religion and 
politics, in an attempt to represent a valid answer against worrying uses of the 
term as well as a changed historical environment. Section one proposed to 
interpret nonviolence neither as a behaviour, nor as a rigid practice implementing 
an ideal, but as a non-systematic revolutionary approach, an ideology, an 
everyday work of reinterpretation and shaping of reality. In other words: a praxis. 
More precisely, we described it as an impure praxis, because many times it takes 
less than optimal forms due to human limits and the hard environment in which it 
is mired, in order to foster freedom, or liberation, and plurality, or openness.  
This approach allowed us to re-describe the two dimensions of nonviolence, the 
principled and the pragmatic, reconciling means and ends. Principled 
nonviolence has been reinterpreted as an intentional bottom-up actualisation of 
a public principle. This excellent action implies fostering freedom with the ascetic 
act, or self-restraints; plurality with the ethical act or openness to the other; and 
an open and inclusive project with an excellent action, or the religious act, through 
which we become part of a big community with past and future generations.  
Instead, the pragmatic dimension is a practical wisdom, an art of judgment drawn 
from the continuous analysis, reinterpretation and creation of human practices 
fostering freedom and plurality. This phronesis revolves around several key 
features: a realistic analysis of the situation; the research of freedom in the 
enhancement of personal responsibility; the craving for plurality with the focus on 
the power of all; and the construction of an open and inclusive project. From this 
reinterpretation of principled and pragmatic nonviolence it is clear that behaviour 
and principle, as well as means and ends, are no longer divided.  
Section two focused on the praxeological level, on reconciling politics and 
morality, due to the risk of falling into the regressive path of focusing only on mere 
destruction and duragraha (realpolitik and moralism). Nonviolence emerged as a 
transformative kind of realism, a crossroads in-between realism and moralism. 
This approach interprets and shapes any practice as an opportunity for change. 
This leads to a continuous redrawing of the boundaries of politics, fostering trust 
and social capital through a ‘diverse citizenship’. This approach looks at the 
current crisis of democracy as ‘order without life’. Instead of proposing alternative 
abstract models, nonviolence works by reinterpreting and shaping the current 
reality. This means offering excellent actions and phronesis, an ‘art of judgment’. 
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This means actions of self-restraint and the creation of practical ways to enhance 
personal responsibility against the apathy of citizens; ethical acts of openness to 
the others and enhancement of the power of all through new movements and 
political parties; and excellent actions and new and more opportunities to take 
part in social and political life against the dominion of powerful minorities. In a few 
words, the phronesis developed by nonviolence looks at integrating ‘order with 
life’.  
Section three turned to the role of religion. Nonviolence proposes to think of it as 
a ‘religious act’, a thought and action of deepening via facti the link with 
everybody. This approach casts religion at the centre of a post-secular society, 
as it consists in a work of integration of the ‘immanent frame’ with actions of self-
restraint; of society with ethical acts of openness; of politics with excellent actions 
aiming at its ‘spiritualisation’ without imposing law or using coercion. This path 
leads to the construction of what we called the ‘Assisi Presumption’, by which me 
meant the conviction that an open religion is the key for a post-secular society 
and allows a better democracy to flourish.  
At this point, some doubts may emerge. Our understanding of nonviolence is 
quite different from the dominant one, and a change is always risky. Thus, are we 
sure that this reading is a step forward and not a step backwards? In other words, 
are we sure that our interpretation is able to keep the advantages at the basis of 
the success of Sharp’s distinction, as well as answer the problems outlined in 
chapter two at the descriptive, praxeological, and religious levels? At first glance, 
the interpretation offered here may appear to be a step backwards from Sharp’s 
conception. At the descriptive level, our interpretation may jeopardise the 
‘conceptual order’ reached with great fatigue by Sharp. Praxis is certainly not an 
exotic word or theory, but it is definitely more difficult to describe and study than 
a set of techniques or even a religious principle. It is much easier to focus only 
on details of a technique of action than to what an ‘excellent action’ means in 
particular circumstances, or to talk about an ‘art of judgment’. Our interpretation 
requires further scrutiny before judging whether an event or behaviour may be 
catalogued as nonviolence in a certain situation. It will become harder to describe 
nonviolence if we do not divide between the ‘political struggle method’ and the 
‘socio-economic programme’. At the same time, it is much easier to describe in 
general terms what the principle of nonviolence commands, perhaps shaping this 
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definition on the basis of a prophet’s words or deeds, and put it in the list of 
principles prescribed by a certain creed. It is harder to acknowledge personal 
responsibility to live contradictions and to create bottom-up new interpretations 
of a public principle.  
Turning to the praxeological level, some may worry that the quickened pace in 
the adoption of the term nonviolence risks being stopped, or worse, even 
reversed. Fewer groups will adopt this concept because something more than the 
implementation of a technique of action is needed and the nonviolent character 
of some past revolutions may be reconsidered. Some may even wonder whether 
it will jeopardise the success of the term in describing revolutions that are 
happening around the world. At the same time, our interpretation will certainly 
create further problems for the relationship between nonviolence and pacifism. 
No group may be considered nonviolent by default or command. Indeed, the 
‘impure’ and bottom-up character of our definition may clash with dogmatic and 
purist views; the concern with effectiveness would not be left aside anymore; the 
requirement of ‘openness’ or plurality may not be compatible with extreme 
choices of withdrawal from the world.   
Finally, the interpretation of nonviolence as an impure praxis towards freedom 
and plurality may represent a threat to the slow but important process of 
secularisation of the concept. We may be accused of dangerously reintroducing 
a religious flavour to nonviolence. This is a threat because nonviolence may be 
excluded again from politics due to the Westphalian presumption. Indeed, the 
weapon of nonviolence in the hands of religious groups may lead to further 
disorder and increase clashes within society. At the same time, the reunification 
of the concept threatens religions as well. The social character of an open religion 
and the effort towards plurality may endanger the purity of some groups. 
Moreover, the focus on dogmas is threatened in favour of scientific and historical 
knowledge.  
These concerns are understandable. The reasons at the basis for the success of 
nonviolence should be defended. Nevertheless, we strongly believe that our 
interpretation appreciates the advantages drawn from the division in two, and at 
the same time it allows us take a step further. Indeed, nonviolence as an impure 
praxis may represent an important step forward at the descriptive level. Our 
interpretation may represent a useful integration to Sharp’s ‘conceptual order’, 
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without falling into a rigid ‘ethical theory’. Scholarship may still analyse behaviours 
and values, but with the assumption that they are focusing on the symptoms. 
Moreover, the fact that it is harder to describe and find examples of a praxis than 
a behaviour or a generally described principle may represent an opportunity. It 
may trigger reflections on whether what happens in a circumstance is really 
nonviolence, which is a praxis with a clear and different constructive drive, or if it 
is merely a refinement of the traditional way to wage war, coerce, and impose 
one’s will. This is extremely important under both dictatorships and democratic 
regimes. For what concerns the former, it put emphasis on determining which 
society will come out of a nonviolent revolution. Turning to the latter, it is important 
in order to stay focused in front of extremist groups, who do not use physical 
violence but still support closure and separation.  
At the same time, a new definition of nonviolence will replace sterile debates on 
whether a person or an event is part of a principled or pragmatic domain. Instead, 
the focus will be on analysing actions. In particular, at the centre of people’s 
concern will be the notion of whether an action is or is not a protest-to-project: 
does it represent a rejection of cowardice? Is it an attempt to open up to the others 
and exploit an opportunity for a bottom-up creation of a public principle? At the 
same time, the analysis of an action may refine the present level of practical 
wisdom embedded in the concept of nonviolence. In other words, is it always 
positive to enhance personal responsibility, and how does one execute it in a 
proper way? Is the power of all enhanced by this or that action in that particular 
circumstance? Is this particular action promoting an inclusive open project, or it 
is imposing the will of a group in spite of the others?  
The focus on action may represent a real bridge to reintroduce principles, which 
are at the basis of religious and system beliefs, helping to avoid to say again that 
nonviolence is passé. It is true that our focus on the bottom-up actualisation of a 
public principle clashes with mere obedience to a command or a prescription of 
a certain creed. Nevertheless, this may be an opportunity for the development of 
religions. It may trigger further internal religious disputes on what it means to 
consider a prophet or a book an example of nonviolence. In particular, the focus 
on action is an opportunity to overcome the obsession with dogmas, and the 
confusion between nonviolence and creeds. 
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At the praxeological level, we believe that the growing use of the term will not be 
halted, but increased and qualitatively improved. Our interpretation does not 
represent a step back to a situation in which only pacifists and religious groups 
will be included. Nonviolence as an impure praxis does not focus on dogmas or 
utopias; it demands much more. Indeed, religious groups and pacifists are 
required to not withdraw from society because of disillusion. There is no place for 
‘two cities’. They are nonviolent only when they act at the centre of society. In 
addition, nonviolence as a praxis helps not to confuse openness to the other with 
mere research of new adepts. Nonviolence is something different, being an action 
of love, of openness to the other, of helping the other to realise him or herself, 
which has nothing to do with imposing a creed.  
Turning to groups who adopted a more pragmatic kind of nonviolence, our 
interpretation may represent the occasion for further reflections. In particular, it 
will introduce some concerns with means, and in doing so clearly show that 
nonviolence is incompatible and cannot be used as a shield to protect extremist 
(and very violent) groups. At the same time, our interpretation of nonviolence 
includes the many revolutions which are called ‘nonviolent’ around the world, 
even though it does not stop there.  
Finally, nonviolence as a praxis of freedom and plurality represents an important 
opportunity at the religious level. As we have seen, this conception is not a threat 
to the process of secularisation. To the contrary, secularisation is at its basis, 
especially because it highlighted the aspects of religions which have not been 
incorporated into nonviolence: dogmas, commands, hierarchies, sectarianism. 
For this reason we did not limit the problem to ethics, instead we talked 
throughout the thesis about religion. Our definition of nonviolence does not only 
represent the return of ethics at the centre: we are proposing a real post-secular 
concept. Religion is reintroduced at the centre of nonviolence and society. This 
conception offers religion to represent its highest and extreme moment as 
excellent action of freedom and plurality. However, this implies a radical change 
of the concept of religion itself. Indeed, nonviolence is compatible only with an 
‘open religion’. From this perspective, religion is thought and action of liberation 
and openness to the existent. In other words, religion is at the centre of our 
concept of nonviolence as excellent action showing extreme freedom and 
plurality, as the highest risk due to the highest hope. Thus, their creed is not the 
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main issue here. What matters is a certain kind of action, even though it means 
helping people with different views to do what authorities would forbid.  
For all of these reasons, we believe that our interpretation of nonviolence as an 
impure praxis does not represent a step back, as it keeps the advantages already 
achieved by Sharp’s division. Nonviolence as an impure praxis of freedom and 
plurality may qualitatively improve the current way in which nonviolence is 
described and found; it may improve the current use of the term in political, 
pacifist, and religious groups; and it may represent a real post-secular concept. 
However, our conception of nonviolence is not satisfied with this alone. Indeed, 
nonviolence as praxis is a conception able to represent the needed unifying and 
pluralistic understanding able to avoid the worrying uses of the term and face the 
challenge of a changed historical environment.  
For a start, we believe that our interpretation represents a unifying and pluralistic 
framework. Our definition is compatible with the primary different uses of 
nonviolence outlined in chapter two. Nonviolence as an impure praxis is a valid 
definition which includes methods for protesting as well as ways of governing, 
actions of overthrowing dictators as well as following Christ. This means that our 
definition may represent a useful platform for scholars’ exchange, without being 
a single binding method of studying nonviolence. Moreover, it also means that 
the complexity of Gandhian nonviolence is rescued. This does not mean that we 
rigidly adhered to the Gandhian doctrine. We already acknowledged its 
complexity and vagueness. However, we maintained knowledge of the self and 
openness to the other, self-rule and the welfare of all; now principled and 
pragmatic nonviolence are strongly reunited under the focus on actions of 
freedom and plurality. Consequently, this interpretation may result more 
progressive because the internal tensions to nonviolence are kept without 
breaking up the concept in smaller ones, fostering new understandings and 
research. In this way, activists and scholars may still acknowledge that they are 
part of the same, open-ended project. 
At the same time, our conception is also pluralistic. This means that we aim to 
foster a plural conception of the good which requires free exercise of reason, 
excluding any dependence upon commands and diktats. At the same time, we 
avoid the risk of ignoring, or worse repressing, values and belief systems looking 
at nonviolence only from a strong scientific, value-free, and purely behavioural 
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approach. Nonviolence cannot exist but in actions, which include both behaviours 
and values.  
Does it mean that our interpretation is incompatible with the important effort of 
the pragmatic school? Absolutely not. The conception of nonviolence as a praxis 
requires the effort of gathering and creating more efficient techniques of collective 
actions short of violence. This is one of the most interesting challenges to other 
ideologies. However, it reminds us that nonviolence is something more than that. 
It is an approach looking for freedom and plurality that actively chooses, 
reinterprets, and shapes techniques. 
Is the reintroduction of values, and even religion, at the centre of nonviolence, 
going to spark more debates and contestations? Yes. The reintroduction of 
values once again makes nonviolence a full political ideology, which is indeed 
thought-provoking and contestable. This may mean a very different future for the 
category of principled nonviolence: from being the container of leftovers, it may 
become the most advanced and extreme field of research of nonviolence. The 
silence of these years prompted the urgent need for new reflections on the 
relationship between nonviolence and values. 
What are the results of this new interpretation of nonviolence? We outlined here 
a notion of nonviolence which is much more complex than a simple lack of 
physical violence. Thus, it is incompatible with the current ‘non-violent forms of 
right wing extremisms’, as well as with the concepts of ‘nonviolent extremism’, 
‘nonviolent offender’, and ‘nonviolent crime’. To better describe these concepts, 
it would have been much better perhaps to have used terms such as ‘no violent’, 
‘not violent’ or ‘non-physically violent’. Most definitely, this should be the subject 
of further research. At the same time, the praxis of freedom and plurality is far 
from being something fashionable, which can be passé. It is an urgent necessity 
for the upcoming years, and the fact that important political actors, such as Blair, 
have pondered this idea, reveal how much the literature on the topic must 
improve and spread.  
Finally, our interpretation deals with both the crisis of democracy and the 
resurgence of religion. The way we handled these problems may appear a bit 
vague, and perhaps insufficient. It was not the aim of this thesis to offer a 
thorough solution to such enormous contemporary issues. Nevertheless, we 
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proposed an approach, a point of view on where the issue stands and how to 
react. Further research may highlight consequences, challenges and further 
opportunities for this approach.  
Before ending this thesis, it is worth reflecting on the possible consequences of 
our effort. Indeed, this thesis did not intend to put an end to the study of 
nonviolence. To the contrary, it hoped to reinvigorate the theoretical debate on 
the topic. For a start, we hoped to have clarified the fact that a new theoretical 
reflection on the meaning of nonviolence is urgent and beneficial. Indeed, there 
are still too few books and articles focusing on theoretical challenges and 
possibilities of the concept of nonviolence. This effort should not undermine the 
(legitimate) more practical focus of the current scholarship. To the contrary, more 
theoretical work will surely reinvigorate the latter, which may become aware of 
new and unexpected meanings of what they are actually doing.  
In order to do so, this thesis highlights the fact that a concept split in two 
autonomous categories is a threat to the united complexity of the nonviolent 
project. For this reason, the aim of this research was to unify and not to further 
divide. The idea of nonviolence as praxis may represent this bridge. It may 
represent a ‘temporal’ bridge, linking old and new nonviolent movements and 
actors, as well as a ‘spatial’ bridge, linking departments, centres for the study of 
principled or pragmatic nonviolence, and people from different faiths and parts of 
the world. The concept of praxis may even be the bridge between the continental 
and the analytical tradition, as recently claimed by Floyd (Floyd, 2015). It is a 
concept which had fortune on both sides of the Atlantic, and in different schools 
of thought. Thus, we claim that it may represent an interesting platform from 
which to start.  
Further research is needed to analyse the relation between nonviolent praxis and 
other political ideologies, such as conservative, socialism, or green thought. 
Nonviolence is certainly an open ideology, which may easily be mixed and even 
included in others. Nevertheless, the integration of nonviolence may have 
important indirect consequences. The morphology offered by nonviolence may 
create frictions and clashes within the different ideologies. Moreover, the stress 
on open and inclusive projects will certainly create uneasiness, and it may be 
considered an incentive to betray.   
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The ‘reconstruction’ of the concept of nonviolence proposed here may have 
consequences on the way nonviolence is taught and trainings are organised. 
Nonviolence can be less easily taught: the problem is no more to use effectively 
a set of techniques. It will be interesting to look at whether existing trainings on 
nonviolent action are compatible with such a view, and whether the concept 
presented here may contribute in developing alternatives. We acknowledge that 
the idea of praxis as a dynamic relation between excellent actions and phronesis 
may give more importance to storytelling, examples, and testimonies, even 
though this does not mean underplaying important statistical works, such as 
Chenoweth’s, which undermine with rigour existent beliefs. Moreover, time has 
come perhaps to start thinking of trainings (or at least workshops) on nonviolent 
politics (on how to imagine a nonviolent politician) or even business (both as a 
different reflection on businessmen, shareholders or consumer). 
What about our reinterpretation of principled and pragmatic nonviolence? We 
hope to have tabled a challenging description of both of these streams. An action-
centred version of principled nonviolence may prompt further debates on what it 
means for a religious group to embrace nonviolence. For instance, this 
interpretation may represent a further element of reconciliation in the Catholic 
world between the more conservative strands and the liberation theology. The 
link between nonviolence and liberation theology is strangely absent or 
understated by handbooks and introductions to nonviolence. Nevertheless, our 
conception may help the scholarship on liberation theology abandon (even more 
than what they already did) divisive aspects of Marxist vocabulary and means of 
analysis. In particular, it may help tie together the term plurality (or openness) 
with that of liberation, finding new grounds for overcoming divisions without 
surrendering the precious social role played in South America. This may enlarge 
the struggle beyond the exact interpretation of the Gospel, as well as beyond the 
poor and socialism. At the same time, more effort will be required by the church 
to act instead of focusing on dogmas.  
Turning to our interpretation of pragmatic nonviolence, the focus on phronesis 
and art of judgment may open up new opportunities for research. It links protest 
and government with the centrality of construction and bottom-up value 
formation. In this effort, the existent stress on statistical analyses, like Stephan 
and Chenoweth, represents a valuable attempt to criticise existent practices, 
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showing persuasively that a different action is possible (and perhaps desirable). 
These kinds of works are valuable ways to foster a different phronesis, a new art 
of judgment. However, they should not lead us to think that an event or a person 
should be judged solely on the basis of the techniques of action used. Moreover, 
the focus on ‘regularities’ should not lead us to give less attention to ‘exceptions’, 
to new and sometimes apparently utopian excellent actions.  
Then, this thesis hoped to bolster interest towards Aldo Capitini. We believe that 
the introduction of his thought into the English language should not be postponed. 
The time has come to produce an introduction to the thoughts and deeds of the 
Italian philosopher. It is not enough to translate an Italian monograph in English, 
because the audience, the writing style, and the ‘sensibilities’ are different. More 
works on Capitini will inevitably trigger a larger interest on the actual impact of 
this philosopher and of nonviolence in the Italian and European debates. This is 
something that has not even been accomplished in Italian. Moreover, the rich 
reflections of the Italian philosopher may support contemporary and future 
debates about nonviolence.  
Finally, going back to the introduction of this thesis, another possible topic of 
research may be to look at the opposite of nonviolence as praxis of freedom and 
plurality. This thesis began by discussing opposites, but it did not delve into that 
supposition of what would be the opposite concept of nonviolence. We sketched 
here a positive conception of nonviolence, which may take different opposites 
depending on the field, time, and circumstances. This may certainly be a topic for 
further research.  
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